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CHAPTER I 
INTRODUCTION 
Anyhow the true judgment about me lies, 
not with clubs or with coteries, but in my own acts. 
Letters and Diaries 
~What, Then, Does Dr. Newman Mean?"I 
Mr. Kingsley's pamphlet comes to mind as we seek today the meaning of 
Newman's oft quoted after-dinner toast to conscience. 
Certainly, ifl am obliged to bring religion into after-dinnertoasts, (which 
indeed does not seem quite the thing) I shall drink - to the Pope. if you 
please, - still, to Conscience first, and to the Pope afterwards.2 
The Apologia itself offers us the key Newman bimself wished to give to whaI he 
·'means." Rather than go by books, we ought go by persons.; In our search for Newman's 
thought on conscience vis-a.-vis the religious authorities of his beliefs, we pursue that "living 
intelligence by which I [Newman] write, argue, and act.-..4 
I Apo. PreQce. (L
 
2 "Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk" in Diff. ii. 261.
 
1 LD xxii. 158.
 
• Apo. Ibid. 
In fact, Newman considered the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk. wherein the toast is 
contained, his "last publication."s We may rightly apply his own historical and 
theoretical method in the Apologia and An Essay on the Development ofChristian 
Doctrme to Newman's thought on conscience as he lived it throughout his life, and to 
which he gave long meditation as related in the Letter. 
Our method shall be interdisciplinary. based on the philosophy of religion in the 
Grammar ofAssent. but open to the historical method ofAn Essay on the Development of 
Christian Doctrine. the personal, concrete, touch of the Apologia, and the theological 
horizon of the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk. In fact. in the Grammar,· Newman sought to 
investigate "natural truths:' rather than revealed ones.n Here, likewise, we wish to deal 
with the natural truth ofconscience vis-a-vis authority as applicable to all humans 
independent, but not exclusive, of their religious beliefs. 
With Newman, we believe that this philosophical basis is the best. 
An evil time is upon us. 
Principles are being adopted as starting points. 
which contradict what we know to be axioms. 
It follows that the only controversy wrnch is likely to do good., 
is philosophical 7 
As to our hermeneutic principle, it shall be that established in the Essay: 
~ LD lCCY. 29 
6 GA93 
, LD lOCiv. 74. 
2 
ideas are in the writer and reader of the revelation. not the inspired text 
itself: and the question is whether those ideas which the letter conveys 
from writer to reader. reach the reader at once in their completeness and 
accuracy on his first perception of them, or whether they open out in his 
intellect and grow to perfection in the course oftime.8 
Hence, here, we wish to read Newman not only in the text of the Letter (0 the Duke 
ofNorfolk from where the toast to conscience comes, but rather in a more global view of 
how Newman himself, the writer of the toast, perfected his ideas ofconscience and 
religious authority over the course of his life. So, to a certain degree, we are paralleling 
his treatment ofdoctrine in the Church in An Essay on the Development ofChristian 
Doctrine by not only reading a teaching in a text, but also seeing the whole development 
ofan idea over time. In the Apologia. his aim was merely to "state the facts" rather than 
expound Catholic doctrine. 9 Likewise, in this essay, we do not wish to isolate the 
concrete, living, Newman, from his global horizon of truth, revelation, conscience and 
authority. 
Besides, following the distinction of the Grammar ofAssent we are concerned with 
that ""personal assent'" of conscience to religious authority, that is, the act of faith rather 
than the content of that faith. 10 So, the argument of religious authority is considered from 
the point of view of personal conscience. That is, we are concerned with how Newman 
viewed different aspects of religious authority during his life. 
• /Xv. 56. 
• Apo. Preface. 13.
 
10 GA 94
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So, as this essay advances, we seek to find in Newman a process of reasoning 
starting off from his own natural conscience as a child, moving on in his life to the 
acceptance or rejection ofcertain religious authorities with their teaching and commands. 
This latter principle, we wilI argue, implies a liberty of conscience vis-a-vis religious 
authority. Hence, we hope to show that Newman followed consistently a path 
such as to secure us against hopeless mistakes and emancipate us from the 
capricious ipse dixit of authority. I I 
Therefore, the thrust of this dissertation shall be to parallel the method of the 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua with an Apologia Pro Dictu Suo (an apology for his saying). We 
seek to analyze key periods of Newman's life in chronological order, combining writings 
and decisions, focusing our attention on his teaching and life which bear on conscience, 
and thus clarifying a meaning to his toast to conscience in the Letter to the Duke of 
Norfolk. 
II Ibid. 211. 
4 
CHAPTER II 
An Ordinary Child 
To a mind thus carefully formed upon the basis of its natural conscience.
 
the world, both of nature and ofman.
 
does but give back a reflection of those truths about the One Living God.
 
which have been familiar to it from childhood.
 
An Essay in Aid ofa Grammar o.(Assent 
To prove his point that there is''an instinct of the mind recognizing an external 
Master in the dictate of conscience... , Newman sketches in the Grammar ofAssent a 
phenomenology ofconscience in the mind ofa child., or rather. "an ordinary child." 
There is like an -impulse of nature:' which recognizes a Moral Governor in the 
consciousness of right and wrong. Without using the word ~innate.·· Newman does see a 
"spontaneous reception" of the link between the sense of wrong and its religious truth as 
an offense against God. A child who has offended his parents will "alone and without 
effort" place himself in the presence ofGod and beg of Him to set him right with them.2 
1 GA 102. 
2 Ibid. IOJ. 
5 
The importance of Newman's phenomenology of religion in a child is to prove the 
connatural character of conscience in every person from infancy. Such a phenomenon is 
present in every human being prior both in time and authority to all future authority. 
Newman gives the example of a child otTending his parents and placing himsel f in the 
presence of God. 
The application to other religious authorities is also drawn by Newman. All other 
divine authorities such as Revealed Religion and Churches based thereupon have their 
authority in God speaking to conscience. This is because conscience relates directly to 
God as the source of the authority of revelation and religious authority. Hence, 
revelation, written and oral, is accepted by the individual precisely as a message and 
mandate from God only and in so far as it has, and is recognized in conscience to have, 
authority from God in that specific mandate. In fact, at the end of his phenomenology of 
natural conscience, Newman states how 
this vivid apprehension of religious objects ... is independent of the 
written records of Revelation; it does not require any knowledge of 
Scripture, nor of the history or teaching of the Catholic Church. l 
Revelation is a great "addition" of fullness and exactness to our mental image of 
the Divine Personality and Attributes.4 Conscience is therefore prior to and independent 
ofauthority, like that of a child's consciousness of God, which is priorto, and 
independent of, his parents' authority and teaching. Later on, for the believer, conscience 
3 Ibid. 107. 
• Ibid.
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will follow God prior to and independent ofany religious authority. Religious authority 
for the believer, therefore, only has force in so far as it is recognized in conscience to 
have divine authority. Hence, conscience is both chronologically and naturally prior to 
authority, sinc~ God is first known directly by conscience, according to Newman. 
Here we have the force and weight ofconscience as Newman will later defend it. 
[t is neither the rule of pride against authority, nor blind acceptance of human authority, 
but rather an obedience to a "kindly Light." where there is "one step enough for me."; 
This natural link between God and duty, as brought out in the Grammar ofAs.~enl.6 in 
each one's conscience from childhood sets the stage for our own reading ofNewman's 
childhood, considering Newman as "an ordinary child.,,7 
How does this conscience develop and grow? In these same pages, Newman 
speaks of the divine image being strengthened and developed by "informations external 
to ourselves...ll Applying our method of reading Newman through Newman's life, let us 
examine key details of his own conscience as a child vis-a-vis authority, paralleled to his 
teaching on conscience in a child 
In John Henry's mind, the world of"natme and of man" are somewhat a mirror 
where the child attains these first truths on conscience. In his own case, certain 
~ From the poem. "Lead. Kindly Light,n in W 156. The verse reads: 
nKeep Thou my feet; I do not ask to see 
The distant shore - one step enough for me." 
• GA 103·107.
 
7 Ibid. 103.
 
• Ibid. 105.
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"informations external" to himself will shed light on his future decisions in conscience as 
they evolved. Hence, the individual circwnstances surrounding the life ofNewman and 
every child become pan ofdivine providence helping that infant discover the meaning of 
conscience. God and our duty are thus both intertwined in a manner "'singularly congenial 
to the mind," due to the fact that the growing human person goes beyond the mere shapes 
and aspects ofgoodness. The child knows good things, persons and actions, and 
immediately goes beyond to a sense ofGod.9 
As Newman looked back at this life and faced surprise after surprise, these truths 
held. So, no event in a life is indifferent or purposeless. Indeed, unforeseen and unusual 
circumstances can force untold influence on the development of each one's conscience. 
The Apologia would never have been born without Kingsley, the Letter to the Duke of 
Norfolk without Gladstone, An Essay on the Development ofChristian Doctrine without 
his death to the Anglican Church. 10 The world of'"nature and man" is the horizon on 
which Newman walked his path. These ideas are clearly expressed in the whole thrust of 
the Apologia. Newman's "Secretum meum miht' (my secret is mine) made him "rest in 
the thought of two and two only absolute and luminously self-evident beings, myselfand 
my Creator. ,,11 The meaning he gave to his life came from the central truth of his 
teaching on conscience as knowing God as a self-evident Being from infancy. 
• Ibid. 103 - 104.
 
10 Newman's -death to the Anglican Cburcb" will be addressed in Chap. Vlll.
 
II Apo. 16. 
8 
The "world of nature and ofman" which reflected a sense ofGod in Newman's 
conscience as a child were his home and family. These memories of places and people 
are linked in Newman to his concept ofGod and, hence, to his teaching on the presence 
of God in conscience. 12 Reminiscing these events meant for Newman remembering the 
same God he knew in conscience as a child, echoing his teaching on conscience as being 
an innate personal relationship with a living God. 
One vivid memory of his childhood was the image of a huge house in the 
countryside near London, isolated in a field of greenery, illuminated in the evening with 
the fleeting glimmer ofcandles burning in honor ofAdmiral Nelson, the victor at 
Trafalgar. 13 This was Grey's Court at Ham near Richmond, some miles from the hustle 
and bustle of London. The thought of this immense and quiet home made such an 
impression on Newman that much later in life he affirmed he was able to recaU the 
slightest detail although he had seen the house only once or twice since his youth. 
Newman, sensitive to his own history as the dwelling-place of God in his conscience, 
will later search history for the dwelling-place ofGod in the Church. I~ 
The first authority figure in Newman's "world of man" was, of course, his father, 
a banker who wished to give Iris family the peace of the countryside. Nevertheless, hard 
hit by the financial troubles after Waterloo, Mr. Newman acquired the craft of the 
12 GA 106.
 
u W lOC. 46.
 
,. In the introduction to An £ssoy on the Developmell/ ofChriS/ian Doctrine Newman wished to
 
use in conuoversy "the testimony ofour most natural infonnant concerning the doctrine and worship of 
ChristiaDity, viz.. the history ofc:igltteen hundred years,- 29. 
9 
brewer. This change of fortune brought an end to stability and security at home. No doubt 
a lesson to the child John Henry on the fragility of what is human. Towards the end of his 
life, he found again the "poor book" ofviolin music used in his infancy. This "voice from 
the grave" had to be auctioned after his father went bankrupt. "What a world of history," 
he sighed, "has any single family in it., which perishes like the leaves in Autumn.,,15 
Another constant trait in Newman's sense of conscience related to his father was 
his pride in being a gentleman and an English gentleman at that. Kingsley had accused 
Newman of untruthfulness, but John Henry felt confident of his acquittal by his fellow 
Englishmen. He considered them" the most suspicious and touchy of mankind," but he 
would rather be an Englishmen than belong to any other race. 16 In his writings Newman 
reveals some of his father's traits which attracted both esteem and admiration. As an 
English gentleman, his culture was that of a liberal member of the bourgeoisie of the 
nineteenth centwy. An avid lover ofbooks and music, Newman's childhood religiosity 
was without doubt more confonnist than profound, but, nonetheless, more interested in 
sincere convictions than outward manifestations. Later on, we see the adult Newman 
lament the extravagances in some external exaggerations of Marian devotions, from 
which the ""national good sense" has protected English Catholics. 17 
John Henry inherited from his mother the "Bible Religion" of which he was so 
proud. Aided by his grandmother and Aunt Elizabeth, Newman was introduced to the 
I~ Wxxv. 352. 
'6 Apo. 8. 
17 Diff ii. 99-100.
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sacred texts, and the Bible remained the manual, par excellence, for all of his religious 
life. The text spoke as much to his eyes as to his mind, and the impressions which he 
received from it day after day were both aesthetic as well as religious. Bible history 
revealed some strong and beautiful images to him. His memory then collected them as 
precious symbols, burying them in the deepest recesses of his mind, in order that they 
might never be lost. Much later, they will spring forth from him spontaneously. Every 
sermon in St Mary's at Oxford and at Birmingham, every letter to diverse friends, every 
work of apologetics, are already present in germ because of this first biblical initiation. 
Linked to the text is the revelation ofa personal God, living at the very heart of history, 
so rich in personages and heroes, that filled the child's subconscious with a richness of 
images of the divine. The notion "God and myself,ls is in the heart ofScripture, at the 
heart of the Apologia and at the heart of his concept of conscience. 
It [the Bible] is the best book of meditations which can be, because it is 
divine. This is why we see such multitudes in France and Italy giving up 
religion altogether. They have not impressed upon their hearts the life of 
our Lord and Saviour as given in the Evangelists. They believe merely 
with the intellect, not with the heart. Argument may oversee a mere assent 
of the reason, but not a faith founded in a personal love for the Object of 
Faith. They quarrel with their priests, and then they give up the Church. 
We can quarrel with men, we cannot quarrel with a book. 19 
John Henry, therefore, inherited a contented and tolerant Anglican religion, the 
Via Media, always moderate in its enthusiasm and formal in its rites. His sincere efforts 
in conscience to add depth to its doctrine will later prove its undoing. However, his 
18 Apo. 16.
 
19 W xxvi. 81.
 
II 
childhood religion enjoyed the King James Bible as an ancient patrimony, guarded more 
with fidelity to ttadition than with personal passion. Later on, here too, Newman would 
see the weakness ofsuch a ~Bible Religion." 
The Religion of England is "the Bible, the whole Bible, and nothing but 
the Bible" - the consequence is that to strike a blow at its inspiration, 
veracity or canonicity, is directly to aim at whatever there is of 
Christianity in the country. 20 
The other horizon in Newman's conscience as a child were his brothers and 
sisters. John Henry was the oldest, followed by brothers Charles and Francis. While John 
Henry was serious and studious, Charles was capricious and irresolute. Lured by fancy 
and luck, he lived the life of a wanderer, always dissatisfied, always searching. Francis, 
some four years younger than John Henry, changed from docility to jealousy in manhood, 
assuming religious positions contrary to those of his famous brother. John felt obliged to 
refuse to meet Frank "in a familiar way or to sit at table" with him, since he considered 
him "a teacher and organizer of a new sect. .,21 This encounter with envy and heresy, as 
he saw it, was to continue through most ofNewman's life. How he was to handle each 
difficulty would ultimately define his understanding of conscience as a personal 
relationship with God, independent of human and even authoritative approval of his life 
and teaching. 
"'The world of women" of his three sisters also presented conttasts for this 
"ordinary child" Harrien and Jemima both married clergymen, but it was Jemima to 
%0 Ibid. xix. 482-483
 
, 11 Wv.3IS.
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whom John Henry revealed his innermost thoughts. Before his change to Catholicism he 
warned her of the forthcoming step towards "those whom I do not know:'~~ because 
"everything that one does honestly, sincerely, with prayer, with advice, must tum to 
good...2-' This latter statement will be echoed in the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk when 
Newman will speak of the supremacy ofconscience over accepted authority in 
exceptional cases. ~~ 
The death ofhis youngest sister Mary brought home to Newman ..the world, both 
of nature and of man." Though only able to talk about her "in the third person,,,25 the 
beauty ofnature made him feel more intensely than ever 
the transitory nature of this world. Dear Mary seems embodied in every 
tree and hid behind every hill. What a veil and curtain this world of sense 
is! beautiful. but still a veiL ~b 
Sixty years later, he would write to Pusey that "1 do not exaggerate when 1say 
that I have not even now got over my Sister's death:,17 
So, we see that Newman's text quoted at the beginning of this chapter on natural 
conscience knowing those truths about the living God through a reflection of the world of 
a child can be aptly applied to Newman himself. The force of his argument in favor of 
supremacy of conscience is that God is present in one's conscience since childhood and 
22 To Mrs. J. Mozley, 15 Mar. 1845.
 
23 Ibid. 31 Aug. 1843
 
24 Dijfii. 257.258. 
2j Wii. 61­
26 Ibid. 69.
 
Z7 W xxviii. 406. 
13 
that the events of the world around a child are pan of that development of conscience as 
the person grows. Besides, the supremacy ofGod is perceived by conscience in its very 
concept of right and wrong from infancy. Newman's childhood was his own example to 
himself of such a natural conscience. His longjoumey towards "a distant shore" had 
begun.2ft 
11 From the poem ~lead. Kindly Light." VV 156.
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CHAPTER III 
MYSELF AND MY CREATOR 
When I was fifteen, ... a great change of thought took place in me. 
I fell under the influences of a definite Creed 
Apologia Pro Vila Sua 
If Newman's childhood is itself a vivid example of his teaching on human 
conscience being natural and consisting necessarily in a relationship with a personal God, 
the next stage in Newman's life brought him to the experience of a religious conversion. 
What will be interesting in our analysis of this phenomenon will be to see how his 
concept of conscience reacted to a personal experience ofGod. The key task will be to 
see how Newman's conversion was not pwely subjective as an emotional phenomenon, 
empty ofall objective reality, but mther there was a reference to a revealed creed, a 
religious authority, and a responsibility to God as a way oflife. I 
This question should set the stage to answer a deeper concern about conscience 
vis-ii-vis authority. IfGod is the authority over natural conscience as explained in 
I Apo. 16. 
15 
Chapter n, how can we avoid the trap ofsubjectivism? Can Newman's theory of natural 
conscience lead to a reduction of Religion to a "religious a priori", due to man's "sense 
and taste ofthe infinite" in the manner ofSchleiennacher?2 Was Newman not answering 
rationalistic criticism of his Bible religion by adopting an introspective Kantian a priori 
approach to God where the roots of religion lie in the structure of the human mind'f 
Would Newman's doctrine of a supremacy ofconscience over authority owing to the 
relationship of conscience to God not be the death-knell to revelation and church 
authority? Later, and logically, by putting conscience above the Pope, is Newman not 
playing into the ancient temptation of"being like God"T 
Admittedly, his first conversion at age fifteen was that of an adolescent with all 
that his limited maturity implied. Nevertheless, Newman himselfattributed life-long 
importance to this moment of rei igious conversion. After he became a Cardinal, he 
confided to Anne Mozley, the editor ofhis correspondence: 
Of course I cannot myself be the judge of myself; but ... I should say that 
it is difficult to realize or imagine the identity of the boy before and. after 
August 1816.... I can look back at the end of seventy years as if on 
another person.5 
Z Cf Hans Urs von Baltasar, Love Alone. The Way oj Revelation (London: Sheed & Ward.. 1968). 
29-32. 
, Ibid. 27-28. Also. Karl Barth, The Humanity oJGod (Zurich: John Knox Press. 1960),22. 
• Gen. 3:5. 
S	 Moz. i. 19.
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The boy before the conversion clung to the upright morality learnt at home. 
However, some touch of superstition was still remaining. At the beginning of the 
Apologia he stated how 
even though I had fonned no religious conviction ... I used constantly to 
cross myself on going into the dark6 
Before his conversion., he had taken the road towards deism, based on the 
humanistic and liberal model characteristic of the beginning of the 19th. century. 
Newman had ventured into the literary frontiers of the philosophies of the preceding 
century where the seeds of doubt flourished. At age fourteen, having studied The Age of 
Reason by Paine, he did not appear to have been frightened by the rationalism of Hume 
any more than by that of Voltaire.' We notice no anti-clerical bias, no fear of so many 
people between him and God, but rather a moralistic approach to religion as simply doing 
one's duty. As Newman approached his first religious conversion, his early religious 
upbringing seemed to recede and his critical powers were advancing towards rationalism. 
The conversion took place during the summer of 1816. John Henry was sent away 
to the College at Eating where he had to remain after the close of the school tenn in June, 
because of the collapse of the bank which Mr. Newman directed. At Eating, he found a 
discreet and dedicated scholar in the Rev. Walter Mayers who was naturally serious and 
strong of character. This shy man was above all a man of God, preoccupied with the 
Gospel message. Mayers always had a yearning for a more apostolic mission and pastoral 
• Apo. 14. 
7 Ibid. 15-16.
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ministry. He hid the simplicity and depth ofhis faith under the austere appearance of the 
rigid professor, indifferent to sympathy or success. Nevenheless, his example and the 
straightforwardness ofhis words earned him the esteem ofNewman, who knew how to 
look beyond the man's timidity. 
In rel1gion, Rev. Mayers was a convinced supporter of Evangelicalism. The 
essence of the Evangelical stream within the Anglican Communion was to bring souls to 
the purity and rigorous simplicity of faith. This movement was conceived more as an 
experience of assured salvation than as an adhesion to dogmas. From this came the 
importance attributed to conversion and new birth, giving to each one the certainty of his 
own salvation experienced through the grace ofJesus Christ. Accompanying this 
conversion was an austere moralism which gave color to the piety and conduct of 
Evangelicals. 
Newman's new birth ofconversion betrayed a conviction of a singular 
predestination from God, acquired by a strong effort of the will and imagination. John 
Henry experienced the certainty ofGod's pardon in a stirring intuition, thought necessary 
to reach the certitude that Christ had redeemed him from sin. This proof was as absolute 
and infallible as the fact ofone's ~own hands and feet:..!l So, yielding to a flood of 
emotions, his heart let itself go in a touching avowal ofgratitude and love for its God 
who had filled it from His most bountiful mercy. The barrenness of moral formalism and 
the skepticism of rationalism seem to have been answered by a personal call by God 
8 Ibid. 16. 
18 
towards emotional piety. How objective was Newman's conversion to this ardent 
devotion? Was this God neither that of the philosophers nor that of Abraham, Isaac and 
Jacob, but rather the God ofNewman's own emotional needs? 
In the Apuloglu. Newman stated the circumstances of his conversion and his debt 
to Rev. Mayers. As to the objective content of his conversion, we notice that it was not a 
mere subjective certainty of conversion based on this cenainty itself The latter would 
involve the vicious circle of subjectivity, certitude based on this same certitude. Rather 
Newman noticed a great change of thought, and continued: 
I fell under the influence of a definite Creed, and received into my 
Intellect impressions of dogma, ... I neither recollect the title nor the 
contents, except one docttine, whIch I do not Include among those whIch I 
believe to have come from a divine source, viz., the doctrine of final 
perseverance.~ 
What is important in this text is that Ne....man felt certain of both aspects of his 
conversion. It was a lovmg relationship with Jesus as his personal Lord and Savior, and 
also a conversion to God who manifests Himself in a definite creed or objective 
revelation. Moreover, the very doctrine of tinaI perseverance is understood as such, that 
is, a doctrine, an objective teaching to be believed in. In fact, Newman referred explicitly 
to a "divine source·· being necessary for the validity ot a doctrine. Hence, the certitude of 
belief is not based on the certitude itselC but rather on the "detinilt: crt:ed" which itself 
supposes a divine source. I nereiore, me reason bemno his conversion was not the 
9 Ibid. 
19 
strength of emotional certitude but rather the fact of divine revelation as understood by 
John Henry. 
Applying this distinction to conscience, we deduce that conscience for Newman 
in this conversion was not supreme over his previous superstitious and deist convictions 
because it was certain about itself. Rather conscience had found an objective reason for 
conversion. It was the same God who spurred both personal love and revelation about 
Himself as part of this friendship. So we see that, for Newman, the same conscience that 
found God was prepared to receive divine revelation. God who gave man a conscience as 
part of his being also gave him as pan of that conscience the possibility of knowing God 
funher in conscience through some revelation. In this sense, Newman later would write 
that conscience is a messenger from Him both "in nature and in grace."10 
A second characteristic of this conversion according to the Apologia was his 
understanding of final perseverance. On the one hand, Newman asserted the 
consciousness of his inward conversion and cenainty that it would last until the next life 
with his election to eternal glory. On the other, he had no consciousness that "this belief 
wouid iead me to be careless about pleasing God." II Hence, besides the inner 
consciousness and certainty which could easily be argued as a subjective emotion, and 
maybe even a passing one at that, there was a clear link between that certainty and a 
desire to live accordingly. So, Newman. did not fall into the quicksand ofa subjective 
10 Diff. ii. 248 
\I Apo. 16 
20 
conscience based on his feelings, independent and apart from any personal commitment 
in° his lifestyle, but rather saw a clear link between faith and workso 
However, his sense of truth and his sense ofobligation were both directed 
towards a Person. His religious faith was neither towards a creed nor an authority nor a 
virtuous life in themselves, but rather towards his Creator. This God revealed Himself in 
a truth, an authority, and a way of life- In this Person, therefore, for Newman, was the 
force ofdogma, authority and morality. So, the need to follow conscience towards a 
creed and conversion was ultimately the need to follow God. 
Newman's conversion, therefore, was like that of Evangelicals. There was the 
same isolation ofconscience free from beings and things, a sense ofbeing alone and 
dependent on God, with the same assurance ofbeing saved. We find the same evangelical 
openness ofthe young Newman to the call ofliving life to the full, the same wish to 
conquer self in pursuit of the absolute, the same enjoyment ofa lifelong purpose and the 
same need ofan ideal. In this text of the Apologia we note the admiration of the young 
disciple who has found his human and divine master, not through discussion and 
reasoning, but through reasons that only the hean knows. Future years will rub off some 
of the externals, including the departure of his mentor, but a durable foundation will 
subsist. Protound values of personal salvation, definite creed, and service to God will 
bear abundant fruit in Newman's future endeavor to follow conscience. 
Parallel to the Apologia, many confidences in the Journal, written at the time of 
his conversion, are indeed helpful for understanding Newman's state of mind. A first 
annotation: 
21 
[recollect, in 1815 [believe, thinking that [should like to be virtuous but 
not religious. There was something in the latter idea [ did not like. Nor did 
[see the meaning orIoving God. 12 
SO, OUT view is confirmed that Newman before this conversion was seeking a 
moral perfection., rather than a religious fidelity. A call to love God made less sense than 
the demands ofa conscience characterized by sincerity and uprightness. His former 
readings drew him into the ways of a deism perfectly reconcilable with a certain moral 
rectitude. However, it is clear that the young Newman realized that virtue should be lived 
in order to be true. His conversion Was to change an emotionless moralistic theory into a 
personal encounter with God. 
As to Mayers, we note both his influence and its limits. Mayers had influenced 
the lonely Newman in the course of those months of vacation in the empty school. The 
shy teacher was able to express his better self in their conversations. Gaining the 
confidence ofNewman he revealed to him the true meaning of life, the seriousness of the 
call that God addresses to every soul, and the inestimable reward of conversion. The 
grave warnings of Mayers detached Newman from an incipient deism towards the call of 
the austere life in God. Newman seemed captivated, as we see from his letter as a 
Cardinal and the Apologia, quoted above. 13 Exulted at the encounter of God's presence, 
Newman had no doubt of his spiritual experience of a second birth. 
12 Moz. i. 19.
 
13 Notes 5 and 9 above.
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But Newman also soon saw Mayers' limits. Beyond the enthusiastic certainty, 
Newman sought the reason why of his conversion and cenainty of perseverance. The 
strength of his emotions did not block out the procedure of his mind. Though accepting 
Mayers as his teacher, Newman did not rest seeking after truth. As will be his 
characteristic in the future, Newman's conscience was above any teacher, because his 
conscience was his personal relationship of duty and friendship with God. While 
preserving the essence of his conversion experience as a personal relationship with God 
who loves and saves him, Newman showed his independence of mind not to identify God 
with those who claimed to be his representatives. 
In December 1816, in fact, Newman had gone to Oxford. Mayers gave him a 
work to read, the Private Thoughts of the evangelical Bishop Beveridge. Mayers' lener at 
the end of the month revealed the Master's innermost fears: 
On perusing it you will see that the opinions which we have discussed, 
though at present singular, are not novel, nor are they without authority, 
for they are deduced from the only authentic source. To that source let me 
direct your anention. Be more disposed to form your sentiments upon 
religion from that, than to adopt and interpret it to your opinions. 14 
The above not only reveals the fears of a master losing his disciple but touches 
the nerve of liberty of conscience. The master based the force of his argument on the fact 
that the maners discussed are neither novel nor without authority, but based on an 
authority, the book of Beveridge. ~Not Dovel" is an appeal to tradition., which begs the 
question, what authority bas that tradition got? Whereas, the second appeal to authority 
'4 K liS.
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as the "only authentic source" is as equally empty, ifnot dangerous. The implication is 
that Bishop Beveridge is authoritative in religious matters, and., hence, is the voice of 
God. Mayers' command to be "more disposed" to Beveridge begs the final question of 
Mayers' own authority to command., and the limits thereof His rejection ofNewman's 
opinions in favor ofBeveridge's without giving reasons why smacks or religious 
despotism. As we wrote in a previous publication on cult-tactics in the Confessions of St. 
Augustine: 
If Faustus were so sure of his postulates, why was he so afraid of questions 
... ? This implies that either Faustus did not have all the answers or the 
very fact of his not having all the answers did not fit in with the cult's 
credo. His rejection of"1he give and take of argument" would imply no 
argument, except the authority of Faustus to allow no argument. I> 
Newman on the contrary would write in a work intimately involved in his later 
conversion to Catholicism: "An argwnent is needed, unless Christianity is to abandon the 
province of argument:' 16 From Mayers' letter above, we note the pupil did not comply 
without reservation to the principles instilled in him with such great insistence and 
concern. The "absolute obedience" rejected later in the Leller to the Duke ofNorfolk is 
unacceptable from Newman's first conversion., however emotional and salutary. 17 
Obedience, however, though not "absolute", is rendered unto Mayers. Newman 
read the recommended devotional books: Beveridge, Doddridge, Law, and Romaine, ~a11 
of the school ofCalvin" He listened to the sermons which led him towards 
" This writer, Cull Tactics in lhe Confessions in ~Branitf Briefly,» (April 95): 4. 
16 Dev. 31. 
17 Diff- ii. 243. 
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predestination and efficacious grace. 18 He even scribbled some writings, one of them 
drawn clearLy from the Calvinistic inspiration: "These will be punished with eternal 
punishment,,19 More and more, the thought ofpredestination took possession of his 
spirit and an obsession with eternal salvation accompanied it. Newman was seeking to 
persuade himself that the conversion of 1816 really was the "second birth" which the 
books described and which an all too impressive master announced to him. He kept this 
illusion until much later when his inner life grew strong and when the realities of the 
pastoral ministty showed him the inconsistency of this "detestable doctrine" of 
predestination.2o 
Besides, his conversion was not exactly according to the book, as is evident from 
future testimonies in 1821 and 1826: 
I speak of conversion with great diffidence, being obliged to adopt the 
language of books. For my own feelings, as far as I remember, were so 
different from any account I have ever read that I dare not go by what may 
be an individual case. 
In the matter in question., that is conversion, my own feelings were not 
violent but a returning to, a renewing of principles, under the power of the 
Holy Spirit, which I already felt, and in a measure acted on when young?l 
So, we see a conversion that is iuxla modum both in its intellectual acceptance of 
its Master and the books he recommended. 
I. Moz. i. 21. 
19 Ibid. 
20 Apo. 17. 
21 Moz. i. 109. 
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As to his life style, his ~not being careless about pleasing God,,,21 Newman 
sought to copy the models proposed by his masters and books. Applying himself to 
restricting his life within the limits of the straight and narrow way, he made resolutions 
and cultivated virtue, however imperfect. The spectacle he offered his family was one of 
a solitary soul, and one not really understood. Newman reflected: 
Although it is far from pleasant to give my reasons, inasmuch as I shall 
appear to set myself up, and to be censuring recreations, and those who 
indulge in them: presenting my scruples with humility and a due 
obedience to my parents; open to conviction, and ready to obey in a matter 
so dubious as this is, and to act against my judgment if they command, 
thus satisfYing at once my own conscience and them.2J 
So we see that the first and most tangible outcome ofthe conversion was the 
shutting up of the young man within himself The desire for perfection, which was well 
in keeping with his temperament, was stimulated. There is no doubt that the Evangelical 
spirituality had a lasting influence on Newman, not only because of the certainty of its 
doctrinal convictions which fell away quickly enough, but also due to the rigors of the 
moral demands to which he subjected himself Judgment on the sinful world, the denying 
of himself, and the strict preoccupation with spiritual progress were to be retained later in 
the depths ofNewman's religious sensibility. 
Nevertheless, a new element over and beyond the call to conversion in 
Evangelicalism became present in Newman. That same autumn, the noble and 
n Apo. 16.
 
13 Moz. i. 19.
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independent spirit he will later admire in Bishop Dupanloup,24 brought forth in Newman 
the desire to live a celibate life. He had no mistake about the fact that it would be "the 
will ofGod that I should lead a single life." Newman saw celibacy as part of his calling 
to missionary work among the heathen and his feeling of separation from the world. 2S 
What concerns us in our understanding of conscience and its liberty in Newman is 
to notice how, first, his tutor was worried about Newman following his own opinions 
mtlter than received authority. Second, in the decision for celibacy we see Newman made 
a break with that authority and with what its books had taught him. The impact of his 
conversion was not only an emotional assurance of salvation, an adherence to a definite 
creed due to its divine source, and a way of life pleasing to God. His conversion was 
only such in SO far as his conscience decided that such and such was what God wanted of 
him there and then. But when that same God who gave him those assurances, creeds and 
life-style, was now calling him to a personal choice such as celibacy not mentioned either 
by creed, master, or book., Newman was ready to walk the extra mile. His life was for 
God speaking in his conscience first, and then for Mr. Mayers. Conscience is based on 
24 Newman praised the ~noble and independent" Bishop Dupanloup for -daring to do what we 
think right" (W xxiii. 396). 
~ Apo. 19. 
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'"two and two only absolute and Iwninously self-evident beings. myself and my 
Creator.~26 
26 Ibid. 16
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CHAPTER IV 
OXFORD MADE US CATHOLICS 
Catholics did not make us Catholics; Oxford did 
I.etters and Diaries 
When, in December 1877, Newman received out of the blue an invitation from 
W.S. Wayte, the President ofTrinity College, Oxford, to become the college's first 
honorary fellow, John Henry wrote to Bishop Ullathome, 'to see once more ... the place 
where I began the battle of life ... is a prospect almost too much for me to bear. ,I 
Newman's "battle of life' did indeed begin in Oxford, but the Apologia notes his 
discovery of the fundamental tenet of religion as he initiated his snuggle, i.e., to follow 
truth wherever it led him. The link between 'the salvation of my soul', truth, religion, and 
liberty ofconscience are evident even as he took the road to Oxford.2 
At Oxford, the undergraduate Newman credited one key author as close to being 
the savior ofhis soul. The writer was Thomas Scott and the book, his autobiography, Fhe 
I LD xxviii. 283-4.
 
z Apo. 17.
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Force ofTruth (1779). Why did John Henry attribute a kind of immortality to Scott's 
book? Therein Newman found the "fundamental truth of religion: that vigorous 
independence of mind which follows truth wherever it led him. ~3 The basic tenet of 
religion was indeed the salvation ofone's soul, as Newman lived in his first conversion. 
Now, at Oxford, such a salvation was seen as achieved only in the personal search for 
truth. Besides, Newman realized that the search for truth demands liberty to follow truth 
wherever one finds it. 
So the authority of a religious figure, for Newman, became a value only in so far 
as truth is personally encountered in that authority. Therefore, a lack of liberty of thought 
in seeking the truth invalidates the whole religious process. If there is no liberty of 
inquiry, how can truth be personally attained? And if truth is not personally attained, how 
sincere is that religious conviction, and how near to hypocrisy may be external rituals and 
acquiescence?4 
Liberty of conscience, as Newman learnt from Scott as being "the vigorous 
independence of mind to follow truth wherever it led him:' is indeed the ~fundamental 
truth of religion.~; And it is precisely so, because it is the natural right of the human 
person to seek truth. Hence Newman thought that no religious authority can deny the 
l Ibid. 
• "Paris is well wolth a Mass." Alleged quote of the Huguenot Henry IV who converted to 
Catholicism so as to become King ofFrance. See Giacomo Martina. La Chiesa nell'Elo dell'Assnlutisma, 
del LiberaJismo, del TolaiilOrlsma (The Church in the Age ofAbsolutism, liberalism, and Totalitarianism). 
(Brescia: Morcelliana. 1970).298. 
l Apo. 17. 
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right to a human being to seek truth. Using the tenninology of natural law, religious 
authority cannot impose religious duties contrary to human nature, since grace 
presupposes and perfects nature.6 Aquinas applies this principle to the right ofJewish 
parents to educate their children according to their faith. 7 
On the contrary, the opposite to Newman's learning of the value ofliberty of 
conscience is illustrated in the opposite need to control people by controlling their 
knowledge. Information control is considered part and parcel ofany totalitarian 
organization.K 
The other virtue Newman noted in Scott was his opposition to Antinomianism. 
ThiS doctrine, recurrent at different times in Christian history, taught that Christians are 
by grace set free from the need ofobserving any moral law. Applying this doctrine to 
liberty of conscience, religious authorities would identify themselves with the divine, 
denying to their subjects the moral right to question either their teaching or commands.~ 
6 St. Thomas Aquinas. Summa Theologiae, I. q.l. a.8. ad 2. 
7 Ibid. l1-n. q. 10, a. 11. See this writer. ~Religious Liberty: :-Jewman defends Aquinas.~ Braniff 
Briefly, (Dec. 1994): 10-11. 
• We may imagine Newman. Aquinas. or Augustine seeking truth in an organization where -people 
are not allowed to talk 10 each other about anything critical of the leader. doctrine. or organization. 
Members must spy on each other and report improper activities or comments 10 leaders. New converts are 
not permitted to talk 10 each other without an older member present to chllJlCrOne them. Most importantly, 
people are told 10 avoid contact with ex-members or critics. Those who could provide the most information 
are the ones to be especially shunned. Some groups even go so far as to screen members' letters and phone 
calls." In Steven Hassan, Combaning Cull Mind Control (Rochester, VT: Park Street Press. 1988). 65. 
• Cult deprogrammer Rick Ross. in his foreword to See No Evil. states: 
.•A prospective member ofa religious group sbouId ... think twice ifmembers are not allowed to question: 
if isolation and spiritual elitistn are promoted by an ethnocentric theology; 
if independent thinking is discouraged or descn1led as rebellion against God; 
if tile only truth is the leader's tnnh; 
or iftbe leader is above ~man's law" and accountable only to 'God'.ft Tim Madigan,. See No Evil: Blind 
Devotion and Bloodshed in David Kuresh's Holy War (Fon Worth: Summit Group. 1993), xi. 
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If Scott considered the fundamental truth of religion a vigorous independence of mind to 
follow truth wherever it be found, a distinct authoritarian approach would consider that 
"error has no rights.',lO Therefore, in this latter perspective, the seeker after truth has no 
right to either seek or propagate error which is known to him as truth. Hence, religious 
authority should control what their subjects may seek and know. There would be no room 
for freedom of inquiry and ofconscience. Newman, following Scott, rejected that 
approach. It 
The Oxford Newman found at age sixteen was suitable for the task of seeking 
truth in freedom of conscience. The intimacy and quiet of their sheltering walls, which 
maintained the traditions of the University, intrigued him. The country in particular 
enchanted Newman; those charming rolling meadows, divided by groves, enclosed the 
city in isolation and rustic beauty like an incomparable jewel. From the very first day, 
Newman felt himself to be fully in accord with this city and the Oxonian tradition. So 
much so that on taking leave of Oxford in 1846 - 'for good' according to the Apolo/{ia ­
he considered for years the snap-dragon growing on the walls opposite his freshman's 
rooms as the emblem of his own perpetual residence 'even unto death in my 
University.' 12 
10 See discussion on ~error bas no rights" in Mic!lael Davies. The Second J.-Diican Coum:i/ airel 
Religious Liberty (Long Prairie. MN: Neumann Press, 1992),49-53. According to Davies, ~The right of the 
Catholic State to restrict the propagation of heresy derives from a principle firmly established in Catholic 
theology that ~elTor has no rig/n.s." 49. Cf Eric D'Arcy, Conscience mid lIs RighI 10 Freedom (New York: 
Sbeed and Ward, 1961),248-258. 
II Apo. 17. 
12 AfXJ. 183. 
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Though convinced by Scott of liberty ofconscience, Newman remained the 
religious follower of the predestination doctrine ofMayers, together with a certain apathy 
and aloofness towards others. Seeking truth involved the certitude that he was in truth. 
Others were not only in error, but maybe even unable to seek truth. For the doctrine of 
predestination meant that one may think one is saved while presuming 'others' are 
damned. The road from self-righteousness, confidence ofone's salvation, conviction of 
the damnation ofothers, may finally lead to the certitude in conscience that others are 
worth little, ifanything at all. The final step, which Newman did not take, would be to 
deny them liberty ofconscience. IJ We note Newman's elitist's attitude, condemnation of 
others, and isolation, in an early letter from Oxford to his father: 
Besides, ... I felt solitary.... I am glad, not because I wish to be apart 
from them and ill-natured, but because I really do not think I should gain 
the least advantage from their company. 14 
Influenced by Mayers, this predestined youth feared being false to that grace ifhe 
even deviated one inch from the lines stipulated by his master. From the first day, we see 
Newman shut himself off, refusing the company and excesses of student life. The 
common pleasures and tradition oflax morals in a cloister-like milieu, typical of 
university campuses like Oxford, seemed to him a plague and work of Satan. Newman 
was particularly disgusted by the ~Gaudy," the traditional day ofenjoyment when 
students indulged themselves in noisy drinking parties. His condemnation of these 
I J Hence the ambiguity attributed to Christianity ofdemanding liberty ofconscience when weak, 
and denying the same to othen when in power. Martina., 286. 
'4 Mo::. i. 26-27. 
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excesses gave him a pretext for isolation. Happy to 'live like a hermit", Newman 
overdosed himself in inflexibility, narrow-mindedness and scrupulosity. IS 
In the Apologia Newman remembers he was very much alone: 
[ used to take my daily walk by myself. I recollected once meeting Dr. 
Copleston, then Provost, with one of the fellows. He turned around., and 
with the kind courteousness which sat so well on him, made a bow and 
said, "Nunquam minus .~olus, quam cum solu.~...16 
According to his then evangelical beliefsystem, there are only the good and the 
bad, them and us, God and Satan, the perfect and the imperfect, the predestined and the 
damned And Newman considered himself, by the grace of God., among the predestined. 
This simplistic ideology is another atom in the molecule of the denial of Iiberty of 
conscience to others, characteristic of an elitist religious mentality. 17 And Newman's 
reaction was likewise typical of religious groups convinced of their salvation, to the 
exclusion of others. Ifcontrol is not possible, isolation is necessary. III 
Linked to, and maybe because of, his moral rigidity, Newman realized he had an 
excess of timidity and "a trembling within himself." Hence, his failure to get honors at 
Trinity in 1820 did not surprise him too much. His mother was quick to reflect: "Your 
fault is a want of self-confidence and a dissatisfaction with yourselC '9 Newman himself 
15 Apo. 16.
 
'6 Apo. 25. Copleston is quoting Cicero, De Officiis, m, I, ~Never less lonely than when alone"
 
17 Hassan. 80. 
II Madigan, 86. 
19 Mo: i.. 51. 
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prayed that he not get honors if they were to be "the least cause of sin." A puritanical 
view of human greatness as radically opposed to divine goodness, and hence a source of 
possible sin. is apparent.20 
A second lesson came with his winning the Oriel fellowship in 1822. Once again. 
he shut himself up more than ever in his interior solitude by a son of auto-defense 
mechanism. Nevertheless, he would soon note, with great clarity ofvision, that his moral 
austerity bordered on intransigence. It contained the genn ofscorn and of arrogance: 
We are apt to get censorious with respect to others as soon as we ourselves 
have adopted any new strictness. At least, that is the case with me... 
Humility is the root ofcharity. 21 
Nevertheless, all these struggles of conscience were not in vain. They contributed 
to assuring fidelity to the ideal of a religious life based on divine authority, even if, in this 
case, they were tinged by a Calvinistic, puritan spirit. Newman, now a fellow of Oriel, 
would gradually discover the gloomy vanity of a system which, under the cover of 
holiness and perfection, forced a man always to look at himself, at the risk of isolating 
self from others. Oriel, however, held a son of peaceful hwnanism, often bordering on 
intellectual dilettantism, which accorded more weight to original ideas than to truth. 
Leaving the authoritarianism of his former master, Mayers, Newman would be 
tempted by the authoritarianism of his own mind. Moving from a master giving himself 
divine authority, John Henry would live the opposite temptation of the individual playing 
lU Apo. 38. 
21 Moz.. i. 70.
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God with the graces of his own intellect Out of liberty of thought and conscience 
towards truth and salvation, as Scott had taught him, Newman now saw the possibility of 
absolute liberty, absolute pride, absolute individualism, which a priori rejects all 
authority, except oneself This Newman will call ~Liberalism." Having had an absolute 
master as Mayers pretended to be, Newman now was tempted to think of himself as a 
totally independent pupil. In this latter perspective, conscience is absolute freedom ITom 
all authority. One would then toast only to one's conscience, never to another authority.22 
The group of intellectuals, synonymous with this Liberalism, was given the 
bizarre name of~Noetics." It was said of Whately, the most sagacious and most 
paradoxical among them, that he used the minds of his disciples as an anvil on which to 
forge ideas. John Henry was willing to applaud Whately for his "most exact mind" while 
he was "kind enough" to severely snub Newman's first writings.!3 Newman gave 
Whately the highest praise as being the first who taught him "to weigh my words and to 
be cautious in my statements:,2~ John Henry thanked him for teaching him how to think 
and use his reason. More importantly, says the Ap%j{ia. he taught Newman not only 
how to think, but to think for himself: 
He had done his work towards me or nearly so, when he had taught me to 
see with my own eyes and to walk with my own feet. 25 
Z2 Apo. 24. See note A. ~LiberaIism." 216-225. 
23 Ibid.. 20. 
24 Ibid. 
2j Ibid. 22. 
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The strength of the Noetics, and of Liberalism, was to insist on personal assent 
and free inquiry, which Newman no doubt accepted. The temptation for John Henry was 
to give himself over to the mood in Oriel which also included a secret scorn "for 
Christian Antiquity." Liberty was no longer only a conditio sine qua non for religious 
belief, but religious revelation and authority were left out of the picture. 26 
As an epilogue on Whately, what is amazing for such a liberal spirit, are some 
later events on which Newman commented. 21 Whately is offered the highest praise for 
his efforts to teach John Henry how to think and for his critique of Newman's works. 
Nevertheless, Newman later observes how "he made himselfdead to me," and "inserted 
sharp things in his later works about me." 28 
In these poignant passages, Newman outlined his reaction. John Henry preferred 
not to speak out on what would pain him so much. The differences of opinion brought 
out in mutual correspondence and in a friendly spirit on Newman's part finally brought 
him to follow "his [Newman's] reason" and conclude they could not get on together any 
longer. What seems important was Newman's final conclusion in the drama of their lost 
friendship. Whately's influence was wanting in a "higher respect" than intellectual 
advance. The Noetics had preferred intellectual to moral excellence. The ties of 
26 Ibid. 24.
 
v For the conflict belween Newman and the Liberals in Oxford, see Apologia. 22-26.
 
21 Ape. 24.
 
37 
friendship had been brokelL Desire for truth was linked to the desire for life, or salvation, 
as Newman said earlier about Scott.29 
The Apologia also speaks of "very different influences" during these first years of 
Newman at Oxford Newman mentions friends and books which helped him change his 
views. The underlying assumption is that John Henry was open to the wisdom of those 
who did not profess his religious views, be they evangelical, puritan, deistic, or liberal. 
Newman learnt to see with his own eyes and walk with his own feet in the presence of 
friends who made him question his fonner beliefs. The love they professed for the young 
Newman is linked to their love of reason. 
The same link between immortality, wisdom, liberty and religion is found in 
another great searcher for truth e:c umbris el imaginibus {out of shadows and pictures into 
truth).30 In Book III ofthe Confessions. St.. Augustine was impressed by Cicero"s 
HtJrleTL~ius. Feeling a longing for the immortality of wisdom, he desired "not to study one 
particular sect. but to love and seek and pursue and hold fast and strongly embrace 
wisdom itself, wherever found...31 Augustine, however, did soon join a Manichee sect 
and had a long path towards a beauty, so new and yet so old. 32 Augustine was able to free 
himself from the Manichees through sincere friends, personal questioning and free 
29 [bid.. 22-24.
 
30 Newman's memorial tablet. Can be seen today at the Oratory in Binningham.
 
3. St. Augustine. Confessions, m, iv, 8, trans. Henry Chadwick:. (Oxford: Univernry Press, 1992), 
39. 
32	 Ibid. X. xxvii, 38.
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inquiry. The final personal assent to the immortal wisdom ofChristianity came by way of 
a liberty of thought to seek wisdom. wherever found, independent of whoever preached 
it The parallel with Newman shows the value ofliberty of conscience as a basis for 
finding truth in free inquiry and personal assent.H 
Like Augustine following an old friend, Helvius Vindicianus.J.l Newman could 
seek truth because of the emotional influence of friends. There again., like with Mayers. 
Newman was never a devotee of blind obedience to his intellectual teachers. He learnt 
from them to think for himself, and ultimately thinking for himself meant he was not 
always thinking just like his leaders. 
Going to, and starting at Oxford, John Henry Newman had already learnt the 
fundamental tenet of religion, 
see with my own eyes; walk with my own feet. 35 
n This writer. ~Cult Tactics in the Confessions," BraniffBriefly, (April. 1995).4-6. 
]..t Ibid IV, iv, 5. 
}~ Apo.21. 
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CHAPTER V 
TWO ANSWERS TO LIBERALISM 
The truth is, . . . 
I was drifting in the direction of the Liberalism of the day. 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua 
An important tenet in Newman's thought on conscience and its liberty was his 
rejection of Liberalism as he found it historically in Oxford upon his arrival. The 
perspective under which we wish to view Newman in this dissertation is to understand 
his thought in the light of his life. A classic example of teaching based on his life was his 
resistance to Liberalism. Newman knew Liberalism in those early years and rejected it 
from then on. However, Newman insisted over and over on his use of the term 
"Liberalism" "as a Protestant ... and ... in connection with the circumstances under 
which that system ofopinion came before me at Oxford" I 
On receiving the Cardinal's hat in 1879, Newman would proudly state: 
I Apo. Note A, ~Liberalism.ft 
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To one great mischief [the spirit of Liberalism in religion] 
I have from the first opposed myself2 
The epigraph to this chapter follows the stated purpose of the Apologia to "simply 
state the facts. - These words fit into Newman's whole emphasis of going by persons, not 
by books.} On arrival at Oriel in 1822, Newman had felt the power of the Noetics with 
their, by Newman's definition, Liberalism. Their ideology had excluded faith by relying 
solely on reason. Devotion was likewise made superfluous by their k.nowledge.~ 
In fact, we may even note that Liberalism, as criticized by Newman, was an 
immanent philosophy which set up the individual as the ultimate judge of reality. But, 
according to Newman, the very fact of setting the individual hwnan as the judge of 
revealed docnines becomes contradictory. The nature of revelation is precisely to be 
beyond, and independent of, individual judgment. The strength of religious doctrines lies 
in their being divinely revealed. Liberalism then went in circles since it claimed that the 
individual must even understand something that need not be understood. For a Liberal, all 
truth must pass through the sieve ofhis own mind. And all religious authority is rejected 
a priori. Religious revelation and authority must be made to the measure of the 
individual's mind Hence, Newman concluded that Liberalism was ignorant of the very 
"constitution of the human mind.,,5 
2 Bigliello Speech. Rome. May II, 1819. To be discussed in Chapter XVI.
 
3 LD xxii, 158.
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Newman's rejection of this Liberalism will help us understand the real liberty of 
conscience in Newman's thought and life. What John Henry did not discard was another 
kind of Liberalism. The Liberalism rejected by Newman was pointedly called a "'false 
liberty of thought.,,6 He contrasts his use of the term to that of Montalembert and 
LacoTdaire in France. Newman admitted his high admiration of these men. with whose 
ideology he enthusiastically concurred. The "liberty of conscience~ invoked publicly by 
Montalemben in 1863. the year before the Apologia was published, is a freedom from 
coercion and respect for the individual conscience.? Hence. we can logically conclude 
that Newman. by praising Montalembert, accepted this "liberty of thought" 
Why did Newman reject this Protestant Oxonian Liberalism? Newman's change 
of mind did not come by study. Books - "intelligible processes of thought" - did playa 
role in Newman's "history of his opinions". but so also did "honest external means:·i! In 
his critique of Liberalism., in fact. books seem to have no part. Rather his own weak body 
and his dear youngest sister's death stopped his moving towards Liberalism. "Two great 
blows rudely awakened him.-. Let us examine both events with their consequences 
against his "drift towards Liberalism.,,9 
The illness was a depression due to intellectual overwork which he brought on 
himself by assuming the burden of tutor in 1826. The temptation to take on too many 
6 Apo. 218. Note A. ··Liberalism.~
 
7 Discourses to the Catholic Congress at MaIines. See Martina. 534 - 53S.
 
• Apo.36. 
• Ibid. 24. 
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responsibilities remained with him for most ofhis life. Already in 1820, when he 
competed for honors at Trinity, he experienced a distressing lassitude, symptomatic ofa 
state ofextreme cerebral fatigue. 1O The remedy was simple: go out, take some exercise, 
and walk in the open air. These prescribed walks had the added advantage of taking him 
away from the excitement of the common room and giving him more time for personal 
reflection. 
To sister Jemima, he wrote; "It is so great a gain to throw offOxford for a few 
hours. ,-ll With Haniet, there was an acknowledgment ofanother reason for peace and 
quiet a desire to avoid the vanity of success: 
My ride of a morning is generally solitary; but [ almost prefer being alone. 
When the spirits are good., everything is delightful in the view of the still 
nature which the country gives.... How desirable for me to get out of the 
stir and bustle of the world, and not to have the responsibility and 
weariness of success! Now, if! choose to wish a scheme, and in my 
solitary rides, I sometimes do, I should say, "Oh., for some small curacy of 
a few hundred a year, and no preferments, as the world calls it!,,12 
These thoughts reveal a desire for perfection andsilence; no doubt easier to 
achieve in obscurity than in the excitement of the intellectual discussions of the Noetics. 
Beyond that, Newman distrusted the seductions ofth;; academic world- Liberalism had 
linle to offer beyond intellectual advance. John Henry had r~dlizeu th~ magical spell of 
the intellect was unable to satisfy the flight of the soul towards virtuous living. 
10 Mo:. i. 151-152.
 
II Ibid. 172.
 
12 Ibid.
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Linked to his rejection of mere academic success, John Henry remarked that 
ambition also must go, which also included a desire for influence. Being Tutor at Oriel, 
Newman was cautious even about a promising career with considerable influence over 
students. His illness of 1827 cooled the ambitions ofhis tutorship begun the year before. 
The preference for intellectual over moral excellence was defeated. His illness provoked 
solitary walks; then, solitary walks a detachment from the vanity of this world. 
Liberalism was found lacking. IJ 
Mary's death, on the other hand, on January 4th, 1828, came as a shock to 
Newman. Her memory absorbed him more and more. Besides the vanity of intellectual 
excellence mentioned above, her disappearance opened Newman to the thought ofa 
world beyond the senses, the reality ofa spiritual communion beyond the grave, the 
mysterious yet powerful presence ofGod in our life, and, finally, the reality of Death as 
the ultimate arbiter of all human life. Liberalism, with its immanent, individualistic, and 
human limitations had no answer to such a mystery. 
To appreciate the impact and consequences of Mary's death on her brother, we 
may envisage the deep and ineffable friendship between the two. Its special nature was 
born in an intimacy of kindred spirits, quite unknown even to the family. The few extant 
letters of Mary Newman to her brother John or to her older sister, Harriet, reveal a deeply 
sensitive soul who knew how to hide her impulsive heart. One may guess the immediate 
harmonious agreement ofJohn Henry with such a delicate and intuitive spirit 
Il Apo. 22. 
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At first, he had guided his young sister in her early studies. In spite of all his 
professorial seriousness, the influence of the older brother did not stop at the academic 
level. In Mary's open and upright soul, John Henry's deep interior life engendered a sort 
of fascination. Long before her brother's future friends recognized his talents, Mary 
discerned something of the genius hidden behind his above-mentioned solitude. 
A close communion ofsouls in the sharing of a common religious ideal remained 
in Newman after her death. Her memory drew him to the threshold of the invisible world, 
making him even more attentive to the realities inhabiting it Thus did bereavement 
purify the Oriel tutor's soul, deepening his sense of the world beyond and renewing his 
spiritual life. Their common partaking of the same profound reality ofGod produced a 
bond that death itselfwas unable to dissolve but rather strengthened in a renewed 
fidelity. Once again, Liberalism with its a priori rejection of the rationally unacceptable 
seemed inadequate to Newman's life. 
Their communion of souls was kept secret by Mary during her life. There are, 
however, some letters of admiration for her brother, referring to the influence exerted on 
her: 
Well, I really think I have found out the secret of my difficulty in writing 
to you. It is because I never told you the difficulty. At least, I find I write 
much easier since my confession. 14 
A few weeks before her death, she wrote with the same abandon: 
How I long to see you! I can fancy your face· there, it is looking at me. 15 
14 Mo:: i. 117. Mary refers to the "confession" ofadmiration for her brother.
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John Henry's first reaction to so brutal and unexpected a tragedy was one of 
shock. 16 Without guilt, anxiety, or meaningless questions, her death resolved for him the 
problem of his own destiny. Quickly, Newman understood that Mary's death was not an 
end but a beginning, the inauguration of a new order of relations between them. An even 
closer communion began to establish itself Thanks to the mysterious presence of his 
sister, the surviving brother discovered the presence and action of a living God and a long 
list of invisible realities in another world from our concrete world of appearances. 
The utter suddenness ofMary's death revealed the living God in his terrible 
majesty. "Sister death," to use St Francis' image, had been so rapid and unexpected that 
she allowed no room for speculation. The visitor came alone "unheralded,"' coming and 
going with amazing ease. This off-handedness captured Newman's attention. In it, he saw 
the hand ofGod, seizing for Himself such a young life which really belonged to Him. 
Thus, Mary's departure was a silent witness to the power and mystery of the Lord of life 
and death. 
This theophany showed God as the only Actor, the human being as helpless. The 
revelation of the divine was all the more apparent in its rapidity faced with the inability 
of human medicine to either delay or prolong it Newman's poetry shortly after her death 
shows how her demise was totally divine, and hence consecrated to the Lord as a pure 
and spontaneous offering: 
'6 Ibid. 157. 
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Death was full urgent with thee, Sister dear, 
And startling in bis speed;-
Briefpain, then languor till thy end came near ­
Such was the path decreed, 
The hurried road. 
To lead thy soul from earth to thine own God's abode. 
Death wrought with thee, sweet maid impatiently:­
Yet merciful the haste 
That baffles sickness; - dearest, thou didst die, 
Thou wast not made to taste 
Death's bitterness 
Decline's slow - wasting - cha.rm, fever's fierce distress. 17 
So, this "blow~ to Liberalism brought home to Newman the living presence of 
God in his life in a manner similar to the day of his earlier conversion. The absolute 
cenainty of another world beyond death reinforced what his illness had also taught biOI: 
the vanity of this world, and, with it, the vanity of intellectual achievement without 
virtue, of reason without faith, of knowledge without devotion, of man without God. 18 
From then on, Newman's conviction about the invisible world was so real that it 
carne close to constituting one of the most basic foundations ofhis spirituality. Mary's 
death was without doubt the event which contributed the most to the clarity of vision of 
him who wished to "never sin against Iight.,,19 Liberalism's insistence on intellectual 
greatness rejected the notion of the moral greatness of virtue over sin, while its refusal to 
accept revelation in religion bore no answer to the mystery of death. 
11 Ibid. 159.
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Besides the incompleteness of the Liberal ideology, Newman saw the 
insufficiency of its claim to life and success only in this world, what he calls "the pride of 
reason. ,,20 In his letters of 1828, Newman's memories of Mary provoked in him a 
conscious disenchantment with the world caused by his seeing it as so vulnerable. 
[n May, he wrote to sister Jemima: 
Thursday, I rode over to Cuddlesdon.... The country too, is beautiful; the 
fresh leaves, the scents, the varied landscape. Yet I never felt so intensely 
the transitory nature of this world as when most delighted with these 
country scenes. And io riding out today, I have been impressed more 
powerfully than before ... with the two lines: 
... Chanting with a solemn voice 
Minds us ofour better choice.... 
I wish it were possible for words to put down those indefinite, vague, and 
withal subtle feelings which pierce the soul and make it sick. 
Dear Mary seems embodied in every tree and hid behind every bill. 
What a veil and curtain this world ofsense is! beautiful, but a vei1.21 
The transparent quality ofNewman's sentiments are far removed from any false 
affectation and hopeless despair. We see his ability to grasp the profound depth of living 
behind the mask of appearances. Liberalism's mistake ofjudging all human knowledge 
in rationalistic terms blocked out the light of Revelation.ll Hence, Newman's deep 
rejection of such an ideology till his very end. 
Evoking the memory ofMary, his own destiny oflife beyond the grave evoked in 
John Henry more than just a lingering sorrowful emotion ofbis deceased sister. Newman 
saw that a person's past is never totally abolished. A person's history projects itself into 
20 Ibid. 217.
 
ZI Moz. i. 161.
 
11 Apo. Notc A. MLiberalism," proposition 6. 223.
 
48
 
the present, and the future. This spiritual reality beyond senses, science, time, praise, and 
death is real and meaningfuL The past becomes the messenger of the invisible world, the 
life of living persons, close to us always. In June, 1828, five months after his sister's 
death. Newman wrote to his sister Harriet: "Not one half- hour passes but dear Mary's 
face is before my eyes. ,,23 
Newman began to see a happy, serene, life beyond the grave: 
Dearest, gentlest, purest, fairest! ... 
Paradised in the inmost shrine. 
There thou liest, and in thy slumber 
Times and changes thou dost number.24 
From Mary's happiness in eternity, he began to envisage his own destiny on earth 
as a share in God's eternal bliss: 
A sea before 
The Throne is spread; its pure still glass 
Pictures all earth-scenes as they pass. 
We on its shore 
Share, in the bosom ofour rest, 
God's knowledge, and our blest!25 
The above poem shows the impact of his sister's death. Newman now considered 
the real world that ofGod, however invisible and spiritual. In this universe of divine 
knowledge and human happiness, each person has a destiny. John Henry's search for 
truth encompassed another world unknown to science and the senses, known only 
through faith. The duty ofconscience to an "external Master" is to a living God, all-
D Moz. i.16J. 
24 vv. 29. 
2$ Ibid. 108-110. 
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powerful and omniscient. Death, therefore, is the ultimate wibtess to the truth ofall 
things. All elSe is secondary. 
Newman ended his note on Liberalism in the Apologia with a sense of total 
liberty from all threats of authority in his search for truth. Quoting Horace, one's property 
may be taken; cruelty may be his lot; and the great treasure of friends either "dead~ or 
"rude.- God himself, to whom one wished to be faithful in conscience, would ultimately 
set him free. When? At death. There is the final and just end to the story ofms earthly 
endeavor. Mors ultima linea renon est (Death is the line that marks the end of all).26 
So, Mary's death and the thought ofdivine judgment at the hour of his own death 
helped Newman achieve the liberty ofconscience and life to "launch himself in an ocean 
with currents innumerable.,,27 This conviction gave Newman strength when the liberal 
Whately, who taught him how to think for himself, later made himself "dead to me,,,28 
and even when Newman "felt himselfdead as regards my relation with the Anglican 
Church....29 Even ifWhately became dead to him, and he became dead to the Anglican 
Church, the real death for Newman would come later. And what would count then was 
neither the judgment of Whately or the Anglican Church., but the viewpoint ofGod. 
Ending this note on Liberalism, Newman stated his "his flame of mind" and 
strength towards those who persecuted his quest for truth in freedom. Trusting in God 
16 Apo. Note A. ~Liberalism.," 222. Newman is quoting Horace. Epistles. I.xvi. 73-79.
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so 
who ..the moment I choose, will set me free,"30 Newman was faithfuJ to his conscience, 
but ultimately is faithful to God. That same God, all-seeing and all-powerful, set him free 
from all earthly powers and possessions. Newman's love of truth beyond the veil of 
appearances and authorities found its ultimate vindication at the moment of death, 
moment of truth and freedom. 
Newman says "he chooses," because his choice was for truth in all its reality, both 
here and beyond. both in science and in religion, both in reason and in faith, both in 
freedom and in authority, both in life and in death. The ll1timate reason for Newman's 
fearlessness ofacademic and religious authorities is his own death. People and Churches 
may become dead to him, but the living Lord lives forever. And those who die in the 
Lord are no longer dead, but alive. 
Like Mary. 
30 Ibid. 222. 
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CHAPTER VI 
BLESSINGS OF FRIENDS 
Blessings of friends, 
which to my door unasked, 
unhoped have come, 
Apologia Pro Vila Sua 
While Whately became "dead" for Newman as a friend, there were other friends 
who not only taught John Henry how to think for himself, as Whately did, but also 
"influenced his theological view,,,1 What is more, as we shall see in this Chapter, they 
even helped Newman write his first theory of what we are calling "liberty ofconscience. n 
Whately, we noted in Chapter V, only gave Newman "intellectual advance.,,2 
Now two friends enter the picture, who had an influence beyond mere intellectual 
advancement. As with Whately, Newman did not necessarily agree with them on all 
topics, but their influence would be deeper. Paraphrasing his critique of Liberalism in 
I Apo,32. 
2 Ibid,22. 
52 
being mere intellectual achievement without a moral thrust, Newman saw the same 
weakness with individual Liberals. They, like their arguments, did still have an 
intellectual influence on Newman. John Henry still cherished the influence ofWhately 
in helping him think for himself, and of Hawkins in helping him weigh his words. 
Lacking in them, and in Liberalism, was a moral and religious dimension to life, truth 
and friendship. 
Froude and Keble were friends ofa different breed.) Not only did they give 
Newman tools to think for himself, but also helped him to achieve in conscience new 
theological convictions. Newman still preserved in his new friendships with Froude and 
Keble the intellectual freedom he had gained from dealing with the evangelicalism of 
Mayers and the Liberalism of the Noetics. What the three, Froude, Keble and Newman, 
achieved was a respect and communion ofspirits in the mutual search for truth in liberty 
ofconscience. Once again Newman would follow them part of the way, but break: open 
his own new track whenever he deemed necessary. The novelty ofNewman's friendship 
with Froude and Keble in contrast to bis friendship with Whately and Hawkins was that 
in this new friendship Newman maintained this friendship even though he would differ 
intellectually from both Keble and Froude. 
Who were these influential friends ofNewman and how did they influence him 
and each other? Son ofan archdeacon, Richard H. Froude had been brought up in the 
purestTory and High Church tradition of his paternal home and county.4 In a word, he 
3 Ibid. 26 - 32. 
• Ibid. 32. 
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was an English gentleman imbued with traditiOD. Prematurely deprived ofhis mother, he 
recelved a strict education from his father, which possibly exacerbated an already 
difficult temperament. His naturally fiery character carried him into the most diverse 
enthusiasms: the excitement of a boat race at sea, or the contagious fever of an 
intellectual debate where he could use his passion for logic to his heart's content. 
Possessing intellectual, and religious insights, a temperament such as his could 
have easily gone to extremes if it were not for the influence ofJohn Keble, who brought 
him the peace of mind he needed. Before joining Newman at Oxford, Froude had been 
Keble's pupil for years. When Keble retired to a country parish, Froude followed him as a 
private pupil, and the pastor's moral authority soon produced positive results. Keble 
radiated the serenity and innocence of the just. Earthly honors and university titles were 
not his ambition. A man ofsllence and prayer, everything around him exuded peace and 
serenity. His example succeeded in overcoming other powers in the conscience of his 
pupil. Keble showed Froude how to fight against the "pride oflife," along the path of true 
renunciation. In Keble's care, Froude was able to exercise his exceptional gifts, both 
refining and spiritualizing them.5 
Friendship between Newman and Froude grew as they both became involved in 
the reform ofa tutor's role on the conscience of their pupils. Froude tended to follow the 
ideas ofNewman in undertaking a reform of the system. John Henry wrote: 
s Ibid. 31-33.
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There is much in the system which I think wrong; I think: the tutors see too 
little of the men, and there is not enough direct religious instruction. It is 
my wish to consider myselfas the minister ofChrist Unless I find that 
opportunities occur of doing spiritual good to those over whom I am 
placed, it will become a grave question whether I ought to continue in 
tuition.6 
This desire to achieve religious impact and reform showed the earnestness ofboth 
in their religious convictions and their understanding of the role ofOxford in the 
religious education, as it was then. of Anglicanism. 
An episode illustrating Newman's understanding of conscience, fiiendship and 
Oxford, came with the election ofa new provost for Oriel in 1827.7 Newman's esteem 
for Keble did not blind him to the distinction between his "angelic qualities" and the 
practical duties ofadministration in a college. Keble did not seem capable for the 
administrative position. Keble seemed to Newman extremely conservative in the exercise 
of authority. This truth, and the duty to vote for Hawkins, John Henry thought., was 
greater than his personal friendship with Keble. Hawkins as a future administrator 
seemed more realistic. Newman voted for Hawkins accordingly as the best choice for 
Provost. 
Time, however, brought out Newman's error. The final result of the Liberal 
thought of Hawkins was the termination ofNewman and Froude as tutors, in 1830. The 
question may be raised here as to how liberal the Liberalism experienced by Newman in 
Oxford was. The influence of ideas on authoritative decisions in the running of an 
• Moz. i. 133. 
7	 See. Kcr, John Henry Newman, A Biography (Oxfuni: Oxford University Press, 1990),31-41. 
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institution as seen by Newman in Hawkins firing them was to have lasting effect on 
Newman's thought and life. In fact. the cessation ofNewman and Froude as tutors was to 
spark the Oxford movement. "Humanly speaking, that movement never wouJd have been, 
bad he not been deprived ofms tutorship.',g 
Richard Hurrell Froude and John Henry Newman later became friends with 
mutual influence on each other. The road to Rome was first shown by Froude who taught 
Newman 
to look with admimtion towards the Church of Rome, and in the same 
degree to dislike the Reformation. He fixed deep in me the idea of 
devotion to the Blessed Virgin, and he led me gmdually to believe in the 
Real Presence. 9 
What interests us here in this essay, however, is not so much what Newman began 
to believe, but how he came to believe. Through Froude's friendship there was obviously 
freedom from the constraint of coercion, and, on the contrary, there was persuasion based 
on argument and affection. "Cor ad cor loqUi/ur.~1O . 
We see Froude's influence also on Newman's spiritual life. Froude showed him 
the sanctity of a sincere and simple conscience. Constantly F~oud~~~ught to bridge the 
gap between his life and ideals. The burning fire of his enthusiasm often met with the 
cold ice of reality. His many ideas expressed in the Remains I I convinced Newman of the 
dangers of intellectualism. Soon after his friend's death, John Henry wrote: 
3 Moz. i. 140. 
• Apo. 32. 
10 Newman's motto on his canIinal's coat ofanns.
 
11 Froude's papers published posthumously by Newman and Keble.
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Dearest: he longs to speak, as [ to know,
 
And yet we both refrain: 12
 
"Faith without works is dead" may have been his reflection. Not only was the 
dilettante intellectualism of Liberalism incomplete as to moral excellence, but other ideas 
may also become sterile ifnot brought to action. Newman learnt from Froude that 
personal convictions need to be spoken of in public. Later, Newman would say: I wish to 
keep quiet; but if Bishops speak, [ win speak too. 13 Before we saw how Newman 
rejected the vanity ofambition, preferring to pass unnoticed Now he refused to be silent 
about his understanding of truth in accord to the demands of conscience. 
A deeper lesson Newman learnt from Froude was how to deal with conflict 
Newman and Froude saw that ideas may be only words in a discussion, but also may 
become linked to deeds, and sometimes to deeds by those in power. The very fact of their 
dismissal as tutors by Hawkins showed Newman the power ofauthority. Not only can 
there be an intellectual disagreement with someone, but also that discord may lead to the 
dissenter being shown the door. Their rejection as tutors was only the beginning of many 
sword-crossings with other ideas, people and powers that be. 
Froude's fearless firmness ofconvictions with others equaled his firmness with 
himself Ifhe was convinced of some claims of the Church of Rome, he was indifferent 
to his friend Newman's beliefthat the Roman Church was the anti-Cbrist. 14 Froude's 
11 vv 195-196. 
13 Apo. 115. 
•4	 Ibid. 32.
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obvious sincerity, his open and direct manner toward one and all, and his freedom of 
thought both frightened and stimulated Newman. Impressed by his friend's contagious 
vitality and ardor, Newman learned how to overcome his own reserve and timidity. John 
Henry learned to argue in public the battle that became the Oxford Movement. 
Upon Froude's death in 1836, Keble and Newman edited the papers left by their 
friend. The intimate notes of his Journal testify to the marvelous combination of an 
intense loyalty to the traditions of the Anglican Church together with caution towards the 
self-righteousness of the majority in power. This conservative combination meant a 
critical attitude towards the political and religious leaders of the day, such as Peel and 
Hawkins, whose sole wony was power in alliance with Liberalism. The influence on 
Newman of this fidelity to tradition plus fierce independence from those in power will be 
seen later as John Henry advanced in his search for truth. 
Newman's second influential friend, John Keble, had decisive influence on John 
Henry's first theory of libeny of conscience. The link between the two came about due to 
Froude. In the Remains Froude wrote: 
Do you know the story ofthe assassin who had done only one good deed 
in his life? Well, if I was asked what good action I have done, I would say 
that I brought Newman and Keble to understand each other. IS 
Their first encounter was rather one of admiration. After all, Keble then enjoyed 
incomparable prestige at Oxford, having obtained at a young age all the honors of the 
University. In the Apologia Newman recalls the shock he experienced when be came face 
IS Ibid. 27.
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to face with Keble on meeting him in the street and then in the common room at Oriel 
during Newman's presentation ceremony. In a letter to his friend., Bowden., John Henry 
wrote: 
I had to go in great baste to the Tower in order to receive the 
congratulations ofall the fellows. I bad suffered it just until Keble shook 
my band., then I felt myself so confused and so unworthy of the honor 
which had been conferred on me that I would have wished for the earth to 
swallow me up. 16 
However. the relationship between the two scholars lay dormant from that day in 
1822 IU1til after Keble's retirement to a country parsonage in 1836. In fact, the wise 
master considered Newman still too imbued with the schools of evangelicalism and 
Liberalism. Keble considered both those ideologies arch-enemies of the Church of 
England., and N~wman seemed to have a stake in both antagonistic camps. 17 
Events in 1827 brought together their paths oflife into a deep fiiendship. First, 
Newman favored Hawkins over Keble in the election for Provost. When that door of 
tutorship was later closed to him. he would tum for guidance to Keble. Newman's open 
spirit appreciated the beauty in Keble's Christian Year published that same 1827. This 
book ofpoetry is a defense of Anglican traditions in the line of the Book ofCommon 
Prayer. On reading Keble's poems. Newman was deeply moved A first visit to Keble's 
home followed in 1828. 
16 Ibid. 26-27.
 
17 Ibid. 27.
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The Peel affair in 1829 brought another twist to Newman's disillusion with 
Whately and Liberalism. Newman called it the "fonnal break-.. 18 Once again, the door to 
his friends Froude and Keble grew wider, while the door to Liberals Whately and 
Hawkins was closed Peel's vote for Catholic Emancipation might seem an unlikely 
cause celebre for Newman, our supposed defender ofliberty of conscience. I? The point 
which the Apologia makes, however, is that it was not a matter of politics and religion, 
but rather consistency and Oxford's independence. John Henry could not take a gross 
inconsistency all of a sudden from Peel who before was against Catholic Emancipation 
and now was in favor "as dictated by Liberalism. ,.,20 Liberalism, which Newman attacks 
later in Note A of the Apologia as being against the "constitution of the hwnan mind," is 
shown in this episode as being also against the constitution ofa State in so far a liberal 
politician, Peel, showed no consistency ofbelief. 
Going back to Keb1e's Christian Year (1827), an important development took 
place in Newman's thought relevant to our issue of liberty of conscience. Newman dwelt 
on the topic at this stage of the Apologia even though, as he admits, his philosophy of 
religious assent will later be dealt with extensively in An Essay on the Development of 
II Ibid. 24. 
•9 The Act ofCatholic Emancipation in 1829 meant religious liberty for CllhoIics and an end 10 
most discrimination in the British Empire. For historical backgroWld 10 Newman's participation in the 
controversy with Peel, see Ke:£, 32 • 39. 
20 Apo. 24 -25. 
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Christian Doctrine and the Grammar ofAssent. At this point, we follow Newman's 
ideological development as related in the Apologia. 21 
References to Newman's two works on Miracles were a first step on the path 
towards defining liberty of conscience. Newman first saw a development in his ideas on 
miracles between these works, one written in 1826, the other, in 1842. In the first essay, 
before Keble's Christian Year, John Henry divided miracles into those received and those 
rejected. In the second version, the difference lies in the degree of probability perceived 
to create certitude, or only opinion.22 The development in Newman's thought can be 
attributed to Keble, but, as seen before with Mayers and Whately, evangelicalism and 
liberalism, Newman saw in Keble a master, but never a divine one. 
So, on the one hand, Newman did call Keble "his new master,~23 and took from 
him via Butler the concept of "probability" being the rule oflife. Nevertheless, Keble 
attributed the "full internal assent" in religion not to probability, but to the force of faith 
and love in the subject. Quoting a Mr. Miller, Keble attributed to Scripture that power by 
which the human subject knows and is certain ofhis faith. 24 
Newman, however, was "dissatisfied" with this explanation. He found it 
"beautiful and religious," but "lacking in logic." Once again, going beyond his master, 
Newman tried to "complete it with considerations onus own." The lack oflogic was 
21 Ibid 29.
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briDging in religion to justify religion. This, ofcourse. would be the fallacy ofa "petitio 
principii. " Besides, the door lies open to subjective appraisals of religion by any 
individual who feels God has spoken personally to him. The reason for such a certitude in 
reduced to the person's conviction that he has the necessary faith and love in order for 
God to speak to him. This "ipse di.:cit" argument might seem to open the door to all 
fonns of religious subjectivism, fanaticism and tyranny, and was therefore rejected by 
Newman. 25 
Newman saw another line of solution. Accepting both Butler's and Keble's theory 
of the idea of probability, Newman noted the difference between certainty and certitude. 
Certainty pertains to the quality of propositions; while certitude pertains to a human habit 
of mind Therefore, in accord with the greater or lesser probabilities ofthe case in point, 
there should be greater certitude. So, Newman considered that certitude is stronger or 
weaker in accord with neither the faith and love of the believer nor the power of 
Scripture, but rather on the strength of the probabilities themselves.26 
Going a step further, how did Newman justify this jump from probabilities to 
certitude and full internal consent? John Henry draws on "the very constitution of the 
human mind and will of its Maker. ,,27 Newman considered that part and parcel of reality 
is that the human mind is so made by God that it makes this leap to assent. This topic will 
occupy a great part of his Grammar ofAssent when he deals with the "mative Sense." 
v Ibid. 29. J I.
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The mind can amass a certain amount ofevidence but needs to go beyond the individual, 
concrete, elqlerience to affirm certain realities due to the lesser or greater degree of 
cwnulation of probabilities.28 
[n the case ofmiracles, about which Newman developed his thought at this stage 
of his life, the point in question was the distinction between miracles per se and the 
accounts thereof John Henry affirmed that miracles, such as the Resurrection, are to be 
believed. or to be rejected. etc., in accord with the circumstances with which they are 
presented to us. The Ap<)logia refers to the classical distinction between religious truths 
true in themselves, "certain" quoad se. and truths as they are known to be certain to us, 
quoad nos. Therefore, though propositions about God or religion may be totally "certain" 
quoad se, they are not quoad nos. 
Applying this distinction to "private judgment in religion," Newman made it clear 
that the objective content of religious truth is not clearly known to all hmnans, but 
demands subjective effort. So, the Resurrection may, of course, be true, but its 
knowledge and acceptance by the individual is a matter of certitude based on the 
probability of the fact brought home to US.29 The parallel to Aquinas' distinction between 
Deus per se notus and notus quoadnos is remarkable.30 
:Ill GA 270-299. 
29 Apo. 30. 
30 Summa Theologiae 1, q.2, a.1. C[ this writer. "Religious liberty: Newman defends Aquinas," 
BrrmilfBriefly. (Dei:A:rrber. 1994), 10-11. 
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What also interests us are several adjacent considerations to this theory of 
religious assent. Newman speaks of probabilities "attached to a professed fact" as it is 
"brought home to US.,,31 The implication here of the phmse "brought home to us" is that 
not only are there variations in the probabilities themselves, but also in the individual's 
assessment of them. Therefore, religious truths, or even an ideology like Liberalism, may 
or may not be assented to by the individual person. This assent is not only because of the 
arguments per se, but also in so far as those arguments or probabilities are brought home 
to this specific person. Newman's life itselfcomes to mind as he struggled along the path 
ofevangelicalism, Liberalism and now Keble's Anglicanism. 
The logical follow-up to the above theory of probabilities and certitude becomes 
the realm of duty and conscience. The subjective appraisal of diverse probabilities 
"attached to a professed fact" with all its pluralism in no way takes away the element of 
"objective fact" in our assents. lfNewman here was willing to accept the heterogeneity 
of probabilities and the variety of individual assents, he likewise insisted in the same 
breath on linking probability, certitude, objectivity, conscience and duty. There is a duty 
to have certitude in accord with the objective probabilities which are "brought home to 
us." 
Hence, we may conclude with Newman that there is both an inherent subjective 
and objective element in all religious assent The subjective element is the individual 
person assessing probabilities as they are brought home to him. Hence, Newman 
31 Apo. 30. 
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understood pluralistic views in religion, precisely because each subject accepts 
probabilities in so far as they are convincing. Also, the very law of probabilities implies 
an objective content. That objective content in religion bas a force of its own on the 
individual. That force is the force of truth. however imperfectly known. And. thus, the 
knowing subject has an obligation to follow that truth as it is known. To conclude, there 
is both a logical and moral subjective duty to assent to the force of objective facts in so 
far as they are brought home to us by greater or lesser probabilities.32 
Summarizing this concept. we may say that Newman argues for a primacy of 
conscience understood as the individual's duty to assent to truth as it is known. And this 
very primacy demands a rejection of the notion "autonomy of conscience" understood in 
the aforesaid understanding of Liberalism, where conscience is a law unto itself, and 
even rejects a priori certain truths. J3 
These objective probabilities in no way can be identified with subjective whims, 
fancies, fallacies, or fanaticism of what divine thought may be. Hence, Newman's 
argument for the possibility of diversity and error in following conscience did not reside 
in the subjective factors of the individual. Diversity in conscientiously reached decisions 
are based, in his view, on the nature of the facts as brought bome to us, not on our whims 
or fancies. So, for Newman, an explanation of contradictory conclusions in conscience 
among individuals cannot be reduced to subjective desires, passions, or ignorance. The 
n Ibid.
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very nature of the human mind, including the divine will for it, causes the law of 
probability in life, whicl,1.. in tum., causes distinct religious assents in diverse people. 
If we were, in opposition to Newman, to accept a reduction of pluralistic 
convictions in conscience to merely subjective factors, there is only a step to consider the 
individual always culpable of his ignorance, and, if culpable of ignorance, his decision in 
conscience may be considered tainted and unworthy of respect. Hence, no tolerance 
should be offered for dissenters, since they are culpably ignorant of the truth. 
And, ifalso we were to consider that divine revelation, and maybe even the need 
to be a member ofa specific Church, is readily known to all, without probabilities and 
subjective searching, then error would have no excuse but personal passions. In this 
perspective, error ends up with no rights.34 
The rest ofNewman's life will show how he "wrote, argued and acted," in accord 
with this key principle ofjustifying pluralism in religious assent. 35 In the following 
chapters we wish to show the distinction between subjective culpable error and error 
based on the law oflife that is probability. 
For now we may conclude this section on certitude and probability, quoting: 
).I See note 10 in chap. [V
 
35 Apo. Preface.
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This was the region ofjudgment in religion; that is, of a Private Judgment, 
not formed arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or liking, but 
conscientiously, and under a sense of duty. 36 
l6 Ibid. 30. 
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CHAPTER VII 
A STRANGE LOVE OF SICILY 
Time was, ...
 
I would not brave the sacred fight
 
Because the foe was strong.
 
Verses 
"The key distinction between a plurality of private judgments in religion., due to 
whim and due to conscience, as brought out in the last chapter, becomes a drama in one 
particular episode ofNewman's life; his trip alone to Sicily. Following our theory of 
understanding Newman's teaching on liberty ofconscience by seeing how he lived, we 
can analyze this key vital event to bring out even more the difference between judgments 
in conscience and those in fancy. Later, in the Letter to Ihe Duke ofNorfolk Newman will 
deny the rights ofconscience considered as "the right ofself-will" and call it a 
"counterfeit"1 Such a concept ofconscience as self-will became prevalent, according to 
the Letler to the Duke ofNorfolk, in the eighteenth century. What Newman understood as 
I Diff. D. 250. 
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this counterfeit ofconscience, and what he meant by self-will, are clearly illustrated 
during his trip to Sicily. His reflections thereupon taught him to purify his view of 
conscience and duty. 
Having set off from England with the Froudes in December 1832, Newman 
decided to go back to Sicily all alone. His desire was to know more about the enchanting 
places which he had only started to discover in the course of this Mediterranean voyage. 
Dr. Copleston's words came to mind: Nunquam minus solus. quam cum solus (Never less 
lonely than when alone~ 2 
Reaching Naples, the sole voyager wrote to sister Jemima: 
I have lost my companions, and I was going among strangers into a wild 
country to live a wild life, to travel in solitude, and to sleep in dens of the 
earth - and all for what? for the gratification of an imagination.. for the 
idea of a warm fancy which might be a deceit, drawn by a strange love of 
Sicily.J 
The irony of these lines is that they reflect the struggle ofconscience which was 
to follow. On the one band., Newman felt that he was just following his own personal 
desire to enjoy the pleasures of the voyage. On the other, scruples of conscience were to 
magnify in his mind, as if he were committing some kind of a deceit, a falsehood., a doing 
something which was not his duty and maybe not even the will ofGod. John Henry was 
living the struggle of those who wish to follow their conscience but doubt their 
selfishness. 
2 Apo. 25. 
J Moz. i. 337.
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The idea of conscience, duty and the will ofGod, were intimately connected in 
his scruples. In a letter to Froude, Newman explains his anxiety: 
When I went down to Sicily by myself, I had a strong idea that He was 
going to effect some purpose by me. And from Rome [ wrote to some one, 
I think Christie, saying I thought I was to be made something of in His 
Hands, "though if not, the happier for me." 
And when I was in Sicily by myself, it seemed as if someone were battling 
against me, and the idea has long been in my mind, though I cannot say 
when it came on, that my enemy was then attempting to destroy me. A 
number of sins were committed in the very act of my going down by 
myself- to say nothing else, [ was willful, and neglected warnings - from 
that time everything went wrong.4 
Deep down we see that, on the one band, Newman wished to assure himself that 
he remained in the hands of God. On the other, he associated the deadly illness he would 
suffer with a divine punishment for having been too capricious and self-willed. In another 
lener, be wrote: "I felt it was a punishment for my willfulness in going to Sicily by 
myself"s 
As to the nip itself, on arrival in Sicily, Newman was ecstatic at the spectacle of 
Taormini. However, assailed by illness, he decided to go inJand towards the city of 
Catania. Accompanied by Gennaro, his faithful servant and guide, John Henry in pain 
reached the town of Leonforte, a hundred miles from Palermo. After a sleepless night, he 
was overwhelmed by fever without finding a suitable remedy to fight it. Two or three 
days later, realizing that his state was getting progressively worse without hope of rapid 
improvement, he decided to take to the road again in the hope of reaching, at any cost, a 
4 K 315.
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place where he would be in a better position to receive care. A few miles later, he was 
forced to stop anew. A doctor, met by chance, took him to the village of Castro-Giovanni, 
where he was to remain for nearly three weeks in a precarious state between life and 
By throwing Newman into a state bordering on agony, this illness was a terrible 
encounter with his deeper self. It became a dramatic confrontation between the forces of 
self-will and the mission he felt he had to do in England Jolm Henry himself, a year 
earlier, had consoled his bed-ridden friend Thomas Mozley: 
It is one especial use of times of illness to reflect about ourselves ... had 
it pleased God to have visited you with an illness. . . it would seem a 
rebuke for past waste of time. I believe that God cuts off those He loves 
and who really are His, not interfering with their ultimate safety, but as 
passing them by as if unworthy ofbeing made instrwnents of his 
7 purpose. 
These austere reflections on human weakness made earlier to Mozley were 
probably now present in the mind of the depressed voyager, languishing in a poor Sicilian 
inn. His physical weakness stirred up a sorrowful examination ofconscience, while the 
mounting fever made fonner scruples reappear. The plunging into the hidden recesses of 
truth bore the mark of a personal chastisement. God appeared to abandon his servant to 
the worst oftemptations, the one of the desert, revealing to Newman the image of his 
own self-will, with the threat of spiritual failure beyond repair. 
6 Apo. 40_ 
7 Moz. i. 228_
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This sense of rebellious self-will, later to be called a "counterfeit of conscience" 
in the Leller to the Duke ofNorfolk,8 and empty intellectualism as seen with the 
Liberalism of the Noetics,9 reached a peak at Leonforte during the most critical phase of 
the fever. Newman alluded to it in a memoir written some eighteen months after the 
event: 
Next day the self.reproaching feeling increased I seemed to see more and 
more my utter hollowness. I began to think ofall my professed principles, 
and felt they were mere intellectual deductions from one or two admitted 
truths. 
I compared myself with Keble, and felt that I was merely developing his, 
not my, convictions. I knew that I bad very clear thoughts about this then, 
and I believe in the main true ones. Indeed, this is how I look on myself~ 
very much (as the illustration goes) as a pane of glass, which transmits 
heat being cold itself. 
I have a vivid perception of the consequences of certain admitted 
principles, have considerable intellectual capacity ofdrawing them out, 
have the refinement to admire them, and a rhetorical or histrionic power 
to represent them; and having no great (i.e. no vivid) love of this world, 
whether riches, honors, or anything else, and some firmness and natural 
dignity of character, take the profession ofthem upon me, as I might sing 
a tune which I like - loving the Truth, but not possessing it, for I believe 
myself at heart to be nearly hollow, i.e., with little love, little self-denial. I 
believe I have some faith, that is aiL 10 
The above letter merits a detailed analysis to see Newman's critique of academic 
success empty of virtue and his understanding ofself-will as a counterfeit ofconscience. 
First, we notice the rejection ofan empty Liberalism whicb has nothing to say 
beyond words at Newman's bour ofagony. John Henry realized that he had thoughts 
• Diff ii 250. 
9 See above chap. V. 
10 Moz. i. 366. 
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about this or that, that he drew logical deductions, and even had the capacity to deduce 
their consequences and admire their beauty. All of which gave Iinle strength to a dying 
man alone in a strange land. 
Second, we perceive the reference to Keble. Again, Newman felt he lacked the 
inner peace and sincerity ofconscience, which was the charm and source of his friend's 
influence. Newman saw that he was unable to realize, with regard to himself, this 
marvelous accord, this sort of natural symbiosis between truth and sentiment, grace and 
life, of his friend, pastor and scholar. 
Thirdly, we note that Newman felt that the Lord was banling against him, but not 
because of earthly pleasures. These, he admitted, never attracted him: "I do not love the 
world, its riches, nor its honors.',L I The problem was his self-will, his desire to rule his 
own life, taking him away from a destiny where God wanted him. This self-will was 
made up ofan independence ofjudgment and an impatience of heart which sometimes 
became unbridled pride. 
The spiritual trial of his deadly illness tore Newman's conscience apart in two 
different directions. On the one hand, Newman was attracted by moral beauty such as 
that represented by Keble and, on the other, he felt be was not living up to the 
requirements of what he knew to be his duty. Newman felt that '"he had not sinned 
against the light,,,12 but also that "God was fighting against me, ... - at last I knew why­
11 Moz., I.e.
 
12 Apo.4O.
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it was for self-will."11 In Catholic terminology, Newman saw he had done no evil, but, 
likewise, had committed the sin of omission by not following the will of God, but rather 
his OWIL 
In this Sicilian drama, the anxieties and scruples of past years came to his 
conscience. A kind ofspiritual fire threw light on his most intimate sentiments, as he lay 
on his death-bed. A new light was shed on his conscience to know even better the 
imperfections of his acts and thoughts. l1te resulting remorse made him condemn any 
remaining trace of self-will. 
With illness, a deep questioning spirit threw a true light 00 his "private judgment 
in religion, not formed arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or liking, but 
conscientiously, and under a sense ofduty."14 In spite ofconversions and self-deniaJs, in 
spite of the security ofa divine presence which gave him light, his journey in conscience 
in Sicily was more the work of his will than that of God. It was less a revelation of God 
than a performance by Newman. Up to now, John Henry had chosen his path in life, not 
that of the Lord. The poem "Sensitiveness," written during this Mediterranean trip, states: 
Time was, I shrank from what was right
 
From fear ofwhat was wrong.
 
I would not brave the sacred fight
 
Because the foe was strong ....
 
Such dread of sin was indolence.
 
Such aim at heaven was pride. IS
 
\] Moz. i. 365. 
14 Apo. 30. 
•5 WLX. 113, January 13. 1833. 
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Having discovered how be had lived arbitrarily and not reaJly in conscience as a 
sense of duty towards a loving Person, Newman entered the next step. A sense of desen 
and hollowness made him feel how much his soul was empty. To cut shon such painful 
reflections, he counted the nwnber of stars and flowers "in the pattern on the walls~ to 
keep himself busy in his sick room. 16 Such a trial accomplished the necessary 
purification of his will towards a more complete abandonment to whatever mission the 
Lord destined for him in England Newman had indeed chosen his own way, but his 
search for the light was sincere. The Lord would eventually make his will known. 
Though erroneous, his conscience had led him on the road to truth: 
I had a strange feeling on my mind that God meets those who go on in His 
way, who remember Him in His way, in the paths of the Lord; that I must 
put myself in His path, His way, that I must do my part, and that He met 
those who rejoice and worked righteousness, and remembered Him in His 
way.I7 
Newman notes in the Apologia that "especially when [ was left alone ... I began 
to think that I had a mission.~ And going to Sicily, he noted that "the presentiment grew 
stronger.~ At several stages during this drama, such a conviction surfaces. First, there was 
the spontaneous farewell to Msgr. Wiseman at the English College in Rome before his 
trip to Sicily, when Newman said he had a work to do in England. Then, in Leonfone, 
when the fever struck, he assured GeMaro he would not die for "he had not sinned 
16 AW 123-125.
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against light" Finally, on becoming well again, he could only explain his violent sobbing 
by exclaiming: "I have a work to do in England.""1 
Hence, Newman's understanding ofdivine, and not self, will involved freeing his 
judgment from whim and fancy in order to discover truth in doing God's will as one 
understood it. Newman would consider self-will as not being real liberty of conscience. 
And such a liberty involves a decision to follow truth and God wherever they might lead. 
On his return to Oxford, Newman would now brave the sacred fight, even if the 
foes were strong. 19 If, up to now, Newman had chosen his own way, he would now have 
to banish all vanity and attachment to his own self-will. The desire for total sincerity in 
conscience to what he thought God's mission for life became the "kindly light" to lead 
him on. Though later he might lose friends, churches, Oxford, and even Rome, he 
endeavored never "to sin against light.nZO 
Newman's ultimate answer was to repeat the words dear to him from youth, 
"Exoriare a/iquis "(Let someone rise Up).21 Together with the sense ofdivine mission in 
the verse from Virgil, Newman applied to himself Southey's poem ofThalaba, a young 
Arab, whose appointed task was to destroy a race of sorcerers. Thalaba succeeded, 
despite great difficulties, due to his faith in the Lord.22 With his conscience at peace 
'" Apo. 40. 
'9 VV, LX, 113. 
10 Ibid. and Apo. 40. 
11 Aeneid IV. 625. 
n Apo.4O. 
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again, Newman renewed his resolution to be a faithful instrument in the hands of the 
Lord Once his self-will was fully submitted in conscience, the latter understood as a 
moral sense and sense ofduty to a living and loving Creator, his mission was able to 
assert itself. God was presenting to him a mission in the Church in England. Newman 
would now undertake it, not as a task chosen by himself, but as a mandate received from 
God 
The certitude that he was obeying Truth, and not his own whim or fancy, was to 
fortify his conscience in all his trials. On his return to Oxford, Newman would surprise 
himself with his own courage and audacity. Froude had taught him previously how to 
dominate his personal repugnance and timidity towards controversies and possible 
enemies. Now in Sicily, the Lord himself showed Newman the meaning of his illness and 
the strength ofAchilles returning to battle.23 
All this episode had a key message in Newman's understanding of liberty of 
conscience. We have seen that Newman's "private judgment in religion'~ was not based 
on a "fancy or liking." He undertook the trip to Sicily as an act of self-will. Here, we see 
Newman reject an understanding of liberty of conscience as sel f-will, as what I want to 
do, without any consideration of truth beyond my liking. 
Of course, the opposite implication is also true. A decision in conscience is 
likewise not doing whatever the other's "will to power" might be. Newman felt strong 
now to "brave the sacred fight ... even if the foe were strong..,24 Libeny of conscience 
23 Ibid. See Iliad xvm.125.
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involves freedom from slavery to one's self-will in the same breath as it is freedom from 
the will ofother human beings, however divine they consider themselves. 25 In other 
words, autonomy or servility ofconscience is not the same as primacy of conscience. In 
the first case, autonomy or servility means making oneselfor another the divine law, 
following self or another's will. In the second case, primacy of conscience means doing 
what one considers one's duty in conscience.26 Likewise, primacy ofconscience means 
seeking the will ofGod, above self-will or any supposedly divine institution, such as the 
Anglican Church, which may become dead for us. 27 
We have also seen how Newman, on the one hand, says he "never sinned against 
the light," while, on the other, he was a slave of ~self-will." How can these views be 
reconciled? It remains obvious that Newman was erroneously following what he thought 
right, though indeed it was more personal fancy than conscientious duty. Ultimately his 
desire to always follow the light, led him out of the darkness of self-will to the fuller light 
of divine truth. The lesson here may be that even if a private judgment in religion be 
guided by self-will, if the ultimate desire is to seek truth, there is a possibility of 
repentance and, even, ulterior strength. As happened to Newman in Sicily. 
The light of conscience may grow dim amid the darkest night. The traveler may 
choose to follow in pride his own path, but while he searches with the light ofa sincere 
l' In the leiter to the Duke ofNorfolk, Newman writes of religious authorities making conscience 
their creature and their slave, -doing. as ifOD a divine sanction, his [authority's] will" Diff. ii. 255. 
Conscience si10uld be "-free in f8ct, ... independent." Cr. cult tactics. above., 30. 
26 Ibid. md Apo. 30
 
27 Apo. Note A, -Libenilism," 222.
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conscience the road to truth becomes clear. Therein is reflected a serene humility, a 
peaceful confidence, and trust in God, who gives spiritual strength and a hopeful end 
Newman's strange love for Sicily ended on the sea-voyage home with this poem: 
Lead., kindly light, amid the encircling gloom
 
Lead Thou me on!
 
The night is dark, and I am far from home ­

Lead Thou me on!
 
Keep Thou my fee~ I do not ask to see
 
The distant scene, - one step enough for me.
 
I was not ever thus, nor prayed that Thou
 
ShouIdst lead me on.
 
I loved to choose and see my path; but now,
 
Lead Thou me on!
 
I loved the garish day, and., spite of fears,
 
Pride ruled my will, remember not past years!
 
So long Thy power hath blessed me, sure it still
 
Will lead me on.
 
0'er moor and fen., 0'er crag and torrent, rill
 
The night is gone.
 
And with the mom those angel faces smile
 
Which I have loved long since, and lost awhile. 2&
 
John Henry arrived back at his mother's house in England on July 9, 1833. The 
following Sunday, John Keble preached the sermon "National Apostasy" from the 
Oxford University Pulpit. For Newman, that date was always considered the start of the 
Tractarian Movement.29 
18 VV 156; June 16.1833. Apo. 40. 
29 Apo.41. 
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CHAPTER VIII 
DEAD TO THE ANGLICAN CHURCH 
My change ofopinion arose, 
not from foreign influences, 
but from the working ofmy own mind, 
and the accidents around me. 
Grammar ofAssent 
The events sUrTOlmding Newman's life from 1833 to 1841 can globally be 
considered the time of the Tracts. Our interest here is to see how Newman understood 
liberty ofconscience as he developed his own religious convictions. 
What is indeed remarkable in this time-frame are the apparent ironies in 
Newman's decisions. First, he set out with the Tracts to defend the Anglican Church 
against Liberalism, while eventually he ended up being considered ~dead ... to the 
Anglican Church.'" Then, he started writing the Via Media, as the way of the Anglican 
Church, in order to prove he was not becoming a Roman Catholic. Again, this effort 
I Apo. Note A.. ~Liberalism," 222. 
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eventually drew him close to Rome. l Finally, he sought in the 39 Articles the theological 
basis for his anti-Roman bias.3 Their analysis in Tract 90 brought him nothing but 
trouble in Oxford and lead him "into the hands of the Philistines" [the Heads ofColleges 
at Oxfordl.4 
The purpose ofour reflection is not a theological analysis of the arguments used 
by Newman to justify his ideological position. Rather, we wish to analyze how he lived 
an understanding of liberty of c90science as free inquiry and personal assent. Above all, 
we wish to see in action in Newman's life his own theory on the "region of private 
judgment in religion; that is, ofa private judgment, not formed arbitrarily and according 
to one's fancy or liking, but conscientiously, and under a sense ofduty."s 
In this stage of Newman's life and writings, a paradox is seen in his contrasting 
opinions, as time evolved. How could he reconcile such contradictions? How did he 
envisage the clash of individual conscience and the ecclesiastical authority he was living 
under and only wishing to defend? As he wrote ofthe Traetarian Movement: 
And so it proceeded, getting stronger and stronger every year, till it carne 
into collision with the Nation, and that Church ofthe Nation, which it 
began by professing especially to serve.6 
2 lbid.6l.
 
3 lbid.7l.
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First. let us briefly view the theological horizon of the events of the Traetarian 
Movement of 1833-1841.1 Newman attributed its beginning to Keble's Sermon on 
National Apostasy in 1833, and its end to Tract 90 in July, 1841. Its purpose was to 
defend the Anglican Church against the dangers of Liberalism and Evangelicalism. 
Liberalism showed itself in the political sphere by intrusions by the State into religious 
affairs such as the appointment of an Anglican bishop in Jerusalem for foreign policy 
reasons. Newman considered this appointment inspired by religious indifferentism as the 
third blow which "finally shattered" his faith in the Anglican Church.g Liberal religious 
indifferentism also promoted the de-establishment of the Anglican Church. Case in point 
was the suppression of the ten Anglican bishoprics in Ireland, and the removal of 
religious tests in Oxford and Cambridge. especially subscription to the 39 Articles. 
Evangelicalism, on the other hand, insisted on personal conversion and religious 
experience. Indirectly, it promoted Liberalism in Religion by making religion only "a 
subjective idea ofour minds. ,,9 
Newman denounced both evils and wished to engage the battle on its true terrain, 
which was not political but religious. John Henry wanted to bring the Anglican Church 
back to a sense of her own dignity by helping her rediscover the sense of her mission 
from Apostolic times. Healing against Liberalism and Evangelicalism would come only 
1 See Ker. 54 -100.
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from within by the renewal of faith and faithful obedience to the Church of the Fathers 
which the Anglican Church had forgotten. 
So, for Newman, the problem went beyond the question of privileges for religion 
in the State or Universities. The question was for the Anglican Church to get back to the 
faith of the Church of the Fathers. Indeed. Newman still held the then-common assertion 
of state-support for religion. He rejected the separation ofChurch and State, Church and 
University, fostered by the religious indifferentism of Protestant Oxonian Liberalism. The 
latter was in contrast to Roman Catholic Liberalism in France, where Montalembert and 
Lamennais advocated liberty of conscience in the context ofGallican control of 
Catholicism. 1o Montalembert rejected State enforcement of religion. Religious assent 
should be personal and non-coercive. Newman's ideological evolution followed a 
differentapproach, as we shal.l see. Ultimately, however, it was his very life which bore 
out his understanding of liberty ofconscience during these Tractarian years. 
The means Newman chose to bring the Anglican Church back to the Fathers was 
the wide diffusion oftmets destined to arouse or stir up from indifference all those, cleric 
or lay people, interested in the affairs of the Church. Pamphlets written in a striking style, 
incisive and dealing with unexpected subjects, were the weapons selected. rather than 
ideological petitions. Newman edited numerous tracts and wrote letter upon letter, 
traveling throughout the countryside in order to bring tracts just off the presses to the 
vicarages. 
10 See Chap. V above. 
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His opposition to Liberalism continued unabated. A painful example revealed the 
depth of his belief in the Anglican Church in 1834. In disagreement with the current 
opinion of that time, Newman, VicarofSt Mary's since 1826, refused to perfonn the 
wedding of an unbaptized woman who belonged to a dissident sect. The sacramental 
discipline in the Anglican Church was then very relaxed, brought under the influence of 
lax theologians and liberal pastors. Newman's refusal to marry the couple was part of his 
effort to return to the practice of the Primitive Church. This was the principle defended 
by the Traetarian Movement, to appeal to the Church of the Fathers. 
John Henry encountered hostility among his own family; even his mother did not 
spare him her disapproval. In painful isolation, he only received letters of support from 
Keble and Pusey. Newman felt an obligation in conscience to obey his local Bishop. 
However, it would be an obedience under a certain compulsion. If he were to disobey, he 
knew disobedience ultimately meant disowning the authority of the Bishop and, finally, 
would involve resigning from his pastorate in the diocese. II 
In this incident, we see in a nutshell the inherent contradiction or, rather, power of 
development ofNewman's thought both about the Anglican Church and liberty of 
conscience. He sought to defend the Anglican Church by appealing to the Church of the 
Fathers. Hence, he exercise his freedom of thought in a search for truth in his religious 
beliefs. However, the truth about the Primitive Church - in this case, about marriage. 
would come back to judge the Anglican Church. His wish was to defend orthodoxy, but 
11 LD tv. 299.30 I.
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orthodoxy as he discovered it. Newman felt obliged to accept the bishop's authority, but 
also clearly saw the limits on such authority. Put another way, and as has already been 
seen with Newman's many previous teachers, those in authority may be God's 
representatives, but they are so only in so far as God decides. So, ultimately, Newman's 
understanding of the "'region of private judgment in religion; that is, of a private 
judgment, not fonned arbitrarily and according to one's fancy or liking, but 
conscientiously, and under a sense of duty,~12 also subjects all religious authority to such 
a test of truth. Are they really representing God? and within what limits? 
Newman's answer to Liberalism was to reach the vast public with signs of 
doctrinal, liturgical, and ascetic renewal, based on a return to the Church of the Fathers. 
The latter, however, caused Newman to be criticized as looking towards Rome. To 
answer that interpretation., between 1833 and 1836, Newman wrote The Prophetical 
Office ofthe Church Viewed Relatively to Romanism and Popular Protestantism. 
Newman thought he had given the Anglican Church an original status, that of Via Media, 
between the Roman Catholic and Protestant interpretations of the Primitive Church. 
Thus, the Church ofEngland claimed ber right to apostolic succession in a special way, 
which distinguisbed her from the innovations of Protestantism, born of the Reformation, 
and., at the same time, from the corruption which had weakened Roman Catholicism. 
Newman did not consider the Via Media as being the political compromise of Elizabeth 
I, a son ofwatered-down version ofProtestantism and Roman Catholicism. Rather, he 
12 Apo.30. 
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saw in the English theologians of the seventeenth century the true face ofChristianity as 
it had been defined by the Church of the Fathers. Newman's unique effort tended to show 
that the Via Media was the rich source towards which his Church of England ought to 
return in order to express in her acts, as in her life, a fidelity to her basic constitution. 13 
In 1841, Newman published the celebrated Tract 90, his last In it, he first 
differentiated between the concepts of"Popery~and "Roman doctrine.~ Then he went on 
to ascertain what a man who subscribed to the 39 Articles might hold rather than that 
what he must hold. Again, the method was "a first approximation to the required 
solution,~ with the acknowledgment that "in minor things, whether in question of fact or 
ofjudgment, there was room for difference or error of opinion~; and Newman was 
willing to own a mistake, if it were proved against him. 14 
Before analyzing Newman's response to the Church of England's reaction, let us 
examine some aspects of Newman's sense of duty in conscience on writing the Tracts. 
First, since Sicily, Newman was no longer afraid to "brave the sacred fight, because the 
foe was strong.,,15 In fact, the "position of his mind~ was that it would have been 
"intellectual cowardice" not to seek a "basis in reason" for his faith. Secondly, it would 
be "moral cowardice" not to put it in writing. Newman felt that if their opponents, the 
13 Ibid. 61-63. 
14 Ibid. 72-73. 
1~ VV. LX, 113. 
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Liberals, did so, the Tractarians should do likewise. This, says Newman in the Apologia, 
was the main reason for Tract 90. 16 
As to the issue of authority versus private judgment, we note Newman's reaction 
to the public censure ofTract 90 by the Heads ofHouses at Oxford. Newman found 
himself not at all troubled. The latter was not some kind ofStoical resistance to pain. 
Rather, it was because his opinion remained unchanged as to the truth and honesty of the 
principles ofTract 90, and of the necessity ofmaking it public. 17 
As to the reaction ofecclesiastical authority, the first step was his bishop's­
Bagot ofOxford - request for silence and an end to discussion. One is reminded of other 
instances in religious and moral drama where the command to "keep silence~ is the 
answer to awkward questions. III Newman found that artificial, akin to cowardice. Then, 
the bishop, at the urging of the Bishop of London, requested that Tmct 90 not be 
reprinted. Again, Newman tended first to obey, but had second thoughts. 
Here, John Henry described several nuances in this power struggle between his 
respect for religious authority and his private judgment. To begin with, he saw the 
bishops becoming more authoritarian as he became more obedient. The more he 
submitted, the more they demanded: 
16 Apo. 63. 
17 Via Media ii. 368-387. 
•8 .See this writer's. ~Cult Taaics in the Confessions.n BraniffBriefly. (Apri~ 1995), S. Faustus' 
only answer 10 Augustine's questions is silence. A shrewd tactic to avoid defeat. Cf. Federico Garcia Lorca. 
TlrTf!e Tragedies, vol. 3, The House ofBernardo Alba (New York: New Directions, 1955). The final words 
are ~Did you bear me? Silence. silence. I said. Silence.," 211. 
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They pressed on me whenever I gave way;
 
they fell back when they saw me obstinate. 19
 
The mistreatment became worse, as Newman suddenly saw himself being used 
against himself He was to write a letter suppressing the Tract at the Bishop's request. 
Again, he perceived that, ifhe obeyed, he would leave himself defenseless against those 
who attacked his ideas. Finally, he felt so strongly that, if pushed by the Bishop to resign 
his living, he "could not in conscience act otherwise.n20 
This episode of the controversy finally ended with a compromise. Newman did 
not defend the Tract, ceased to publish new Tracts, and wrote a letter of compliance, not 
recantation, recording the Bishop's view. John Henry keenly saw the meaning and 
limitation of the Bishop's disapproval. Tract 90 had been found "objeetionable,~ but no 
reason had been given and no doctrine condemned by Authority. His one aim was to save 
the Tract. 21 
The damage, however, was done. Not only was Newman even more doubtful of 
the claims of the Anglican Church as it was de facto, but his religious submission to its 
authorities was severely shaken. The clear distinction between the divine message and 
the messenger was firmly established. Newman's naive obedience had come to an end. 
He understood the bishops' refusal to condemn Tract 90. Their interest was not 
19 Apo. 79. 
20 Lenerto E.B- Pusey, March 24, 1841. 
21 Apo. 79. See Ket". 220-224. 
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adherence to the value of the 39 Articles to serve the Anglican Church's cause, but rather 
to keep peace and avoid disturbance.22 
Again, Newman reaffinned the principle of submission to his bishop, but there 
was a clear limit. Compromise was the solution, but he added: "[ have no intention 
whatever ofyielding any one point which I hold on conviction.,,23 Authorities at Oxford 
and in the Anglican Church had lost confidence in him, he was on their black list. 
I saw indeed clearly that my place in the Movement was lost; 
public confidence was at an end; my occupation was gone. It was simply 
an impossibility that [ could say any thing henceforth to good effect, when 
I had been posted up by the marshal on the buttery-hatch ofevery College 
of my University, after the manner of discommoned pastry-cooks, and 
when in every part of the country and every class of society, through every 
organ and opportunity ofopinion, in newspapers, in periodicals, at 
meetings. in pulpits, at dinner-tables, in coffee-rooms, in railway 
carriages, I was denounced as a traitor. 24 
However, John Henry never lost confidence in himself His aim was to defend the 
Church of England and the "Catholic" - understood as 'Church of the Fathers' ­
interpretation of the 39 Articles. Henceforth he found himself"dead to the Anglican 
Church.,,25 
Newman's immediate conclusion to all this controversy over Tract 90 was to stay 
with the important question ofauthority, or, rather, divine authority. Ultimately, who 
decides the interpretation ofScripture, the Church of the Fathers, and orthodoxy? 
22 To 1. Keble. 10 Apr. 1841.
 
23 Letter to A.L. Philipps. 8 Apr. \841.
 
24 Apo. 78-79.
 
2S Apo. Note A, "Liberalism," 222.
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Newman had begun Tract 90 with distinctions of the meanings of~Romen; next, he faced 
the question ofwho was to decide the interpretation of the 39 Articles; and now he found 
himselfconfronted with the key issue of religious authority in all religious belief 
Ultimately, it was be his personal "conviction" which decided the issue. 
Beyond that, Newman wished to let the whole issue rest. As usual, he felt that 
truth would work itself out, adding: "I felt that by this event a kind Providence had saved 
me from an impossible position in the future.,,26 Tract 90 marked the end of Newman's 
belief in the cause of the Church of England All his sincere efforts to bring to the 
Anglican Church the dogmatic structures justifying its claim to be the Church of the 
Fathers in the 19th century ended in a command to silence. Even though the Tracts had 
come to an end., the workings ofhis own mind and the accidents around him were 
bringing about a change in his opinions.27 
In July, 1841, the British Critic carried an article by Newman on "Private 
Judgment." Seemingly resisting his own changes of opinion, Newman listed a series of 
conditions for change ofjudgment in religion.. First., change seems the characteristic of 
error, and men who change must show the sincerity of their willingness to change by 
their willingness to suffer. 
We repeat it, ifany men have strong feelings, they should pay for them; if 
they think. it a duty to unsettle things established, they should show their 
earnestness by being willing to suffer.28 
16 Ibid. 79.
 
17 Ibid. 68.
 
111 &S. ii. 139.
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Newman remembered his own experience at "the hands of the Philistines,n29 
when the Heads [ofcolleges at Oxford) did him a "violent act. n30 
Second, since truth in religion is a revelation from God himself. change of 
religion would be a sin, were it not one's duty. Religion and a change thereof is a most 
serious matter, since it deals with God himself 
Considering the emphatic words of the Apostle. laid down by him as a 
general principle, and illustrated in detail. "Let every man abide in the 
same calling wherein he was calIed:n considering, in a word., that change 
is really the characteristic oferror, and unalterableness the attribute of 
truth. of holiness, ofAlmighty God Himself, we consider that when 
Private Judgment moves in the direction of innovation, it may well be 
regarded at first with suspicion. 31 
However, such may be one's duty in conscience. Newman's former definition of 
private judgment in religion based on the law of probability in life comes to mind. 32 
Third, and satirically, Newman distinguishes between "the right of private 
judgment" and "the private right ofjudgment.n John Henry notes that the former, the 
right of all to have their personal judgment in religious matters respected., is totally 
distinct from the latter, where some think only they have the right to judge. Hence. he 
concluded that 
the doctrine of private judgment, all private judgment, and nothing but 
private judgment - is held by very few people indeed.H 
:l9 Apo.78. 
JO Ibid. J 13. 
31 &S. ii 138.
 
31 See chap. VI above. Also, Apo. 30.
 
33 Ess. ii. 141.
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Taking the case of an anti-Catholic Protestant whose daughter enters a Roman 
Catholic convent, Newman remarked on the father's small delight in such an event. 
Hence. the real sense of the "right of private judgment," as understood by Newman, 
means respect for the individual conscience, whereas the "private right of judgment" 
reflects the tendency of some to demand freedom of religion for themselves. but not 
others.34 Therefore, they demand freedom of religion when their religion is not 
respected, while coercing religious conformity when in power.35 
Newman's final justification for a right of private judgment in religion is 
Scripture. In this way, the error of Liberalism is avoided, in so far as the human mind is 
not erected as the judge of divine revelation. On the contrary, the Scriptures do teach us 
to inquire about the teacher of doctrine. 
And this obvious fact does, as far at it goes, make it probable that, if we 
are providentially obliged to exercise oW" private judgment, the point 
towards which we have to direct it, is the teacher rather than the 
doetrine.36 
When, therefore, an appeal is made to private judgment. what we are calling a 
judgment in conscience - this is done in order to settle who the teacher is and what is his 
authority, rather than to substantiate this or that religious opinion or practice. Newman 
added that even in the early Church, very grave outward differences seemed to exist even 
between Christian teachers, such as Paul, Cephas, and Apollos at Corinth., with partisan 
14 Apo. 30. 
]5 See Mattina, 285-286.
 
36 Ess. n. 152.
 
92
 
groups forming around them.37 John Henry concluded that we must distinguish between 
"party feelings and interests" and "the holy Church Catbolic.~JR 
Hence. there is obviously a freedom for the individual· a Scriptural privilege - to 
seek the truth about religion. to judge the validity of the claims ofteachers to preach the 
divine message. 
Let it be observed how exactly this view of the province of private 
Judgment., where it is allowable. as being the discovery not ofdoctrine. 
but of the teacher of doctrine. hannonizes both with the nature of Religion 
and the state of human society as we find it.39 
Such a search aims, in free inquiry and through persuasion., towards truth by 
private judgment. Scripture sanctions an inquiry. not about the content ofdivine teaching, 
but rather about the teacher: whether or not he be true or false. 
Another category mentioned by Newman in this essay on private judgment are 
those who "despise the notion of a teacher altogether." These assert that there is no such 
teaching authority anywhere. Consequently, Newman wished them to avoid the example 
of the dog in the fable - "who would neither use the manger himself. nor relinquish it to 
others:,..Io Such are those who neither seek the teacher of truth nor allow others to do 
SO:H 
17 Ibid. 158.
 
11 Ibid. 159.
 
19 Ibid. 152.
 
-IQ Ibid. 15S.
 
•• C[ 101m Locke. An Essoy conceming Human Understonding (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1975). 
In Chapter xvm. on "Faith and Reason". Locke affirms: "The believing. or not believing that proposition. 
or book, to be ofdivine autbority, can never be matter of faith. but matter of reason; . . . But yet, it still 
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As for his own conscience, whether be should continue in the Church ofEngland 
or take the road to Rome, he advocated leaving the issue to time. "Truth can fight its own 
battle. ,.42 Rather than attempting "to trace by anticipation the course of divine 
providence,~ Newman insisted on doing "simply what we think right day by day.···n 
belongs to reason. to judge of the truth of its being a revelation. and ofthe signification of the words. 
wherein it is delivered.n 693-694. 
<2 To R. Belaney. 2S Jan. 184\. 
<3 To R. W. Church, 2S Dec. 184!. 
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CHAPTER IX 
CONSCIENCE AND REASON 
I had no right, I had no leave.
 
to act against my conscience.
 
That was a higher rule than any argument
 
about the notes of the Church.
 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua 
In 1841, after the tragedy ofTract 90, Newman had the highest regard for 
conscience. He still could not in conscience join the Church of Rome. I On the other 
hand, he "said boldly": 
The Church in which I found myself had no claim on me, except on 
condition of its being a portion of the One Catholic Communion, and that 
that condition must ever be borne in mind as a practical matter. and had to 
be distinctly proved.2 
Parallel to the Tracts for the Times, Newman bad preached the University 
Sermons to the University ofOxford between 1826 and 1843. His conviction on the 
I Apo. 121. 
2 Ibid. 123.
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primacy ofconscience vis-Ii-vis the proofs for the claims of both Churches had found 
early expression in those Sermons. A key element to understand his argument in 
conscience for either Church was the primacy he gave to moral, rather than intellectual, 
proofs for the validity of their claims. 3 
A passage in one ofhis early sermons "The Usurpations of Reason' (1831) 
coincided with Newman's critical view ten yeaTS later ofboth Churches: 
So alert is the instinctive power of an educated conscience, that by some 
secret facuJty, and without any intelligible reasoning process, it seems to 
detect moral truth wherever it lies hid., and feels a conviction of its own 
accuracy which bystanders cannot account for; and this especially in the 
case of Revealed Religion, which is one comprehensive moral fact. 4 
In later sermons Newman did a great deal to make intelligible the process by 
which conscience is able to detect bidden moral and religious truth. Above all, the 
question he had to resolve in 1841 was how, on the one hand., he was asking proofs from 
the Churches for his adhesion in conscience to their claims, while, on the other, he 
seemed., in the Sermon above, to exclude an ""intelligible reasoning process." If the later 
were true, wouJd Newman not be reducing conscience to non-rational subjective 
A key distinction was his use of the terms "implicit" and "explicit" acts of 
reasoning in the third edition of the University Sermons, published in 1871, only a year 
J Ibid. 110. 
• US 66. 
, Cf David Hume, TrealiS2 ofHuman Nature, bk. 3, pt. 1, section 2. (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 
J978). Hunte considered that the "distinguishing impressions, by which moral good or evil is known, are 
nothing but particular pains or pleasures," 471. 
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after the key doctrine on conscience in the Grammar ofAssent. Newman gave instances 
which incline one to acknowledge tbat there is genuine reasoning, reasoning of which the 
reasoner may be unaware, and in which the grounds of inference may only be vaguely 
seen. So, for example, from a peTSOn's religious views, we can often deduce where they 
may stand on apparently indifferent issues, defending those issues better than they defend 
them themselves.6 Newman contrasted "implicit reasoning" with "argument." "People 
may argue badly, but reason well"; that is, their professed grounds are no sufficient 
measures of their real ones. People reach conviction not normally as a result of some 
proof seen as decisive, but as a result ofmany minute considerations coming together, 
which the mind cannot "count up and methodize in argumentative form.,,7 
Examples of the above in Newman's life were his consideration of St. Augustine's 
principle ofsecurus iudicat orbis terrarum (the whole world judges with assurance).K 
The Apologia remarks how a friend repeated these words to Newman "again and again,,., 
and, when he was gone, they kept ringing in Newman's ears. Then, the mere sentence 
struck him "with a power which I never had felt from any words before.,,9 Obviously, the 
lesson is that something, however so true and powerful, needs time and reflection in 
• US 21\
 
7 Ibid. 274.
 
• The full sentence, in Augustine's Contra epislo/om Parmeniani (ill. iv. 24) can be uanslated: 
"The whole world judges with assurance that they are not good men who. in whatever pan of the world. 
separate themselves from the rest of the world.n 
•	 Apo.98.
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order to penetrate the mind and conscience. And, what may have been unknown before, 
becomes a source of truth and duty. 
Another example from the Apologia is Newman's attitude towards converts. 
Newman reflects how Catholics have accused him of backwardness in making converts; 
while Protestants have argued from his reluctance to seek converts that he really had little 
eagerness to do so. Newman answers: 
h would be against my nature to act otherwise that I do;
 
but besides, it would be to forget the lessons which I gained in the
 
experience of my own history in the past. 10
 
Newman found himself unable to give reasons for his behavior, except the weight 
of his own experience. There was an ~implicit reasoning" in his conduct, whereas he was 
hard put to find "arguments" acceptable to others, be they Catholics or Protestants, to 
justify his convictions. The whole point of the Apologia was to give some intelligible 
meaning to his conversion, but not necessarily with an intelligibility acceptable to aI L 
What Newman achieved was a subjective conviction on what his conscience asked of 
him. Sometimes it was in the different expressions of revelation. Other times, he sought 
rationalization of truth as a Liberal. But, the narrative of the Apologia was to state the 
objective "apology" Newman had for his journey with truth. Arguments took time to be 
convincing in conscience. 
In summary, the Third Edition of the University Sermons, explains the essential 
relationship between implicit and explicit reasoning. Reasoning can be implicit, as in the 
ID Ibid. 105. 
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above examples in Newman's life, or explicit, when it seeks articulated argument for 
what is implicit. 'Explicit reasoning,' therefore, is articulated argument from an 
"analysis' ofwhat goes on in implicit reasoning. II 
Another setting for Newman's theory on conscience and reasoning is when he 
contrasted conscience and faith, on the one hand, and reason, on the other. By 'reason' 
Newman meant 'reasoning.' The parallel between faith and conscience in their 
relationship towards reason is seen in Sermon 10: 
No one will say that Conscience is against Reason, or that its dictates 
cannot be thrown into an argumentative form; yet who will, therefore, 
maintain that it is not an original principle, but must depend before it acts, 
upon some previous processes ofReason? Reason analyzes the grounds 
and motives of action: a reason is an analysis, but is not the motive itself 
As, then, Conscience is a simple element in our nature, yet its operations 
admit ofbeing surveyed and scrutinized by Reason; so my Faith be 
cognizable, and its acts be justified, by Reason, without therefore being, in 
matter of fact, dependent upon it. 12 
The notion may be taken from the above text that conscience does not need 
reason. In this line of thought, conscience is totally independent of all that is objective 
reasoning. Hence, it becomes subjective, more of a feeling in the Humean sense, and 
therefore, a master unto itself In such a perspective on moral convictions, the impression 
may then be taken from this text ofNewman that he is favoring a concept ofconscience 
wherein the subject himself, in conscience, is determining right and wrong. 
1\ US 66, foomote 4.
 
12 US 183.
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However, a careful reading of the text shows that he is talking about conscience 
having an independence of action prior to any process of reasoning. In other words, 
conscience has a motive, prior to formal reasoning. for acting. Therefore, conscience is 
prior to. not independent of. objective reasons for moral convictions. Nor, is there a 
double motive for action; first, what conscience uses as a motive, and, later, what reason 
sees to be a motive. Conscience acts sometimes for motives which are implicit, and may 
be put into argumentative form in explicit reasoning. Therefore, the implicit reasons of 
conscience become rationally argwnentative by the process of reasoning. 
The parallel with faith shows that conscience. like faith, can be justified by 
reasoning. Hence, faith, like conscience, has implicit reasons for one's faith or moral 
convictions. However, in matter of fact, in life's daily duties and beliefs, faith. like 
conscience, is independent of reasoning in its manner ofacting. Only later can one 
deduce from what is implicit the explicit reasons for either faith or conscience. [n 
Sermon X. Newman gave the example of the judge who does not justify the innocence or 
guilt ofsuspects. He merely discovers their truth. Likewise, reason only discovers what is 
in faith or conscience. 13 
Another context used by Newman in the University Sermons to explain 
conscience is to contrast the senses with the reasoning used in perception. The typical 
example is the sailor who looks at the clouds and feels the wind, and decides a storm is 
blowing. Therefore, according to Newman, the senses give us "direct and immediate 
13 Ibid.
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acquaintance" with their objects, whereas pen:eption by reasoning is obtained "indirectly 
upon grounds.,,14 So, following Newman's terminology above, sense perception would be 
implicit perception, whereas the reasoning of the grounds behind that perception would 
be explicit perception. Thus, the sailor, from previous elCperiences of certain clouds and 
winds, has learnt that a stonn is coming, even though he cannot articulate there and then 
the reasons for and against. 
Likewise with Newman's own conscience, his religious conversions were hard to 
reason explicitly. There were implicit reasons that needed analysis. Therefore, Newman 
was understandably slow towards prosdytism. Both Catholics and Protestants had 
difficulty with his experience in this regard. IS 
Concluding our comparison of faith and conscience, we quote Newman's example 
ofthe sagacious general in Sermon XI: 
Consider the preternatural sagacity with which a great general lcnows what 
his friends and enemies are about and what will be the final result, and 
where, of their combined movements, - and then say whether, if he were 
required to argue the matter out in word or on paper, all his most brilliant 
conjectures might not be refuted, and all his producible reasons exposed 
as illogical. 
And, in an analogous way, Faith is a process of the Reason, in 
which so much of the grounds of inference cannot be exhibited, so much 
lies in the character ofthe mind itself, in its general view of things ... that 
it wiIJ ever seem to the world irrationaL16 
I. US 205-207. 
'1 Apo. 105. 
16 US 217-218.
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So faith is like conscience. The action ofboth involves their operating rationally, 
but not by way ofarticulated reasoning. 
The importance of these comparisons and the distinction between implicit and 
explicit reasoning in conscience is that Newman clearly included moral intelligibility as 
an activity ofconscience. Hence, when Newman speaks of the subjective power of . 
conscience to ascertain a conviction on right or wrong, the action involves the implicit 
reasoning to detect hidden objective moral truth. Newman uses the qualification 
"educated" for such a conscience. 17 
We may conclude, then., that the doctrine of conscience in the University Sermons 
implies that conscience engages in moral reasoning of an implicit kind. The term in the 
Grammar ofAssenr will be "natural inference. ,,18 Conscience decides the rightness or 
wrongness ofan action by implicit reasoning, as if the action simply presented itself, and 
its rightness or wrongness simply felt or seen. We may call the latter psychological 
immediacy in so far as the subject is immediately aware of his convictions without a 
formal, conscious, process. Explicit analysis by reason of the grounds and motives of 
actions dictated by conscience comes later. 19 
As a final note to these reflections, we consider the best guide to Newman's texts 
to be Newman himself His whole youth from evangelicalism to liberalism to 
11 Ibid. 66. Earlier in the University Sermons Newman speaks ofa mind -habitually and honestly 
confonni:ng itselflO its own full sense ofduty,ft 20. Cf. Grammar ofAssent. 106. where he speaks of 
ft
-careful formation of the individual's natural conscience. 
Ii GA260. 
19 US 183. 
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anglicanism to Tract 90 bears testimony to his search for reasons for his belief At the 
same time, he always wished to ~see with my own eyes and walk with my own feet:,20 
This combination of personal conviction and objective reasons are summarized in a 
passage when he was "on his death-bed" as regards the Anglican Church in 1839: 21 
The one question was, what was ( to do? I had to make up my mind for 
myself, and others could not help me. I detennined to be guided, not by 
my imagination, but by my reason. And this I said over and over again in 
the years which followed, both in conversation and in private letters. 22 
The question of what he had to do was, of course, the question of conscience. 
Conscience consisted in an ultimately personal decision, unresolved by others. Quite 
obviously ifothers could not help him, neither could they coerce him. Newman knew he 
had to seek for himself explicit reasons for his decisions in conscience. And once again, 
John Henry insisted in that dark hour, that such was his consistf.'nt belief in conscience 
and reason throughout his life. 
20 Apo. 22. 
21 Ibid. 121 
22 Ibid. 100. 
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CHAPTER X 
GOING TO THOSE I DO NOT KNOW 
When I was fully confident that the Church ofRome was the only true Church, 
[joined her. 
Apologia Pro Vita Sua 
Newman's conversion to the Roman Catholic Church is intimately linked with his 
writing ofAn Essay on the Development a/Christian Doctrine. This book was written 
before the author became a Catholic.' In fact, the outcome of the book was to remove the 
last obstacle on his road towards Rome.2 Once again, we note the amazing link between 
Ne\\lman's life and books. In fact, he had learnt the lesson from his illness in Sicily and 
I Remarkably, the Oxford Dictionary 0/the Christian ChuTch swes: ~ On 9 Oct. 1845 Newman 
was received into the RC Church. Almost immedia1ely afterwards he issued his An Essay on the 
Development o/Christ/wl Doctrine in defence of his change ofallegiance.n F. L.Cross and E.A 
Livingstone, OrfordDictionary 0/the Christian Church, 2d ed., (Oxford: University Press. 1993), 965 
The impression given here is that Newman wrote his Essay a posteriori to defend his change of religion. 
Whereas, in his own postscript, be stated that ~ work was wrinen and panty printed before he was a 
Catholic.n DiN. lei. He wrote, then changed. Not vice versa. 
2 letter to his sister Jemima, 15 Mar. 1845. The context reads: "I have a bad name with more - 1 
am fulfilling alI their worst wishes and giving them their most coveted triwnph - I am distressing all [ love, 
unsenIing alII have instructed or aided - I am going to those whom I do not know and of whom I expect 
very little - I am making mystelfan outcast, and that at my age. 011, what can it be but a stem necessity 
which causes thisT 
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friendship with Froude that certitude in religious questions demands action.} [n 
considering the question ofjoining the RC Church in 1843, Newman's own simple 
answer to his great difficulty had been 
Do what your present state of opinion requires in the light of duty, 
and let that doing tell: speak by acts.4 
Accordillgto the method of this dissertation, we wish to analyze Newman's 
concept of conscience as he wrote this book and acted accordingly. We shall endeavor to 
note the following characteristics of conscience as brought out in this episode of 
Newman's life. First, its individual, personal, character as each person finding alone their 
own path towards duty in truth. Secondly, we shall emphasize the historical dimension of 
decisions in conscience as written and lived by Newman at the time of his conversion to 
the RC Church. Finally, we wish to note the divine element in any decision in conscience 
as understood by Newman. Our hope is that this elucidation of conscience as lived by 
Newman in his decision of 9 Oct. 1845 will prepare the road towards our later 
conclusions on his understanding ofliberty ofconscience. 
On March 20, 1841, Newman had written: No one can enter into my situation but 
myself.5 Newman's purpose in writing the An Essay on the Development ofChristian 
Doctrine was not to write an apology for his conversion to Catholicism. Less still was he 
writing an apology for Roman Catholicism itself.6 His purpose was totally personal; how 
l See above chapters VI and Vll. 
4 Apo. 168. 
I Ibid. 137.
 
6 Preface to the edition ofl878, Dev. vii.
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to answer his own difficulty in becoming a Catholic at a precise time in his life.7 His 
need was not for logical reasons to join the Church of Rome. He felt a great dislike for 
"paper logic." 
All the logic in the world would not have made me move faster towards 
Rome than I did~ as well might you say that I have arrived at the end of my 
journey, because [ see the village church before me, as venture to assert 
that the miles, over which my soul had to pass before it got to Rome, 
could be annihilated, even though I had been in possession of some far 
clearp.r view than I then had. that Rome was my ultimate destination.R 
Newman insisted here on the personal, historical dimension ofdecisions in 
conscience. Comparing logical argwnents to seeing the village church at a distance, he 
distinguished between seeing intellectual reasons for going to Roman Catholicism and 
actually going over to Rome. At the root of this distinction is his philosophical dislike for 
"unfeeling logical inferences.',9 As developed later in the Grammar 0/As.~ent. Newman 
considered certitude as being in the concrete by an acting person, whereas logical 
inference only reaches conclusions in the abstract. 1O Here, with An Essay on the 
Development a/Christian Doctrine, Newman distinguished between seeing and walking. 
One thing is to see intellectual arguments for Roman Catholicism. Quite another to 
actually go over to that Church. The human mind may foresee intellectual consequences 
in Logic from certain premises. But, it is the "whole man who moves...11 Newman's 
7 Dev. ix-x. 
I Apo. 136. 
• Ibid.
 
10 Below chapters XI and XlI.
 
II Apo. 136. 
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philosophical anthropology involves the whole person with his life situation, a clear 
rejection ofan intellectual abstraction. 
Therefore, in An Essay on the Development ofChristian Doctrine, Newman's 
method ofcertitude for his own conscience is the law of probability. On the question of 
development of doctrine, there is the high antecedent probability that Providence would 
watch over His own work., directing and ratifying those developments of doctrine which 
were inevitable. 12 On the other hand, the existing developments ofdoctrine are the 
probable fulfillment ofiliat expectation. 1l This system of writing and arguing by 
Newman in this work follows the distinction quoted above from the Apologia between 
the certainty in logic due to rigid demonstration, and certitude in religious inquiry, where 
we arrive at certitude by accumulated probabilities. 14 For that reason, it is the whole man 
that reasons and moves; whereas "paper logic is but the record of it."IS Therefore, for 
Newman objective reasons or apologetics have a clear limit; the individual person needs 
certitude from an accumulation ofprobabilities brought home to him alone. 
The personal and historical character of conscience is also seen in his 
Advertisement to the First Edition ofAn Essay on the Development ofChristian 
Doctrine. The work is intended to "avow his present belief' with his desire to "suggest 
'2 De". \O(l
 
13 Ibid. 92.
 
14 Apo. 157. 
B Ibid. 136. 
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thoughts" and "carry forward" other inquirers. 16 So, it: on the one hand, Newman found 
his own certitude in Roman Catholicism on writing this book, on the other hand, he 
clearly knew that his reasons for belief are mere suggestions for other seekers. Not only 
did he see his own decision in conscience to be entirely individual, but also considered 
that the same held for other people. Just because he saw reasons for conversion to Roman 
Catholicism with the decision to walk that road did not mean he felt others should in 
conscience follow his path. On the contrary, precisely because his own certitude was 
entirely personal and historic, likewise the conscience of others had to see and walk for 
themselves. 17 
Besides, this characteristic of conscience can be seen in both An Essay on the 
Developmem o/Christian Doctrine and the Apologia. He began the Essay as an non-
Catholic as he says in the Advertisement, and decided to become a Catholic when "he 
had got some way in the printing." But, this, his own personal certitude, did not entice 
him on a crusade of proselytizing for Roman Catholicism. On the contrary, in the 
Apologia he remarked that he was eager for converts while he was "fighting in Oxford 
for the Anglican Church." Nevertheless, as soon as he turned towards Rome, he kept to 
the principle of "finding disciples, rather than seeking them," because his concern 
became entirely his own duty in conscience. 
16 Dev. x. 
17 Cf. chapter IV above. HawkiDs taught Newman "to see with my own eyes and to walk with my 
own feet." 
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This went on till 1843; but, at that date, as soon as l turned my face 
Romeward, l gave up, as far as ever was possible. the thought of in any 
respect and in any shape acting upon others. Then I mysel f was simply my 
1M 
ownconcem. 
The divine cl-.amcter ofdecisions in conscience is brought out in An Essay on the 
Development o/Christian Doctrine. Newman's conversion is concomitant with the 
discovery of the historical character ofdivine revelation and providence in the 
development ofdoctrine. Newman's argument was history against which there were no 
arguments. His problem was likewise history in so far as certain apparent inconsistencies 
appeared in historical Christianity. And his solution was history in so far as probability 
demanded a divine providence over developments of doctrine in history. Chapter rv of 
Part 1 precisely reviews instances to illustrate his point. All of Part n is a historical view 
of doctrinal developments vis-a-vis doctrinal corruptions. In the final analysis, this 
historical Christianity turns out to be Roman Catholicism. So, he could conclude his 
introduction to the Essay: 
The following Essay is directed towards a solution of the difficulty which 
has been stated, - the difficulty, as far as it exists. which lies in the way of 
our using in controversy the testimony ofour most natural informant 
concerning the doctrine and worship ofChristianity, viz., the history of 
eighteen hundred years. I~ 
The historical and divine character ofChristianity determinant in Newman's 
certitude in embracing Roman Catholicism is also paralleled in the historical and dutiful 
character of his decision towards conversion in conscience. There is a precise "here and 
11 Apo. 169.
 
\. Dev.29.
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now~ when Newman decided to embrace the Church ofRome as coming from God His 
theory of lhe development ofdoctrine was not only a hypothesis to account for a 
difficulty,20 but also the historical moment for his certitude on what God wanted him to 
do. There was a precise here and now in his decision to write the !:.ssay,21 but also a 
precise historical "circmnstance~ which allowed him to act on his cenitude, and be 
received into Roman Catholicism as the Church ofChrist22 
Therefore, the argument of history which determined his conviction on the divine 
nature of Roman Catholicism in An Essay on the Development ofChrisllan Doctrine is 
also the argwnent to determine his own historical conversion, understood as his certitude 
in conscience at that time and place. Hence, his theory ofconscience was historical, 
changing and seeking divine certitude. His certitude in conscience was not the same at 
the beginning ofthe Essay as at the end So, later he would apply to others what he 
himself had lived. His theory ofconscience, then, could likewise be considered a 
hypothesis to account for the difficulty of his change in certitude, and, consequently, 
other people's changes in certitude. 
The second edition of the Apologia is precisely titled History ofmy Religious 
Opinions since he says it is "historically relating my state ofmind.,,23 The Essay is in 
itself a testimony of history on how Newman gradually changed from a non-certitude in 
zo Ibid. 30. 
21 Apo. 177.
 
21 Dev. xi.
 
2J Apo. 157.
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the Church of Rome to intellectual conviction.24 Hence. he could conclude a theory of 
conscience where each person, day by day, must seek their certitudes: 
Is not this a time of strange providences? is it not our safest course. 
without looking to consequences, to do simply what we think right day by 
day? shall we not be sure to go wrong, if we attempt to trace by 
anticipation the course ofdivine Providence?25 
This gradual change ofcertitudes in religious matters finally raises the question of 
the divine presence in conscience which seems concomitant with error. How can the 
same God be present in contradictory conscientious certitudes? Consequently, is it 
enough for a personal. historical conscience. such as Newman's. to seek truth, though he 
find error? How can real objective truth be allied with subjective change') What respect 
merits a conscience we know to be in error? 
Again, Newman's life is Newman's answer. Beginning the Essay we cannot doubt 
his sincerity as a non-Catholic.26 while. at the end. we cannot fail to admire his courage 
to "go on the open sea..27 God. who lives as a Personal. AU-seeing. All-judging Being in 
his conscience,28 is the same Lord who provides the antecedent probability of divine 
protection and the subsequent probability of his action in the development ofdoctrine. 
2< Ibid. 
.~ Ibid. 130. 
26 Dev. xi. 
27 Apo. 182.
 
28 Ibid. l56
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Newman applied this theory to the individual conscience when he faced the 
question of his change of certitude possibly leading people to be skeptical as to all 
objective IIUth. lfNewman was mistaken as an Anglican, might he not be mistaken again 
as a Catholic? Quite the contrary: John Henry argued in the Apologia. The very fact of 
objective IIUth demands that a person recognize that he has been deceived, as Newman 
was by the Anglican divines. Truth demands change in accord with the knowledge the 
individual achieves in his historical life. The contrary - to remain in a known error ­
indeed would be militating against objective tTuth.29 So, Newman's decision to enter the 
Church ofRome as soon as he saw the emptiness ofhis doubt was not an apology for 
relativism, but rather for objective truth.)O 
The next step in Newman's theory ofconscience was to ask whether a person 
should always follow an erring conscience. The whole focus ofAn Essay on the 
Development ofChristian Doctrine is that Newman was in error in regard to his doubts 
about Roman Catholicism. Hence, his change. Nevertheless, at no point did Newman 
consider his subjective error to be an objective culpable fault. On the contrary, he stated 
that he has "always contendedn that 
;:9 Apo. 161. Letter written on Apnl 3, 1844. 
30 Dt!V. 10. 
1\2 
obedience even to an erring conscience was the way to gain light, and that 
it mattered not where a man began, so that he began on what came to 
hand. and in faith~ and that any thing might become a divine method of 
Truth~ that to the pure all things are pure, and have a self-correcting virtue 
and a power ofgerminating. ...And though I have no right at all to 
assume that this mercy is granted to me, yet the fact, that a person in my 
situation may have it granted to him, seems to me to remove the perplexity 
which my change ofopinion may occasion.J I 
Hence, obedience to an erring conscience not only is not considered "evil,~ but 
rather is considered the road to truth. Besides, Newman added the historical reference to 
those conscientious Jews being precisely those who converted to Christianity, whereas 
the lukewarm did not. 32 This reference implies that obedience to an erring conscience is 
precisely that; obedience to conscience as to a Living Person dwelling within, and not to 
some fancy or liking. J3 In Newman's case, it was his desire to defend the Church of 
England against Liberalism which eventually brought him to the truth of the Church of 
Rome.J.l 
A final question then arises as to Newman's view of the "authority" of conscience 
vis-a-vis Church authority as brought out in the Essay. We note thai in the postscript he 
Slates: "His first step on his conversion was to offer his Work for revision to the proper 
authorities." This obedience to the authorities of Roman Catholicism was a consequence 
of his recognizing the presence ofGod in that Church. J5 
II Apo. 162. 
32 Ibid.
 
33 Ibid. 30.
 
14 Chapter vn.
 
J~ Dev. postsaipl, x-xi. 
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Again, the whole point ofAn Essay on the Development a/Christian Doctrine 
was a final farewell to the Church ofEngland and her authorities. Newman did finish the 
work obeying the authority of the Church ofRome, but the book itself is a clear dissent in 
conscience from the Anglican Church. The final authority for conscience is the Lord 
Himself. In the case ofChureh authorities, Newman discovered writing the Essay that 
that same Lord dwelt in the Church ofRome, rather than in the Church of England. The 
primacy ofconscience is the primacy ofGod himsel f over both the individual either in 
error or truth and the religious authorities which teach error or truth in his name. 
So, we see in An Essay on the Development o/Christian Doctrine. besides the 
reason for Newman's conversion, a moderate approach to dissent. Obedience is granted 
to the religious authorities accepted in conscience by Newman. In no way would John 
Henry agree with a systematic rejection of religious authorities known to be ofdivine 
origin. Nor would he enhance himself as an authentic teaching authority of the Church. If 
he considered that the Lord endowed the Church with a living authority throughout the 
ages,36 he consequently included in the postscript the offer of his work to the proper 
authorities.37 
Thus, primacy of conscience as seen by Newman's conversion to Roman 
Catholicism is the primacy ofGod over the individual and religious authorities. This 
primacy implies the liberty of conscience to seek God in truth, follow him when known, 
J6 Ibid. chap. II, section 2. 
J7 Ibid. postscript, xi. 
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consequent conversion implies that Newman believed in freedom of inquiry in so far as 
he sought out truth: freedom of expression in so far as he thought it fit to print what he 
wrote; and freedom of religion, in so far as he felt free to change his religious beliefs and 
practice. 
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CHAPTER XI 
CONSCIENCE AS A MORAL SENSE 
For twenty years I have begun and left off an inqui'Y again and again., 
which yesterday [ finished. 
Letters and Diaries 
Newman's most extensive philosophical treatment of the nature of conscience 
comes in An Essay in Aid ofa Grammar ofAssent, published during the year of the [ 
Vatican Council, 1870. To help us understand Newman's understanding ofconscience 
vis-a.-vis authority during these years, a careful analysis of this text may be invaluable. 
Nevertheless, we soon realize that Newman entered on the subject incidentally, when he 
showed how the proposition that there is a God is possible and that conscience is where 
he looks for proofofGod's existence. I 
Our first introductory observation on conscience in the Grammar ofAssent is that 
Newman considered conscience an act, rather than a faculty.2 Although conscience is an 
I GA97. 
2GA 98. Cf. Summa Theologiae. I, q.79, a.13: ~Respondeo dioeudum quod conscientia.. proprie 
loquendo. non est potentia, sed aCNS (I amswer saying that conscience. properly speaking. is not a potency, 
but an act)." 
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original endowment ofnature as much as memory and reason are, Newman implied that 
conscience does not have the same manner ofbeing as they do. Newman considered 
memory and reasoning as "'faculties" whose existence is inferred from the corresponding 
acts. They are genuine instruments. like the apparatus ofbreathing: 
We know indeed that we have a faculty by which we remember, as we 
know we have a faculty by which we breathe: but we gain this knowledge 
by abstraction or inference from its particular acts, not by direct 
experience. 3 
When conscience is later associated in the text with memory and reason. it is not 
as a faculty. It is placed among "our mental acts," along with the "action"' of memory and 
reasoning.4 
This placing by Newman of conscience in the category of mental acts does not 
affect his doctrine that conscience is part of our nature, underivable from anything else. 5 
Newman showed that conscience is not a product of our upbringing in the story of the 
child who offends his parents. The child, "alone and without effon, as it were the most 
natural ofacts," places himself in the presence ofGod.. Just like the infant has a 
knowledge of his mother or nurse, "without previous experience or analogical 
reasoning," so he is able to perceive the voice ofGod in the dictate of conscience.6 This 
brings Newman to affirm that "'we have by nature a conscience."? So, even though 
} GA66.
 
. • Ibid. 98.
 
S Ibid.
 
• Ibid. 102-103.
 
7 1bid.98.
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conscience for Newman is not a faculty, but a mental act, it is still in us by nature, just as 
much as memory and reasoning. 
The next distinction made by Newman On the nature of conscience is to ascribe to 
it a double aspect: 
The feeling ofconscience ... is twofold: • it is a moral sense, and a sense 
ofduty, a judgment of the reason and a magisterial dictate. Of course its 
act is indivisible~ still it has these two aspects, distinct from each other, 
and admitting ofa separate consideration. ll 
In this paragraph Newman explains the distinction between moral sense and a 
sense ofduty, although both are part and parcel ofconscience. One may lose his rnoral 
sense in one area ofconduct, but not his sense ofobligation to follow what he considers 
right. On the contrary, in other case, one may no longer feel an obligation to do a known 
good or avoid a certain ~dishonesty", but still has a sense ofgood and evil. Newman 
considered the act ofconscience "'indivisible," but admitting ··a separate consideration" 
for each one of its aspects: moral sense and sense ofduty.9 Our first step, in this chapter, 
will be analyze the concept of moral sense. In the next chapter, we shall see Newman's 
understanding of conscience as a sense ofduty. 
"'Moral sense" has a precise philosophical history in British moral theory, the 
anaJysis ofwhich will help us see Newman's use ofthe term. The predominant use of the 
term, as described by Hume, is ··a pleasure or uneasiness of a particular kind" induced by 
the contemplation of"an action, or sentiment, or character." The particular kind of 
I Ibid. 
• £bid. 
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pleasure or pain which constitutes the moral sense is partly specified by the contemplated 
object Nevertheless, the moral sense is ultimately specified by the pleasure or pain felt 
by the subject. Hwne presupposes our recognizing what be is referring lO, when he calls 
this pleasurable or painful feeling a "moral sense. ,,10 
Comparing this to Newman, we notice that Hwne's moral sense is not a cognitive 
sense~ there is nothing it ascertains. According to Hume's subjectivist view, something is 
morally good or evil in accord with a particular kind of feeling: 
An action, or sentiment, or character is virtuous or vicious: why? 
because its view causes a pleasure or uneasiness ofa particular kind II 
Hence, for Hume, the feeling induced in the subject and the features of the action 
ascertained by ordinary perception are all that are relevant to the rightness and wrongness 
of an action. Later, we shall see how Newman differs from this view of moral sense. 
A second historical use of the term "moral sense" in the British philosophical 
moral tradition insists on the objective standard ofmorality. According to this use of 
"moral sense," the rightness or wrongness of an action, the goodness or badness of a 
person's character, exist independently of any feelings induced in us by the 
contemplation ofan action or character. In ascertaining the goodness or badness ofan 
action, moral sense here has a cognitive operation. Moral sense may be considered 
analogous to sight; as a seeing of self-evident moral truth. 
10 Hume. 470.
 
II Ibid. 471.
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Shaftesbury was the most imponant proponent of this second type of moral-sense 
theory. For Shaftesbury, there is an "immutable independent nature~ ofright and 
WTong. 12 Hence, Shaftesbury would distinguish between our feelings and our knowledge. 
The latter constitutes moral sense according to Shaftesbury, whereas the former are 
subjective affections. However, Shaftesbury does give a certain role to the subject's 
moral character. For Shaftesbury, for a person to lack a certain moral sense, implies 
having a certain defect ofcharacter. This moral defect ofcharacter is also linked to the 
social behavior and feelings one has in society. In contrast. Newman linked a person's 
whole moral perception with his whole moral being. both in personal character and in 
society. 13 
Common to both the subjectivist and to the objective types ofmoral-sense theory 
is the idea that moral sense operates without ratiocination, with the immediacy of feeling. 
Reasoning may often be necessary to establish relevant matters of fact. Once these 
matters of fact are established, inference or the adducing of reasons is over. Some sort of 
feeling or perceiving takes over, presenting the actiOD as right or wrong. Differing from 
that., we have seen in Chapter IX how Newman used the concept of"implicit reasoning" 
to save the role of reason in moral sense. 14 
11 Anthony Ashley Cooper, Earl ofSbaftesbwy, Characlerisrics ofMen. Manners. Opinions. 
Times (New Yark: Babbs-Merrill Ca., 1964),255. 
13 GA 106. 
I. We remember the definitian af"reason" in the preface to the third edition of the U1liversity 
Sermons. "By Reason is properly understood any process or act of the rnind.. by which., from knowing one 
thing, it advacnes on ta know another." prefilce, xi. 
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An aspect ofboth moral-sense theories taken up by Newman is the "sense of 
beauty" analogy. I; This inward sense ofbeauty produces an account of the moral sense 
appropriate to both a subjectivist and objective viewpoint It is subjectivist in so far as it 
lends itself readily to a disposition of the subject on contemplating an object. And it may 
be objective in so far as a thing ofbeauty is a joy forever in so far as it is a "thing." A 
sense of beauty implies a feeling on the part ofthe subject - in the case mentioned. a 
feeling ofjoy - but, also, implies some thing which causes joy. 
Coming back to our original quotation from the Grammar ofAssent on 
conscience as a "moral sense,"16 we notice first a subjectivist understanding of 
conscience in Newman. Conscience is subjectivist as a feeling 
being, ( repeat, a certain keen sensibility, pleasant or painful, - self­
approval and hope, or compunction and fear. - attendant on certain ofour 
actions, which in consequence we call right or wrong. 17 
In this subjectivist view, according to Newman. we feel self-approval or its 
opposite. In consequence - retrospectively - we call things right or wrong: right, since 
doing them resulted in self-approval; wrong, since doing them resulted in self-
condemnation. So, the contemplation ofcertain things induces in us a feeling of 
approbation or disapprobation, in consequence of which we call these things right or 
wrong. Newman added that the doing of these things evokes in us further correspondent 
pleasurable or painful feeling. 
15 Ibid. 100.
 
16 Ibid. 98-99.
 
17 Ibid. 98.
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This feeling ofconscience lends itself to the affirmation that Newman in fact is 
saying that personal conscience detennines right and wrong. Is this not a view of 
conscience as purely subjectivist and autonomous? Are we not back to Home? 
However, the paragraph before in the text explains well the key difference from 
Home. Those feelings have a cause in the objects themselves. There Newman wrote how 
right and wrong are brought to our knowledge by conscience as a moral sense: 
As there are objects which, when presented to the mind, cause it to feel 
grief, regret, joy, or desire, so there are things which excite in us 
approbation or blame, and which we in consequence call right and wrong; 
and which., experienced in ourselves, kindle in us that specific sense of 
pleasure and pain, which goes by the name of a good or bad conscience. 18 
So, the comparison.. for Newman., is double. Just like the senses convey things 
which cause feelings of grief, etc., so "things" excite in us approbation or blame. The 
knowledge in both cases is immediate, and the cause is something objective known by 
the subject. Secondly, pleasure and pain, for Newman, is obviously not physical. but 
~specific" as a pleasure or pain associated with approbation or blame, and, consequently, 
with a good or bad conscience. All ofwhich is a far cry from Home, for whom 
the very feeling constitutes our praise or admiration. 
We go no further: nor do we inquire into the cause ofthe satisfaction. 19 
A further argument for both a subjectivist and objective view of conscience as a 
moral sense in Newman is his use of the parallel between moral sense and the sense of 
beauty. 
II Ibid.
 
19 Hume, 471.
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As we form our notion of whiteness from the actual sight ofsnow, milk, a
 
lily, or a cloud, so, after experiencing the sentiment of approbation which
 
arises in us on the sight ofcertain acts one by one, we go on to assign to
 
that sentiment a cause, and to those acts a quality, and we give to this
 
notional cause or quality the name of virtue, which is an abstraction, not a
 
thing.
 
And in like manner, when we have been affected by a certain specific
 
admiring pleasure at the sight of this or that concrete object, we proceed
 
by an arbitrary act of the mind to give a name to the hypothetical cause or
 
quality in the abstract, which excites it. We speak of it as beautifulness,
 
and henceforth, when we caB a thing beautiful, we mean by the word
 
nothing else than a certain quality of things, which creates in us this
 
special sensation.20 
Here we see Newman's understanding ofvirtue as caused by a quality of the acts 
themselves parallel to the subjective feeling caused by contemplating the quality of a 
thing of beauty. Following this parallel, we can ask what is the "quality of things" found 
in both the moral sense and the sense ofbeauty? In Hwne's case, it is a "structure of 
pans"ll in natural and moral beauty that is more properly "felt thanjudg'd 0(,,11 Hence, 
moral good is not something present in the object. Whereas in Newman's case, as quoted 
above, the quality is indeed found in the "acts" themselves as known by the moral sense, 
just as being beautiful means a "cenain quality" in things themselves. 
The next question arising from Newman's comparison of moral sense and sense of 
beauty is whether this quality of acts "named as virtuous" is something "metaphysical" or 
something merely reducible to sense-knowledge. In the moral sense, Newman uses 
ambiguous tenns like "experiencing" approbation, "assigning" a cause, and "giving" a 
10 GA69. 
11 Hume, 299. 
12 Ibid. 470. 
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name. In the sense ofbeauty, we are "affected" by the sight of a concrete object. 
Nevertheless a reduction ofNewman's concept of the "quality of things" to merely 
individualistic sense-knowledge would fail to pass the test of its being an objective cause 
of feelings, as is clearly shown in the passage above. What, however, remains open to 
discussion from the above text is the role of reason in this moral-sense theory according 
to Newman. The answer to this question will help us ascertain the way in which 
conscience decides virtue from vice, and right from wrong. 
Our first impression ofNewman's understanding of the role of reason in 
conscience is found in the paragraph following his account ofconscience as a moral 
sense. Newman wrote: 
Here I have to speak of conscience ... as supplying us, by means of its 
various acts, with the elements of morals, such as may be developed by 
the intellect into an ethical code.!3 
Conscience, so, as a moral sense, discerns the "elements of morals." From these 
elements as data, the moral principles ofan ethical code would be derived by certain 
processes of reasoning. Finally, these principles would be premises for inference to the 
rightness or wrongness of actions. Newman's morally-sensed "elements of morals" are 
not moral principles, but rather the cause of the formulation of such principles. So, 
Newman's moral sense starts from the rightness or wrongness of individual actions in 
fully determinate circumstances, from which moral principles will be rationally derived. 
He added: 
D GA98.
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By first principles ( mean the propositions with which we start in 
reasoning on any given subject matter. 24 
These so-called first principles are conclusions or absnactions from 
particular experience; ... they are not elementary truths prior to 
reasoning. 25 
The moral principle chosen by Newman as an illustration of this view is the first 
principle in moral philosophy: that there is a right and a wrong. Newman could have said 
more about the derivation ofother moral principles, but the point at hand is the nature of 
assent given to first principles. For his purposes, it is sufficient merely to mention the 
procedure by which moral principles are obtained: we ""abstract and generalize" from 
·"particular experiences," Hence. Newman's insistence on a ~sentiment of approbation" 
as being foundational to the knowledge ofan objective moral law in no way involves him 
'"denying the objective existence of the moral law." 26 The point in the text is the 
concrete particularity of the experience from which the moral law in its general 
principles has to be reasoned to. The continuation of his remark emphasizes even more 
the objective character of the ~sentiment ofapprobation... There is an ""instinctive 
recognition of the immutable difference in the moral quality of acts, . , elicited in us by 
one instance ofthem,,,27 So. we conclude that the role of reason in conscience as a moral 
sense is proceeded by abstraction and generalization. This action is not ultimately due to 
24 GA66.
 
1S Ibid. 69.
 
26 Ibid
 
27 Ibid. 66.
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any feeling or sentiment ofours, but rather specifically to what is right or wrong in a 
concrete act. 
The next question we may ask about Newman's theory on conscience as a moral 
sense is how we are to ascertain what is right and wrong in a particular case. In a late 
section of the Grammar ofAssent, Newman explains the "illative sense~ as "right 
judgment in ratiocination:' a "power ofjudging and concluding:' and the "controlling 
principle in inferences. ~ The faculty with which the illative sense is compared is 
Aristotle's "phronesis" - "judgment" in Newman's terminology. 28 
In his account ofphronesis, the manner in which we ascertain right from wrong in 
a panicular case is a question no ethical system can answer. We have to go to the "living 
intellect., our own., or another's. n An ethical system may supply "laws, general rules ... 
examples ... landmarks, limitations ... distinctions," but all these have to be applied to 
concrete situations: it can tell us that virtue lies between extremes. but cannot determine 
for an individual where the mean lies for him. Phronesis, arising out of native 
endowment, "formed and matured by practice and experience:' regulates judgment in 
these matters.29 So, phronesis is 
a capacity sufficient for the occasion, deciding what ought to be done here 
and now, by this given person, under these given circumstances. It decides 
nothing hypothetical, it does not determine what a man should do ten 
years hence, or what another should do at this time. It may indeed happen 
to decide ten years hence as it does now, and to decide a second case now 
as it now decides a first; still its present act is for the present., not for the 
distant or the future. 
2& Ibid. 276-28 L
 
29 Ibid. 278.
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and such is phronesis, from which the science of morals forms its rules, 
and receives its complement.30 
There is a parallel in the analysis of conscience as moral sense in Newman and 
his treatment of the illative sense relative to phronesis in Aristotle. Reason in both cases 
starts out from individual, concrete, experiences, and, from there, forms the "ethical 
code" in the case of conscience, and the "science of morals" in the case ofphronesis. 
Wherein lies the difference between conscience and phronesis according to 
Newman? Conscience, earlier on in the Grammar ofAssent, is stated as having to do with 
"self alone and one's own actions.',31 Phronesis, on the other hand, is a resort either to 
oneselfor another in matters of a personal, social, or political character. J2 Phronesls 
coincides with conscience when deciding what ought to be done here and now, by this 
given person, under these given circumstances. Phronesis goes beyond the realm of 
conscience because it has resort to another's actions or even to another person in 
deciding what is right or wrong in the concrete here and now. 
Both conscience as a moral sense and phronesis, according to Newman, seem to 
follow the same three steps in moral knowledge. first, particular moral acts are the 
starting-point for the formation of moral rules. This principle of Newman implies 
logically immediate moral perception by the individual, that is, without explicit 
reasoning. Second, both conscience and phronesis form by reason "an ethical code" or 
JO [bid.
 
II [bid. 99.
 
12 Ibid. 278-279.
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"science of morals." Finally, moral particular judgments in concrete cases are fonned 
based on that code or science of morals. 
The main difficulty with the above conclusion is that it shows Newman's concept 
of both conscience andphronesis in Aristotle as having logically immediate perception in 
that first stage. Phronesis, however, in Aristotle would seem to be more in the category 
of practical judgment, or prudence, understood as the practical application of principles 
to concrete actions, that is, in the third stage. This is shown by Newman's insistence that 
phronesis is "matured by practice and experience.,,33 Can we combine an understanding 
of conscience as a moral sense including immediate moral perception with growth in 
moral sense by practice and experience? Newman seems to understand the moral sense 
as having as its starting-point moral judgments not produced by reason and not subject to 
growth. 
However, Newman's understanding of the moral sense in conscience is 
associated, in a later essay, not only with phronesis, but rather with another Aristotelian 
faculty, nous. The context of Newman's description of this other faculty is his objection 
to the use of the word "reason" to designate mental proceedings which do not involve 
reasoning. Newman then wrote ofa "faculty in the mind which acts as a complement to 
reasoning", upon which reasoning is "dependent", which has "truth for its direct object." 
)) GA278. 
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Viewed ~in its relation to religion," this faculty is the ~moral sense." In its wider scope as 
"being the apprehension of first principles," it is the faculty called by Aristotle nou.~.J4 
The point that Newman is making here is that the moral sense has moral truth as 
its direct object. Hence, moral sense perception is to be contrasted with reasoning ofany 
kind, be it implicit or explicit. So, moral reasoning is dependent upon moral-sense 
perception due to the latter's intuitive apprehension of first moral principles. 
So, how does conscience determine right and wrong based on Newman's 
understanding ofconscience's role as a moral sense? John Henry may answer that 
conscience sometimes perceives that an action is right or wrong, and sometimes infers 
this. Conscience, then, as a moral-sense has both an intuitive and a ratiocinative 
operation. 
Evidences ofNewman's insistence on both roles ofconscience as moral sense are 
read in his correspondence with Charles Meynell. Newman had Meynell go through the 
Grammar ofAssent at proof stage due to Newman's anxiety to keep within the bounds of 
"doctrinal propriety." Newman wrote: 
You will find I there consider that the dictate ofconscience is particular .. 
. and that from the multiplication of particulars I infer the generaL 
Next that this dictate ofconscience ... is a moral instinct and its own 
evidence - as the belief in an external world is an instinct on the 
apprehension ofsensible phenomena. 35 
}04 SITQ)I £.s.says, 97-98. Cf Nicomm:hean £lhics 1141a 5-8. Cf Summa Theofogioe, I, q.79, a. 12. 
Synderesis, according to Aquinas, knows its first practical principles, -absque im-esrigatione raliollis 
(without !3tional iovesligation)." 
)~ Newman to Charles Meynel1. 25 July 1869. W xxiv. 297. 
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This "instinct" is more than psychological immediacy. As seen by the words "its 
own evidence" and by comparison with "instinctive·· belief in an external world. it is an 
operation also characterized by "logical immediacy," that is, with no reasoning process 
involved. 
This consideration of the dual function ofconscience both as intuitive and 
ratiocinative leads us to the consideration of the reliability of conscience as Newman 
understood it In Newman's teaching we have seen that conscience is to be our guide in 
all the various circumstances ofour lives. Therefore, its role is to be a "rule'· and 
"sanction of right conduct"36 In some circumstances, conscience operating in a intuitive 
fashion may suffice. However, in difficult complex cases, such an instinct would be 
inadequate_ So, if, as Newman sees it, conscience has a role of always determining what 
is right and wrong for the individual here and now, it should be adequately equipped for 
its role. Hence, Newman clearly envisaged both an intuitive role for conscience as well 
as a reasoning one. 
So, conscience in its determination of right and wrong has a moral-sense type 
operation but is open to diverse ways of operation. [n other words, if reasoning is called 
for, conscience can reason. But this reasoning may be implicit in the operation of 
conscience as we have seen in Chapter IX. And, as studied in this chapter, the 
conclusions of conscience remain in accord with initial intuitional moral sense 
perception. 
j6 GA99. 
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Our final consideration in this chapteT, linking us to the following, is whether 
conscience may be reduced to a merely cognitive role. Newman insisted that conscience 
was indivisible with two aspects: a moral sense and a sense ofduty. Being distinct from 
one another, they admit of a separate consideration.37 The cognitive role may be, as we 
have seen here, either as an immediate moral instinct or as a reasoning process. The two 
expressions, "moral sense" and "a judgment of reason:' are coupled together. However, 
we have seen in this chapter that they are not synonymous. Explicit reasoning is not 
identical to the "moral sense"' perception and implicit reasoning of conscience. "A 
judgment of reason" would be in accord with our analysis in the UnIVersity Sermons. 
Explicit reasoning sums up or concludes the process of implicit reasoning perfonned by 
conscience. That is why Newman speaks of conscience as "supplying us, with its various 
acts, with the elements of morals."' Later, the explicit reason may develop these elements 
into ~an ethical code.',3M 
As to the indivisibility ofconscience, no deciding on right and wrong - moral 
sense - takes place before an imperative of conscience - sense of duty - is felt, because 
nonnally none is needed. As soon as Newman felt it was his duty to be an Evangelical, 
Liberal, Anglican or Catholic, to assist at Vatican I or not, etc., implicitly he thought that 
such was the right thing to do. 39 A moral sense and a sense ofduty go together. The very 
J7 GA98.
 
38 Ibid.
 
39 Apo. 179. Newman is in doubt whether he is impeUed by what -seems clear" or by a -sense of
 
duty.­
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fact of knowing something to be good or bad for me here and now implies in itself tbat I 
may have a duty to do or avoid such and such an act. Nevertheless, Newman insisted on 
these two elements ofconscience as being distinct from each other. One problem is to 
know what is good, quite another to fulfill that duty. In Newman's life, we have seen how 
he struggled to fulfill his obligations in conscience..j() 
Conversely, when he felt something to be his duty in conscience, there was 
always something known by Newman. Corresponding to a sense of duty, there was a 
sense of truth known to this acting person. When conscience makes itself felt as a duty to 
Newman, there had to be something corresponding to what Newman saw as the cognitive 
side of its act. There had to be some knowing in order to have an obligation in 
conscience. A duty in conscience implies a truth known in conscience. Newman's 
conversion came after An Essay on the Development afChristian Doctrine. Ultimately, 
duty depends on truth. An obligation can only be felt ifit is known as such.. Hence, the 
link between moral sense knowing right and wrong and a sense ofduty obliging us to 
follow the truth known also implied for Newman a clear distinction. The duty to follow 
truth is always present. However, as we have seen in his life, that same truth, which 
remains unchangeable, takes time and effort to be known. Hence, duties change in accord 
with the truth known. In Newman's words: 
40 See. Chapler X. 
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The law of truth differs from the law ofduty, that duties change, but truths 
never; but, though truth is ever one and the same, and the assent of 
cenitude is immutable, still the reasonings which cany us on to truth and 
cenitude are many and distinct, and vary with the inquirer. 4 \ 
.. GA278. 
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CHAPTER XII 
THE VOICE OF GOD? 
Were it not for this voice, 
speaking so clearly in my conscience and my heart, 
I should be an atheist, or a pantheist, or a polytheist 
when I looked into the world. 
Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk 
Having analyzed Newman's treatment of conscience as a moral sense, and seen 
the link between truth and duty, we now proceed in the Grammar ofAssent to investigate 
conscience as a sense of duty, and, from there, as the voice ofGod Newman considered 
the sense of duty as the '"primary and most authoritative aspect ofconscience," the 
'"ordinary sense of the word," and that "every one knows what is meant by a good or bad 
conscience.,,1 So the first aspect ofconscience as a sense ofduty is its ordering this to be 
done, that to be avoided. '"Good and bad" in this context are subordinated to the primary 
fact of conscience as being something that commands or sanctions, independent of 
I GA99.
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whatever it commands or sanctions, ofwhenever it fimctions, before or after the action. 
Conscience in this chapter will be considered as a "sanction of right conduet," rather than 
a "rule of right conduct.,,2 
The "imperative" nature ofconscience is what gives conscience its "sense of 
duty" and "sanction of right conducC3 Obviously, nuances exist between each term. It is 
the person himself who commands his own actions, giving them a quality as being right 
or wrong for him here and now. Then comes the consequent sense of duty of performing 
the action., with the final sanction ofa good or bad conscience in accord with how the 
action evolved. 
(n the text we next notice how Newman attributed to conscience a universality in 
its magisterial office, contrasting with its singularity in every action of different people: 
So far it is one and the same in the mind ofevery one, whatever be its 
particular errors in particular minds as to the acts which it orders to be 
done or to be avoided4 
What is universal is the fact of there being an imperative for all in the dictate of 
conscience. How each person sees his or her imperative, and then effects it, is another 
maner. However, the nature of conscience in each individual is the same, in so far as it is 
a mandate to do or avoid this or that. And, in the same breath, Newman immediately sees 
the fallible side ofconscience. (t is indeed the "voice ofGod"s in so far it is commanding 
. Z Ibid. 
J Ibid. 99. 
4 Ibid. 
! Ibid. 102. 
135 
something to be done, but remains human and erring in its weakness. So, the primacy of 
mandating conscience is linked to its possibility in the individual to err and the duty of 
the individual to seek what is morally right The duty upon all to follow conscience is 
linked to the obligation for all to seek truth. This text destroys the notion that Newman 
was promoting autonomy ofconscience. The individual's duty to follow his or her 
conscience is always subordinate to the first principle of seeking what is right and wrong, 
that is, the first principle ofconscience as a magisterial dictate.6 
In this context, we can evaluate Newman's description of conscience as a voice in 
order to illustrate his view ofconscience as a magisterial dictate: 
Conscience vaguely reaches forward to something beyond self, and dimly 
discerns a sanction higher than self for its decisions, as is evidenced in 
that keen sense ofobligation and sense of responsibility which infonns 
them. And hence we are accustomed to speak of conscience as a voice ... 
and moreover a voice, or the echo ofa voice, imperative and constraining, 
like no other dictate in the whole ofour experience.7 
The very concept of a "voice" implies a reference to another beyond oneself, 
excluding an autonomy of the selfdeciding what is right and wrong. "Voice" also implies 
a person, not an impersonal categorical moral imperative to do one's duty. In Newman's 
6 Cf Summa Theologiat!, I.U, q.94, a.2 - 4. In article 2. Aquinas shows how the first precept of 
law is that ~bonum estfaciendum el malum vi101ldum (good is to be done and evil avoided).~ Whereas in 
article 4, he Dotes how ~ralio practica negotiatur circa contingentia in quibus sunt operationeshumanae: 
el etsi in communibus sit aliqua necesitas, quanlo magis adpropria descenditur. tonlO magis invenitur 
defectus (practical reason bas to do with changing affilirs in which are human acts; and even if in general 
there are some necessary elements, the more you go into details, the more you find defects.) .. AlthOllgh 
using ditfereur: terminology, both authors seem compatible in their analysis ofconscience as having a first 
principle by nature in so far as it mandates to do good and avoid evil. Later, both agree, that in the real 
concrete world, the individual is prone to error, but must foUow conscience based on its first precept, good 
to be done; evil avoided. 
1 GA99. 
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case. the voice ofconscience clearly refers to God since his place for looking for the 
proof of the existence ofGod "as a reality" is via conscience.8 
Again another comparison for conscience as duty and voice in Newman are the 
similarities and dissimilarities between conscience and aesthetic taste. Just as we have "a 
sense of duty and obligation:' however different the actions mandated by it, so we have 
"a sense of the beautiful and graceful:' for all its diversity in different persons.9 Their 
difference is that aesthetic taste has no essential connection with emotion. Beauty is 
contemplated with tranquil admiration except when it is personal beauty; then emotion 
enters into the experience - affection or passion. Conscience, however, 
is something more than an aesthetic sense; it is always, what the sense of 
the beautiful is only in certain cases; it is always emotional. No wonder 
then that it always implies what that sense only sometimes implies; that it 
always involves the recognition ofa living object, towards which it is 
directed. Inanimate things cannot stir our affection; these are correlative 
with persons. 10 
Newman's point here is to avoid reducing conscience to a moral sense without 
obligation. as Shaftesbury taught, whereby conscience is merely cognitive, reflecting 
virtue as beauty, and vice as deformity. I I [n the same breadth. Newman wished to avoid 
reducing the sense ofduty in conscience to a mere subjective emotion of either 
degradation and shame, or fear and foreboding. Conscience in Newman fulfills a sense of 
• [bid. 97. 
9 Ibid. 99. 
10 [bid. 100.
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obligation and prohibition as part ofour moral experience. We feel. by nature. such a 
sense ofduty, going beyond a mere intellectual knowledge of what is right and good. 
To understand better Newman's treatment ofconscience as not merely cognitive. 
but also imperative. we return to the difficult text in the Grammar ofAssent where he 
distinguishes both aspects of conscience in a hypothetical duel. 
Though I lost my sense of the obligation which I lie under to abstain from 
acts ofdishonesty. I should not in consequence lose my sense that such 
actions were an outrage offered to my moral nature. Again: though I lost 
my sense oftbeir moral deformity, I should not therefore lose my sense 
that they were forbidden to me. 12 
How can we understand this text in the moral philosophy of Newman? 
Conscience has two indivisible aspects: cognitive and magisterial. How can we know 
something as morally right and not feel an obligation to act accordingly? Likewise. how 
can we know something as evil and not feel a duty to avoid it? Do these last two 
examples refer to the magisterial dictate coming from the cognitive act ofconscience? 
The opposite is also posed by Newman: the possibility ofa sense ofduty towards 
something not necessarily know as good or evil. In the latter case. something is mandated 
by conscience which is not known as good 
Newman does consider the act ofconscience as "indivisible," but both aspects are 
"distinct,,13 Hence. either the moral sense or the sense of duty may err. as in the 
hypothetical case he gave of the child. The child may either 44strengthen and improve" his 
12 Ibid. 98.
 
13 Ibid.
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'"initial religious instincts,'" or may be subject to elements "destructive of his religious 
instincts." In the latter case, "the light of the soul will fade away and die out.',I-I 
Therefore, if the moral sense errs, the notion ofobligation remains. The erring 
conscience enforces the person to do what he incorrectly thinks right or wrong. So, we 
have the case of an erring, but still obliging, conscience. 
Likewise, the human fallibility ofthe sense of duty implies that one may see 
something as either right or wrong, but, as yet., feel no obligation to follow through on 
one's convictions. Newman had learnt the lesson on the need to be faithful to one's 
convictions in conscience. As soon as he saw what was right., he allowed that ""Light'" to 
lead him on. 15 On writing An Essay on the Development afChris/ian Doctrine. as soon 
as he discovered the path led to Rome, there he went. 16 
Therefore, moral sense without an obligation would be akin to the moral sense 
described by Shaftesbury as being merely aesthetic - its object being the "venustum .. the 
decorum of things" 17 - with no notion of obligation. For Newman the moral sense is not 
only analogous to a sense of beauty and ugliness, but as he indicated in the course of his 
comparison between conscience and aesthetic taste, it also can be a sense of moral 
beauty and ugliness. IS 
14 Ibid. lOS.
 
13 See poem on p. 76-77.
 
" See Chap. IX.
 
17 Shaftesbury. pt. 4, sec., 2, 92.
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This distinction ofa sense ofobligation from a moral sense in Newman is also 
seen when he calls the moral sense the "principle of ethics" and the sense of obligation 
the "creative principle ofreligion.,,19 As discussed in the previous chapter, the meaning 
ofconscience as a moral sense being the "principle of ethics" is that such an activity of 
conscience supplies us "by means of its various acts, with the elements ofmorals.,,20 
Therefore, according to Newman, the foundation of ethics in the individual is a moral­
sense or intuitive apprehension of the rightness or wrongness ofactions in their full 
personal panicularity.21 
Linking the moral sense role ofconscience to religion as a duty, we mentioned 
above the moral sense knowledge of first moral principles. 22 Later in the Grammar of 
Assent, another reference by Newman speaks of the right attitude brought to reasoning in 
matters of religion. 
We may expect, that when there is an honest purpose and fair talents, we 
shall somehow make our way forward, the error falling off from the mind, 
and the uuth developing and occupying it. Thus it is that the Catholic 
religion is reached, as we see, by inquirers from all points of the compass. 
as if it mattered not where a man began, so that he had an eye and a heart 
for the truth.2J 
19 GA \01. 
:zo lbid.98. 
~I Apo. \00. 
22 Chapter XI. 
13 GA 294-295. 
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Here it is not only a matter of knowledge per se by conscience, but rather the 
attitude one has towards religion. In other words. conscience implies that one knows 
what is right and wrong in different steps, but also that one has a duty, as pan of 
conscience, to seek truth. Conscience is bound to honestly search for truth. In that 
understanding, Newman could be said to favor the dictum that conscience should be both 
always followed and always educated 
As used by Newman here, the role ofconscience i.n religion is the right attitude. 
springing from a sense of duty, so that truth and right be obtained. Conscience, as a moral 
sense. had given us a source of premises in the search for moral truth. There are no 
intuitively ascertained premises in Newman's theology which enable reasoning to get 
under way in a Thomistic five ways to God Rather, Newman sees the evidence ofGod in 
conscience as a sense of duty and an a priori in the human mind. Conscience is 
considered as a sense ofduty, for there we find God. 
So, speaking of an infant, Newman wrote: 
In the dictate of conscience, without previous experiences or analogical 
reasoning, he [the infant] is able gradually to perceive the voice, or the 
echoes of the voice, ofa Master, living, personal, and sovereign.14 
Here we touch the essence ofNewman's phenomenology of religion by stating 
conscience as the place where he seeks the existence ofGod..1S Also we see how 
conscience is considered by Newman as an a priori religious experience. And. just as 
24 Ibid. 102. 
zj Ibid. 97. 
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conscience as moral sense is alike to nous in Aristotle's Ethics,26 it is also the place 
where God may be discovered This discovery ofGod in conscience links us to the image 
of the "voice" used by Newman. Ifconscience reflects a voice, and that voice is that of 
God, with all that the concept ofGod implies, this thought lends itself to a vision of 
conscience as a magisterial divine dictate. Therefore, conscience is the "creative 
principle of religion," precisely because its phenomena "avail to impress the imagination 
with the picture ofa Supreme Governor, a Judge, holy, just, powerful, all-seeing, 
retributive. ,,27 
Newman used several analogous phenomena to explain the transition of the mind 
from the working of conscience to an awareness ofGod in conscience. One analogy used 
by Newman is with the way children, and even animals, discern "amid the maze of 
colours and shapes which meet their sight," "unseen" beings, known as "certain units, 
individuals, substances, whatever they are to be called, which are outside and out of the 
reach of sense." This is Newman's epistemology whereby we know in phenomena 
something beyond phenomena. [n this view, moral and intellectual objects are known 
through the senses, since we do not know" mere impressions," but a real being. 
Another example he gave is of two Christian writers. 
We take up a passage ofChrysostom or a passage ofJerome; there is no 
possibility ofconfusing the one with other; in each case we see the man in 
his language. 2K 
26 See p. 125 above.
 
n GA 101.
 
28 Ibid. 96.
 
142 
In these cases, this kind of knowledge is neither the work ofsense nor of reason. 
It is not sense-knowledge because it goes beyond the senses. It is not the work of reason, 
in Newman's use of the term, since it is based on prima facie impressions. Newman 
called it an "'instinctive certitude,,29 by which we know beyond sense phenomena. In a 
parallel fashion, Newman claims, the "mental phenomena ... found in the sense of moral 
obligation" lead us to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge. 30 Likewise, ifan 
"instinct of the mind" discerns individuals, it also recognizes "'an external Master in the 
dictate of conscience, ... without previous experiences or analogical reasoning.,,3 I 
A second comparison used by Newman in the Grammar ofAssent is our 
knowledge of an external world. By an external world., he meant a physical or material 
world existing independently of all ofour sensory experiences. In the former analogy the 
mind goes from sensory knowledge of individuals to their knowledge as individuals. Here 
the jump is towards knowing a real objective world., rather than knowing sensations. The 
link with conscience is that just as we know such an external world beyond sensations, so 
too we go beyond the activity of conscience as an external "voice," and move on to the 
notion of the personality of that Judge. Newman wrote that as from 
a multitude of instinctive perceptions ... of something beyond the senses, 
we generalize the notion ofan external world ... so from the perceptive 
power which identifies the intimations ofconscience with the 
reverberations ... ofan external admonition, we proceed to the notion of 
a supreme Ruler and Judge. 32 
29 Ibid. 96.
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So, just as the phenomena of sensations demand something causing them. so too 
the phenomena of conscience demands a cause external to itself. Again. just as an 
"instinctive perception" explains the jump from phenomena to the external world., an 
"instinct ofthe mind"J3 explains the leap from the phenomena of conscience to the 
concept ofGod. 
There is, ofcourse, a difference. The step from sensations to the external world 
seems logical and instinctive since it refers to the same objects, whereas knowledge of 
God in conscience implies a jump from mental phenomena to a distinct Being. Newman 
explains that the phenomena of conscience imply a knowledge ofGod., since they 
"require for their exciting cause an intelligent being." 34 
And the second causal connection is that if 
the cause of these emotions does not belong to this visible world, the 
Object of his perception must be Supernatural and Divine. 35 
This double causal connection - conscience to intelligent being; intelligent being 
outside this world to God - seems to imply a "reasoning" from the phenomena of 
conscience as a moral obligation to a view ofconscience as the "voice ofGod." 
However, the use oftenns such as "intimidation," "discernment," "perception," 
"testimony," and "recognition." in the course ofhis remarks on this voice ofGod in 
conscience implies no real "reasoning" as Newman understood reasoning. Rather 
33 Ibid. 102.
 
14 Ibid. 101.
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Newman put into words what he considered conscience per se evok.es. That is why he 
insisted that he was not proposing a ~proof of the Being of a God. ,,36 Newman followed 
here his personalistic epistemology of wishing to "see with my own eyes and walk. with 
my own feet."n If we cannot be brought to a recognition within ourselves of the voice of 
God in conscience, no reasoning can induce its occurrence. 
This Wlderstanding of conscience as the voice ofGod within us by nature. as we 
have tried to prove up to now, also answers another objection to conscience as descnDed 
by Newman. Ifconscience is an original endowment ofour nature, and. therefore, of all 
peoples in all times, there will be no possible force for a reductionalist account of the 
phenomena of conscience. Newman considered the notion of conscience as something 
natural in humans as a ~first principle ... that I assume. "38 
Lord Acton praised Newman's Essay on the Development a/Christian Doctrine 
since it "did more than any other book ... to make his counnymen think historically, and 
watch the process as well as the result. ,,39 Natural history of the sense of moral 
obligation threatened the concept of conscience as the voice ofGod. Others wished. 
Newman said, to reduce conscience to the expedient or the beautiful - a clear reference to 
utilitarianism and aesthetic philosophies - or to education or association. ~o Newman did 
36 Ibid. 97. 
37 Apo. 22. 
31 GA98. 
]'J Hugh A MacDougal1. The Acton-Newman RelaJiOlIS (New York: Fordham University Press, 
1962), 154. 
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not answer such criticisms. His answer was not a capricious ipse dixit based on his own 
authority,41 but rather based on the fact that 
this solemn dogma [that conscience is the voice ofGod] is recognized as 
such by the great mass both of the youn§ and of the uneducated, by the 
religious few and the irreligious many. 4 
Besides the great mass of his own time, this recognition is also true throughout 
the ages by the widest variety ofminds. Even, says Newman, by philosophers, "who have 
been antagonists on other points. ,.43 
Does this mean that conscience is infallible? Ifconscience is the voice ofGod. 
therefore the voice of conscience is without error, a faultless guide ofconduct, and a sort 
ofGod without us. How can its oracle be divine, without being infallible? Conscience, in 
this perspective, would be totally autonomous and needless ofbeing perfected. 
No affirmation of conscience being infallible is found in the Grammar ofAssent. 
Several statements, in fact, would render conscience most fallible. A false solution would 
be to take up the distinction between truth and duty quoted above,~ and used in the 
Leiter to the Duke ofNorfoteS In this argument, infallibility touches the problem 
whether a statement is true or false, whereas a command or prohibition is an utterance of 
41 Ibid- 211. 
42 GA 110. 
013 Ibid. Here one remembers the Iapida!y principle ofsecurus iudicat orbis terrarum (the whole 
world has a sure judgment) in theology, so influential in Newman's conversion. Cf. Apo 98. 
... Above. 129-130. 
45 Lener to the Duke ofNorfolk, chap. 4: ~Divided allegiance." Here Newman distinguished 
between papal infallibility in dogmas and fill1ible authority in maners of conduct. To be considered later in 
this essay. 
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what ought to be done or not. So, in this line of thought, it is one thing for something to 
be true or false, quite another for it to be right or wrong. Infallibility responds to what we 
Irnow. Conscience on how we ought to act Applied 10 Church authority, one element of 
.our life is to believe what the Church teaches as true or false. A totally different realm of 
our existence is to obey or not what the Church commands. 
Nevertheless, this distinction does not answer our question on understanding 
Newman. Ifconscience is the voice ofGod, how can conscience err in its commands? 
How could conscience command us to do evil, or avoid evil, on behalfofGod? Agere 
sequitur esse. Our actions follow our knowledge. Ens est verum el bonum (being is true 
and good). Our conscience commands in accord with our knowledge of reality. If that 
knowledge is false, our conscience makes a mistake. 
An immediate answer to the difficulty ofNewman's having conscience as the 
voice ofGod and its erring possibility,46 is to understand Newman as saying that 
conscience is the voice ofGod only in so far as moral obligation is ultimately 
"identified" as the voice ofGod So, when God is said to command through conscience, 
what Newman is saying is that what we perceive as a moral obligation, we also perceive 
as the voice ofGod. Not the other way around. 
In the latter case, God would speak directly to us and therefore tell us infallibly 
what to do. An example of this latter case would be ifsomeone felt in conscience he 
should follow the will ofGod as found in his rei igion. One would then feel that such and 
46 GA 190. Image ofconscience as the bell. Cf. ~Certainly, I have always contended that obedience 
even to an erring concsicence was the way to gain light." Apo. 162. 
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such a command should be followed because his religion commanded him. But the 
question remains: what is the basis of the person being convinced in conscience felt in 
that he had a moral obligation to follow that known religion as the voice of God? 
The error in conscience is in what we may consider its material object, that what 
it is considering. Where conscience does not err, said Newman, is attributing to God 
Himself the force of moral obligation itself, whatever its content may be..~7 That is why 
in the passage where he quotes the universal philosophical consensus on conscience as 
the voice ofGo<!, he makes the qualification that such an image - "voice ofGod~- refers 
to the "authority and religious meaning ofconscience,...llI not to the content of 
conscience itself. Later in the Grammar ofAssent he will conclude that "it is no disproof 
ofthe authority ofconscience that false consciences abound,,49 
Further considerations complete the paradox between the divine and erring 
elements in conscience. 
We note that Newman, in fact, does not use the tenn "voice ofGod" himself 
Rather he modified the metaphor of conscience as the voice ofGod, because 
by our perceptive power which identifies the intimations ofconscience 
with an echo ... reverberation .. _of an external admonition, we proceed 
on to the notion of a Supreme Ruler and Judge, and then again we image
50Him. 
• 7 Ibid. 97.
 
... Ibid. 1I0.
 
•9 Ibid. 190. 
:lO Ibid. 110.
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All the above images - echo, reverberation, notion - are, ofcourse, coherent with 
Newman's description ofconscience as something natural in humans. Being a mental act 
we all have by nature,51 it is obviously human and the "place where we apprehend Him 
as a reality...52 So, Newman's phenomenology ofconscience explains how conscience 
may be called the "voice ofGod,.. without the ascription of infallibility to any of its 
operations, or the assumption that it is God talking directly to us. 
Concluding our consideration of conscience as the "voice ofGod," we may quote 
from Newman's concept of conscience in its role as "the great internal teacher of 
religion...53 Above, Newman showed conscience as making available to us a realization 
of the existence ofGod and ofour individual relation to God as ruler and judge. Now 
conscience, in the section on natural religion, is 
a personal guide ... and I must use it because I must use myself; I am as 
little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with another's 
lungs. 54 
Therefore, conscience has no divine or super-ego being which transcends our own 
human nature. Our experiences of conscience are part of our everyday life. The theistic 
implications ofconscience are not "notional assents,..55 but have their source in every 
~I Ibid. 98. 
52 Ibid. 97. 
Sl Ibid. 304. 
s- Ibid. 
ss Ibid. 95. 
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man's experience. Newman is interested in conscience in the "ordinary sense of the 
word,~ to ground his phenomenology of religion in the Grammar ofAssent. 
[n our last two chapters, we have been considering the nature ofconscience, what 
it knows, as a moral sense, and how it commands, as a magisterial dictate. [n Newman's 
thought, conscience determines the rightness or wrongness of actions in the concrete 
situations in which we find ourselves, and in doing this is able to engage in reasoning, if 
necessary. The magisterial nature of conscience means for Newman the presence of a 
voice beyond oneself, and, being beyond this world, that ofa Supreme Being and Judge. 
Towards the end of the Grammar ofAssent Newman remarked that he did not 
wish to enter into the question of "how far external assistances are in all cases necessary 
to the action ofthe mind..56 So, following our philosophical analysis ofconscience in 
the Grammar ofAssent. our next step will be to see how Newman brought conscience 
into relationship with the authority of the Church in which he believed Conscience wi1l 
preserve its natural character, as discussed above, both as a moral sense and a sense of 
duty. Obviously, due to the contrast within conscience itselfwith both its erring and 
divine character, conflicts are possible. Newman will attempt to resolve deadlocked 
situations by his appeal to a separation ofdomains: one in which the word ofChurch 
authority is final; the other in which the word ofconscience is supreme. 
In all religious conflicts, however, conscience preserves its nature, with the 
particularity of its dictates and capacity to reason. The Church authority with which 
56 Ibid. 304.
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Newman deals in our next chapter is primarily papal in the Church orRome. However, 
these crises ofconscience will also bring out the authority ofconscience in a man's life 
vis-a-vis any religious authority. The latter will our argument in Chapter XV. What 
authority does conscience, for all people, in aU beliefs. ultimately have? 
The meaning ofNewman's toast to conscience should gradually become clearer. 
Our hope is to show that, in all maners, our author will continue faithful to the 
general principle which I have all along implied: - that no religion is from 
God which contradicts our sense of right and wrong.57 
,., GA325. 
151 
CHAPTER XIII 
CHURCH, STATE, AND CONSCIENCE 
I give an absolute obedience 
to neither the Pope nor the Queen. 
Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk 
Newman's Leiter (0 the Duke olNorfolk in 1875 was a reply to Gladstone's 
critique of the First Vatican's COWlCi! definition of papal infallibility as an article of faith 
in 1870. Gladstone's basic argument is directed towards two elements in papal authority. 
First, that Catholics owe the Pope absolute obedience in their religious submission. 
Second, that the Pope had jurisdiction in all aspects ofa Catholic's life. Seeing that no 
aspect oflife escapes papal jurisdiction, and a Catholic has no right to disobey the Pope 
ever, Gladstone draws the conclusion that the Vatican decrees had put the conscience of 
every Catholic at the disposal ofthe Pope. "Therefore Catholics are moral and mental 
slaves."I 
I "Letter to the Duke of Norfolk."in Diff. ii. 224.
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Newman will address both issues raised by Gladstone, coming, we foresee. to an 
opposite conclusion. In passing, he will develop a philosophy on the supremacy of 
conscience to justify his claims. So, we shall see that once Newman allows the possibility 
ofconscience overruling either the State or the Church in one instance. that is, in the 
political realm, the need is felt to philosophically justify his position. 
In this chapter, we shall endeavor to first address the issue as raised by Gladstone. 
Then describe Newman's answer, followed by his philosophy of the supremacy of 
conscience. In this, we shall follow the Leiter to the Duke ofNorfolk, with references to 
the Grammar ofAssent. 
Some important distinctions made by Newman in the Letter may be helpful 
before we begin. In the exercise of papal authority Newman distinguishes between papal 
teaching on doctrine and papal discipline in matters ofconduct. 2 
Then., within papal teaching there are 
1. Papal teachings which is infallible. 
2. Papal teachings on religious matters which are not infallible. 
3. Papal teachings on non-religious matters which are not infallible. 
Whereas. in matters ofconduct, there are papal mandates that are 
4. On religious matters. 
5. On non-religious matters. 
2 Ibid. 224. 
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The matter at hand in the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk enters within category 
number 5 above, the realm of political action. 
Another key to the reading ofNewman on the question ofconscience and the 
Papacy is the method of interpretation he follows. In the dedication itself, Newman 
addresses the issue, excluding all interpretations of papal documents except that of the 
Schola TheologQrum and oftime.J 
This hermeneutics is carried out throughout. In the final chapter on the Vatican 
Definition, Newman again insists that 
but hardly has she [the Church] spoken out magisterially some great 
general principle, when she sets her theologians to work to explain her 
meaning in the concrete, by strict interpretation of its wording, by the 
illustration of its circumstances, and by the recognition of exceptions, in 
order to make it as tolerable as possible, and the least ofa temptation., to 
self-willed, independent, or wrongly educated minds.4 
Newman, no doubt, considered himselfone of the Schola Theologorum of the 
Church, for his reading of church documents in the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk are 
carried out in that vein. The importance of this hermeneutics is that Newman is 
excluding Church authority itself as its own exclusive interpreter. This is especially 
brought out when Newman gave the example ofthe Catholic dilemma with two 
conflicting Popes. 
How else could private Catholics save their souls when there was a Pope 
and anti-popes, each severally claiming their allegiance.5 
) Ibid 176. 
• Ibid. 321. 
, Ibid. 245. See also Newman's reading of the SyUabus of 1864 in Sections 6 and 7 oftbe Leaer to 
lhe Duke ofNCHjo/Jc. 
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Coming back to the original question posed by Gladstone, Newman tackles both 
issues; whether obedience is absolute and whether obedience is due by a Catholic in all 
aspects ofhis life. The quotation from the Council, used by both Newman and Gladstone, 
is that clergy and laity are 
bound by the duty of hierarchical subjection and of sincere obedience; and 
this not only in matters that pertain to faith and morals, but also in matters 
that pertain to the discipline and government ofthe Cburch.6 
First, Newman analyses "hierarchical subjection and sincere obedience." Later, 
we shall investigate Newman's hermeneutics of the "matters" involved. In the context of 
Gladstone's question on how Catholics may obey both Queen and Pope, Newman rejects 
"absolute obedience" to either. Newman treats the expression "absolute obedience" with 
irony: "Gladstone speaks of 'absolute obedience' so often, that any reader ... would 
think that the word 'absolute' was the Pope's word, not his.'" However, what is 
imponant is how Newman himself understands the word. It is obedience which is 
unlimited in extent, obedience to whatever might be commanded No person on earth., 
neither Pope nor Queen, has such authority over a person's conscience. 
6 The F'1fSt Vatican Genera1 Council. Dogmatic Constitution "Pastor Aeternus,~ chapter lIL in The 
Christian Faith. 5th. ed. Neuner-Dupois (New York.. Alba House. 1990). n. 826. p. 246. Detlzinger 3060. 
7 Diff. ii. 233. 
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When ... Mr. Gladstone asks Catholics how they can obey the Queen and 
yet obey the Pope, since it may happen that the commands of the two 
authorities may clash, I answer, that it is my rule, both to obey the one and 
to obey the other, but that there is no rule in this world without exceptions, 
and ifeither the Pope or the Queen demanded ofme an 4Absolute 
Obedience,' he or she would be transgressing the laws of human nature 
and human society. I give an absolute obedience to neither. Further, ifever 
this double allegiance pulled me in contrary ways, which in this age ofthe 
world I think it never will, then I should decide according to the particular 
case, which is beyond all rule, and must be decided on its own merits.8 
In this answer Newman develops a personalist ethical theory based on a 
philosophy in which the real is the concrete. Universal concepts belong, of themselves, to 
the realm ofthe abstract.9 Ultimately, the individual must decide in each case, because 
such is the nature of the world. And the laws ofhuman nature and human society, 
according to Newman's philosophy, are universal. There is no rule without exceptions. 
So, seeing that there is no law without exceptions, such universal, that is, in all cases, 
obedience to either the Pope or the Queen always has its limits. 
We remember, ofcourse, from Chapters XI and XII, Newman's understanding of 
conscience as a moral sense and sense ofduty. In the Letter to the Duke o/Norfolk 
a Ibid. 243. 
9 Note the gap between universal and individual concepts. ~To him [the Logician) dog or borse is 
not a thing whicb be sees, but a mere name suggesting ideas; and by dog or horse universal he means. not 
the aggregate ofall individual dogs or horses brought together", but a common aspect. meagre but precise, of 
all existing or possible dogs or borses. which all the while does not really correspond to any one single dog 
or horse out of the whole aggregate," GA 215. Hence, a universal obedieooe to either Pope or Queen is a 
universal com:qJt and does not correspond to every individual situation. 
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Newman again rejects a definition ofconscience as either the "right of self-will~ or a 
definition ofconscience that would empty it of its content. 10 
A further reflection shows that Newman writes that, in fact, such a conflict 
between Queen and Pope could never happen. However, he goes on to consider possible 
examples ofhow that might occur. There are possible cases where a Catholic should 
obey the Pope over the command of the Queen: 
There are cases in which we should obey the Pope and disobey the State. 
Suppose, for instance, an Act was passed in Parliament, bidding Catholics 
to attend Protestant service every week., and the Pope distinctly told us not 
to do so, for it was to violate our duty to our faith:- I should obey the Pope 
and not the Law. 1I 
Likewise, situations arise when a Catholic should obey the Queen over a 
command of the Pope: 
Again, were I actually a soldier or sailor in her Majesty's service, and sent 
to take part in a war which I could not in my conscience see to be unjust, 
and should the Pope suddenly bid all Catholic soldiers and sailors to retire 
from the service, here again, taking the advice ofothers, as best I could, r 
should not obey him. 12 
In another part of the Letter, Newman clearly implies that one Pope did, in fact, 
consider others as having overstepped their authority. 13 
10 Diff. ii 249 - 250. It is interesting to note that the concept ofconscience as "'the right to self­
will" in the Lener 10 lhe Duke ofNorfolk is Rot only applied to the ~popular mind" but only to "educated 
minds." 
II Ibid. 240.
 
12 Ibid. 241-242.
 
Il rbid. 217. Pope Urban VII. in 1641. clearly questions the excommunication ofHcnry VIII and
 
Elizabeth I by Pope Pius V. 
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What is imponant for our study is the fact that Newman does teach that a 
Catholic may disobey the Pope, in certain "supposable cases," under certain conditions. I~ 
Its [conscience's] dictate, in orderto prevail against the voice of the Pope, 
must foHow upon serious thought, prayer, and all available means of 
arriving at a right judgment of the matter in question. IS 
Newman concludes in principle that a Catholic's obedience to the Pope, ..though 
not 'absolute' even in religious matters, ... he [the Pope] has a supreme call on our 
obedience.,,16 This distinction between us not having an absolute obedience to the Pope 
and his having a supreme call on our obedience will be dealt with by Newman later on in 
the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk. 17 Newman will maintain there that obedience to the 
injunctions ofa Pope may be withheld at the dictate ofconscience. However, the main 
thesis holds: conscience may be supreme over the Pope in the political realm. 
The second aspect ofGladstone's critique centered on the Pope's power over all 
aspects ofa Catholic's life. "Absolute" means unlimited in its authority in any aspect ofa 
Catholic's life. "Matters of faith and morals," as defined by Vatican I, would seem to 
cover all one's life. IS Newman begins his comments by stating that 
Mr. Gladstone says that ..the Pontiffdeclares to belong to him the supreme 
direction of Catholics in respect to all duty." Supreme direction; true, but 
"supreme" is not "minute," nor does "direction" mean "supervision" or 
"management. ,,19 
'" Ibid. 242.
 
IS Ibid. 257-8.
 
16 Ibid. 240.
 
17 Ibid. 256-257.
 
II See note 6 above.
 
19 Diff. ii. 227.
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To make his point, Newman draws two parallels; that ofhuman law, and that of 
medical supervision. Human law directs our conduct and must be obeyed, but has not 
total direction ofevery aspect ofour lives. Likewise, Church law and authority has power 
over us: "yet no one would say that the Law, after all, with all its power in the abstract 
and its executive vigour in fact, interferes with our comfort or our conscience."lo Again, 
the bottom line seems that law, per se, whether State or Church, is in the realm of the 
abstract. Therefore, conscience is needed to apply that law to the individual situation. 
Again, in the example of the businessman with a medical adviser, Newman tries 
to answer Gladstone's objection to the seemingly limitless authority, and, hence, possible 
tyranny of the Pope over the whole domain ofa Catholic's conduct. Newman's thesis is 
that the Pope may have authority over any act ofa Catholic, but not over every act ofa 
Catholic. A medical adviser may indirectly control the business life of his patient, as to 
his meals, schedule, trips or, in fact, any act This control is not slavery understood as 
total authority over all areas of human conduct, but rather indirect authority in all life's 
matters. Hence, the distinction is between authority in every act of the patient and 
authority in any act of the patient. An example would be that the doctor may tell the 
patient not to travel in order to write his will, but would not be competent to tell the 
patient not to make a will. 
Likewise a Catholic is not a slave of the Pope, who would have general authority 
over any act of his life. Again, however, Newman insists that papal power may cover all 
20 Ibid.
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one's life, and must be applied by the individual conscience to concrete situations. 21 An 
example would be that the Pope, or the Church. may determine the laws of marriage 
according to the Church, but, obviously, would not tell the Catholic whom or when to 
marry. 
So. coming from the question ofdisobeying the Pope in favor of the State, 
Newman has advanced to the consideration of who ultimately decides when to obey one 
or the other. Having accepted the individual's conscience as the supreme guide in these 
hypothetical conflicts ofChurch and State authority, Newman is brought to the 
conclusion that the individual Catholic conscience may rule against the Pope in other 
supposable cases. 
Having, therefore, accepted the principle ofa supremacy of conscience over the 
Pope in certain circwnstances. Newman feels obliged to give reasons for his thesis. 
Newman substantiat his claim that the dictate of conscience may overrule saying: 
I must begin with the Creator and His creature, when ( would draw out he 
prerogatives and the supreme authority ofConscience.2.1 
Newman based his claim on three principles: 
I.Conscience has the anteeedence of natural religion to revealed religion. 
2. Conscience is foundational to the mission of the Church. 
3. Conscience is coeval with creation. 
21 Ibid. 231-232.
 
22 Ibid. 246.
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This threefold priority ofconscience over the Pope touches the very essence of 
Newman's toast to conscience first, and then to the Pope. The after dinner hypothetical 
toast is the conclusion of the section of the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk where Newman 
begins by linking conscience to creation. Just before the toast, there is a citation of 
theological opinion to the effect that conscience is always to be obeyed. The toast, 
therefore, reflects the ritle ofconscience to obedience in all circumstances, based on its 
link to creation, and supported by Catholic theological opinion.23 
A first reason given for the authority ofconscience is its being the principle of 
natuml religion. Newman's argument may be described as follows: Revelation, including, 
ofcourse, the authority of the Pope, depends on Natural Religion; and Natural Religion 
depends on conscience as a sense of right and wrong. 
Firstly, Revelation, according to Newman, depends on Natural Religion. Hence, 
his lapidary phrase in the Letter: "The Pope, who comes of Revelation, has no 
jurisdiction over Nature.',24 The philosophy of religion espoused is that revelation is not 
independent of, but rather complements, natural religion. In the Grammar ofAssent, 
Newman asserts that "belief in revealed truths depends on belief in natural. ,,15 In An 
Essay on the Development afChristian Doctrine Newman affirms the role of revelation 
as being parallel, but posterior, to the role ofconscience in natural religion. In fact, he 
2l Ibid. Section S. Conscience. 246-26\
 
24 Ibid. 254.
 
~ GA 321.
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considers the rule ofconscience as being prior to the rule of revelation, the former having 
a subjective authority, the latter an objective one.26 
Secondly, conscience, as a sense of right and wrong, is ""the first element in 
religion. ,,27 In the Grammar ofAssent, Newman writes ofconscience as ""our great 
internal teacher of rei igion," giving us '"a rule of right and wrong, as being His rule, and a 
code ofmoral duties,,,28 and concluding "'that no religion is from God which contradicts 
our sense of right and wrong. ,,29 Based on this philosophy of religion and conscience, 
Newman rejects a notion of the Papacy using "revealed prerogatives" to neglect "his 
mission of preaching truth, justice, mercy, and peace, much more ifhe trampled on the 
consciences of his subjects. ,,30 Here at work is a clear rejection of Antinomianisrn as if 
papal authority were over and above the natural law and human conscience.31 
Two objections may immediately be made to this supremacy ofconscience based 
on its role in natural religion and natural religion's role in revelation. First, that in the 
text, Newman insists on conscience as "'the least luminous of teachers." Second, that 
natural religion "needs" to be "sustained and completed by Revelation.,,32 
26 DIN. 86. 
rT Diff. ii. 253.
 
2' GA 304.
 
29 Ibid. 325.
 
JO Diff. ii 254.
 
31 Cf Dante's love for the Church as ~Ia bella donna (the beautiful lady) .. and his critique ofthe
 
Papacy making ~ Dio d 'oro e d'argento (God ofgold and silver)." Inferno. XIX. Cf Paradiso, XVlTI: 
Purgatorio. VI; and Inferno XXVD. 
32 Diff. ii. 254. 
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However, we note that in the same sentence that Newman considers conscience 
the "least lwninous" of teachers, he also considered it "the highest of all teachers." This 
philosophy is difficult but must be accepted integrally ifwe wish to accept Newman's 
teaching on conscience. In the same vein that Newman sees the enormous limitations of 
conscience, he also states its supremacy as teacher. A mystery, indeed, but one that must 
be dealt with courageously. Hence, though mistaken, and very easily so, nevertheless 
conscience should be followed. But, precisely because so weak and erroneous, as part of 
its sense of right and wrong, conscience is precisely bound to seek right and wrong 
beyond its own defective perspective. But one affirmation cannot eliminate the other in 
Newman. 
As to the second objection on the need for revelation, the above weakness of 
conscience explains why revelation is at all necessary. Being hwnan and individual, 
conscience tends to err and, therefore, needs help to find right and wrong. Hence, it calls 
for revelation, the Church, and the Pope, in the Catholic perspective. But such a need in 
no way eliminates the primordial essence of the seeker. To state the need for conscience 
to know right and wrong presupposes that conscience in fact does seek right and wrong. 
Hence, conscience demands respect at all stages of its search. Revelation, as something 
required by conscience, would lose its raison d'etre were it to suffocate conscience. The 
doctor is only needed where the sick exists. 
The second basis for Newman's claim for supremacy of conscience is its role as 
being foundational to the mission of the Church. Newman writes: 
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On the law of conscience and its sacredness are founded both his [the 
Pope's] authority in theory and his power in fact. 3J 
Newman explains this foundationaJ role ofconscience vis-a-vis the Papacy in that 
it is the Pope's "very mission to proclaim the moral law." In this moral theology, the 
moral law, knowable by "'the light of nature," that is, by conscience, is definitively made 
known by revelation, from which also the Pope derives his teaching office. Hence, part 
and parcel of the Papacy is to proclaim the natural moral law of which conscience is an 
essential part. In that sense, conscience is foundational to the Pope's mission. Hence, 
Newman concluded that 
the championship of the Moral Law and ofconscience is his [pope's] 
raison d'etre. J.l 
However, Newman immediately clarified the concept of papal proclamation of 
moral law by not limiting the role of the Papacy, and of Revelation, to "a mere 
republication of the Natural LaW.,,35 Revelation is "distinct" and ""beyond" the teaching 
of nature. So, even though the Pope should preach respect for conscience, such a teaching 
in no way takes away from the originality of Revelation. Again, we have the paradox in 
Newman. On the one hand, conscience must be preached by the Pope. On the other hand, 
conscience needs the Papacy. 
Newman is at the same time affirming the need for the Pope to respect conscience 
and, at the same time, proclaiming all parts of the moral law are part of the Pope's 
lJ Ibid. 252.
 
34 Ibid. 253.
 
JS Ibid. 254.
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mission. Therefore, a wrong conclusion would be to make Newman teach that 
conscience is something opposed to or on a different track to the Papacy. On the 
contrary, precisely because the Pope teaches respect for conscience as part of his mission, 
in the same manner other elements of the moral law are within his teaching authority 
Whether conscience accepts his teaching authority is another matter. But Newman is 
writing the Letter in the context of Catholic coherence in his teaching on conscience and 
the Papacy. So, seeing that the Papacy teaches the moral law, and conscience is essential 
to that law, it follows that if 
he [the Pope] neglected his mission of preaching truth, justice, mercy, and 
peace, much more ifhe trampled on the consciences of his subjects, .. 
then he could not have lasted all these many centuries till now.36 
But Newman also applies the teaching of the Pope vis-a.-vis conscience to the 
authority of the Pope vis-Ii-vis conscience. lfthe Pope "could not speak against 
conscience," it follows that the Church itself is "built" on "the right and duty of 
following that Divine Authority, the voice ofconscience. ,,37 The Church is built on 
conscience, according to Newman, because what inspires papal authority is a sense of 
right and wrong. Likewise, what inspires a person in conscience to follow the Pope is 
precisely the same sense of right and wrong. 
Going back to Newman's experience in his "great change" to Roman 
Catholicism,38 we saw how he became a Catholic because he thought it was the right 
J6 Ibid. 
)7 Ibid. 252.
 
3K Ibid. 349
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thing to do. His conversion had no value if it were not a conversion in conscience. 
Therefore, his conscience was what brought him to Rome. On the other hand, he became 
a Catholic precisely because he saw that the Church of Rome was right, and that its 
doctrines and teaching authority were from God, the same creator ofhis conscience 
seeking truth. 
[n a curious twist to the historical arguments found in An Essay on the 
Development ofChristian Doctrine. in the Letter the very historical fact of the survival of 
the Papacy throughout the ages is proofof his claim to defend conscience and the moral 
law. Not only does Newman argue that if the Pope had trampled on the consciences of 
his subjects, he would not have sUIVived. 39 Also, he affinns the very fact ofconscience 
as being the only foundation for the sUIVival of the Papacy. 
It is by the universal sense of right and wrong, ... deeply lodged in the 
hearts of me, it thus and only thus, that he [the Pope) has gained his 
footing in the world and achieved his success. It is IUs claim to come from 
the Divine Lawgiver, in order to elicit, protect, and enforce those truths 
which the Lawgiver has sown in our very nature, it is this and this only, 
that is the explanation of his [the Papacy's] length oflife.~o 
So, according to Newman, if the Pope rules by divine authority, conscience, with 
the sense of right and wrong, will require that he be obeyed as part of that same sense of 
right and wrong. 
A third reason for conscience's supremacy is that it is coeval with creation. 
Newman began his chapter on conscience in the Letter to the Duke a/Norfolk: 
39 Ibid. 254.
 
4Il Ibid. 253.
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I must begin with the Creator and His creature, when I would draw out the 
prerogatives and the supreme authority ofConscience.~1 
Here we find the same contrast noted above between natural and revealed 
religion, between moral law and papal respect for conscience, also present between 
divlne creation and the divlne authority ofconscience. Conscience has its force because 
it is the etemallaw ofGod as apprehended in the minds of individual men. Again, it may 
"sutTer refraction;~2 but still remains the Divine Law. The conclusion is that even 
though it be mistaken it still is divlne and ought to be obeyed. Newman, therefore, goes 
beyond the mere paradox ofconscience being the highest and the least luminous of 
teachers. Its force comes because it is always "divine." 
Consequently, seeing that conscience is always considered divine, whereas the 
voice of the Pope may sometimes be seen as not divine, it follows that the voice of 
conscience prevails. The basic argument of the Letter 10 the Duke ofNor/o/k is that 
divine law is supreme as coming from God. But there is an inherent subjectivity in the 
individual's knowledge of that law. Nonetheless, the subject is bound to follow God as he 
knows Him and His law over and above any human. including papal, authority. 
So, Newman espouses not some moralistic code of conduct according to 
conscience, but rather sees God always present in the very definition ofconscience. 
Consequently, conscience is always to be obeyed since God is always to be obeyed. 
Whereas the Pope, by his very human nature, is never God and., hence, is not always to be 
.1 Ibid. 246. 
• 2	 Ibid. 247.
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obeyed. Thus, the precedence of conscience over the Pope is not only a matter of what 
comes first in time. Rather it is the precedence ofwhat is created over what is perfected. 
All of the above, in this third reason, in no way takes away from the erring character of 
conscience and a need for Revelation and the Pope. 
The next step is to determine the consequences ofNewman's teaching on the 
supremacy ofconscience, especially in the case ofa believing Catholic. If conscience is 
always to be obeyed, when is the Church to be obeyed by a believing Catholic? In a 
parallel fashion we may ask the same question for someone who accepts the divine 
authority ofsome other religion. Is obedience either blind and supreme, or never at all? 
Newman now applies to his original political question in the Lefler to the Duke of 
Norfolk a personal philosophy ofconscience. 
In fact, we see the same pattern of conscience questioning religious authority 
throughout Newman's life as described in this essay. Newman was born into a religion 
and, following his conscience, decided later to follow different religious authorities. 
Inherent in his philosophy is the optimism that conscience sincerely followed per se leads 
to truth. 
[t [conscience} is so constituted that, if obeyed, it becomes clearer in its 
injunctions, and wider in their range, and corrects and completes the 
accidental feebleness of its initial teachings.43 
Linked to that is his conviction, present in all his life, that truth and, in his case, 
Catholicism only needs a love for truth. 
.[l GA304. 
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Thus it is that the Catholic religion is reached, as we, by inquirers from all 
points of the compass, as if it mattered not where a man began, so that he 
had an eye and a heart for the truth.44 
Therefore, we note that Newman was not in favor of"cafeteria religiosity," 
according to which supremacy ofconscience means a believer may select at random what 
teachings ofChurch authority convince him. 
We are not left at liberty to pick and choose out of its contents according 
to our judgment, but must receive it all, as we find it, if we accept it at 
all.45 
Returning to the text and context of the Letter, we remember that Newman is 
answering a specific question as to the freedom of a Catholic in the political realm. His 
concern was not the relation between conscience and the teaching office of the Church. 
However, he answered Gladstone by staring that ifconscience and the Pope, operating in 
the same domain as they do when the Pope legislates, or gives particular orders, and the 
like, were to clash, conscience would have the final say.-16 
" Ibid. 295
 
.s Ibid. 302.
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CHAPTER XIV 
INFALLIBILITY AND CONSCIENCE 
Then since infallibility alone could block the exercise of conscience,
 
and the Pope is not infallible in that subject-matter
 
in which conscience is ofsupreme authority,
 
no dead-lock ... can take place between conscience and the Pope.
 
Leiter to Ihe Duke ofNorfolk 
Now, a new question arises. How do we combine supremacy ofconscience in the 
search for truth with acceptance of the authority of the Catholic or any religion? As we 
saw in the Leller 10 the Duke ofNorfolk, being a Catholic for Newman does not mean 
being a blind subservient one, lamquam cadaver (like a corpse). One's mind works 
within acceptance of Church authority. Our quest in this chapter will be to define the 
consequent domains ofconscience vis-a-vis religious teaching; then, the meaning of 
supremacy of conscience and that of the Pope in his teaching, jurisdiction, and 
infallibility. We shall conclude with a search for harmony between conscience and the 
Papacy. 
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Newman's concern was with the objection to the possibility ofany genuine 
political freedom ofconscience in the Catholic system. Our conclusion in the last chapter 
was that ifconscience and the Pope were to clash in the politicaJ realm, conscience 
would have the final say. Now a possible reading of Newman would be that conscience 
may, in fact, have the final say over any papal order or even teaching. Hence, any human 
authority, religious or political, may be always subject to the judgment of individual 
conscience. Conscience, in this opinion, would yield absolute autonomy from all 
authority. However, Newman rejected such a reading. Just as the Pope and Queen never 
demand absolute obedience, neither, as we shall see, does conscience. Newman's 
teaching on the supremacy of conscience must be read with his equal rejection of an 
absolute autonomy for conscience. He wrote: 
For what would become of the Pope's "absolute authority," as Mr. 
Gladstone caJls it, if the private conscience had an absolute authority 
also?1 
Newman's argument denying the absolute authority of conscience followed four 
steps: 
1. Conscience must be understood as the voice ofGod in the nature and heart of 
man, as distinct from the voice of religion's representatives. Newman further 
distinguished conscience from self-will and rejected reductions ofconscience to 
imagination. 2 
I Diff. ii. 255.
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2. Conscience is a practical judgment on what is to be done or not done, here and 
now, by the individual person. It is not a judgment on any speculative truth. Hence 
conscience cannot come into direct collision with the Church's or Pope's infall ibility; 
which is engaged on general propositions, and in the condemnation of panicular and 
given errors. J 
3. Therefore, according to Newman, seeing that conscience is a practical dictate 
by the individual in matters ofconduct, "collision is possible between conscience and the 
Pope only when the Pope legislates, or gives particular orders, and the like. ,..I Here 
conscience is supreme, since the Pope is not infallible in his laws, commands, acts of 
state, or administration. This supremacy does not contradict number 2 above. 
4. In order for conscience to "have the right ofopposing the supreme ... authority 
of the Pope," its dictate must "follow upon prayer, and all available means of aniving at 
a right judgment on the matter in question. "5 
5. Hence, Newman can conclude that no "deadlock ... can take place between 
conscience and the Pope:.6 
In swmnary, Newman has answered Gladstone's objection to papal infallibility 
destroying a Catholic's conscience in political matters. Newman placed infallibility and 
) Ibid. 256. See also Grammar ofAssent where Newman contrasts real and notional assent. -Acts 
of Notional Assent and ofInference do not affect our conduct.~ whereas "the fact ofa proposition being 
accepted with a real assent is aa:identally an earnest of that proposition being carried out in conduct . . . 
Real assent is proper to the individual." 87,82. 
• Ibid. 256.
 
~ Ibid. 257-258.
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conscience on two distinct levels of human life. Their subject matter are totally different; 
hence, a conflict is impossible. Infallibility does not touch directly on matters of 
individual conduct, which is the area ofconscience. Besides, conscience is not concerned 
with speculative truths. In the area ofspeculative truth., infal.libility and the Pope prevail. 
In matters ofconduct, conscience. 
The Pope has two domains ofauthority according to Newman; theory and 
practice. Within the former, he is endowed with infallibility. In the first domain, the Pope 
teaches; in the second, he mandates. He can teach infallibly; he cannot command 
infallibly. 
The Pope's infallibility ... lies in matters speculative, and his prerogative 
ofauthority is no infallibility in laws, commands, or measures. His 
infallibility bears upon the domain of thought, not directly ofaction. 7 
Conscience has a singular domain of authority and possible supremacy: that of 
conduct by the individual in the actual circumstances in which one finds oneself. 
Mandating our conduct in these situations, all its commands on right and wrong are 
concrete. This real particularity is what insulates conscience from infallibility. 
Several questions arise from this consideration. Do theory and practice never 
intertwine? Let's suppose a speculative truth by the Pope that all abortions are evil. lei us 
further suppose that the Pope or Council make an infallible statement on morals.8 Even 
supposing Newman's view that universal concepts do not really correspond to anyone 
7 Ibid. 341. 
• GA200.
 
173
 
individual,9 how could a Catholic's conscience be supreme in matters ofconduct and 
justify any abortion? Newman's theory seems a curtailment of Church teaching authority. 
Conscience limits authoritative teaching. 
To answer these objections, step 2 above is critical. Newman states the premise 
that conscience detennines only what here and now, in these actual circumstances, is to 
be done as being right or to be avoided as wrong. As seen in chapters XI and XII, 
conscience for Newman is both a moral sense and a sense ofduty. Conscience both 
mandates and detennines right and wrong in the concrete. Newman's premise, however, 
is that action is exclusively in the realm of the particular here and now by ~self alone and 
one's own actions.,,10 
Why does conscience, for Newman, not make universal judgments on right and 
wrong, like all abortions are evil? We may only answer with the Grammar ofAssent that 
Newman wishes to "investigate what the mind does," I1 with "instinctive certitude.,,12 
Newman starts from the premise of only wishing to describe the functioning of 
conscience as he sees it. This phenomenology of conscience excludes the possibility of 
another interpretation of conscience as fonnulating universal judgments, because, in 
Newman's view, conscience never goes beyond the individual circumstance, here and 
now. 
9 [bid. 215 
10 GA99. 
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The next step in Newman's argument is that individual judgments can never 
conflict with general judgments; the latter being the subject of infallibility. To justify this 
statement, Newman later on states that "exceptions there must be in all concrete 
matters.,,13 To explain his statement, Newman gives three examples of ulterior 
exceptions to Church utterances; that outside of the Church there is no salvation; 
absolute predestination: and usury. 14 
In the first example, Newman accepts the dogma from early Christianity that "Out 
ofthe Church, and out of the faith, is no salvation:,15 However, Newman notes that the 
then Pope accepted the principle of invincible ignorance, according to which one may 
belong to the soul of the Church, without belonging to the body. 16 According to 
Newman, this is an "exception" to the general principle of the dogma.. 17 In the second 
case, "absolute predestination" in the Latin Church since St Augustine has been subject 
to a "great explanation and modification" by the Jesuit School. The latter distinguished 
between "predestination to grace" and "predestination to glory." According to the latter 
distinction, our works do not avail us for grace here on eanh, but do avail us for eternal 
life. IS In the third example, Newman contrasts the statement of Pope Clement V that 
13 Diff. ii. 261.
 
14 Ibid. 334 - 337.
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17 Ibid. 336.
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usury was a sin with the t 831 decision of the Holy See to ~suspend its decision on the 
point." Again, because a double aspect was seen in the word usury. 19 
As a finale to ""this process of partial and gmduaUy developed teaching," Newman 
gives the "apparent contradiction ofBellannine, who says in one place that the Pope is to 
be obeyed by all, and., in another, he is not be obeyed." In the one instance, Bellarmine is 
stating a general principle of respect towards papal authority. In the second., he is giving 
specific exceptions to the rule such as 
ifhe assaulted a man's person, so it is lawful to resist him, ifhe assaulted 
souls, or troubled the state (/Urbanti rempublicam), and much more ifhe 
strove to destroy the Church. It is lawful, I say, to resist him, by not doing 
what he commands, and hindering the execution of his wi!1.20 
Newman's principle of hermeneutics is that these exceptions in their actual 
application are 
determined either by other authoritative utterances, or by the scrutinizing 
vigilance, acuteness, and subtlety of the Schola Theologorum. 21 
In all of the above cases, it is a later decision by the same authority which 
developed the doctrine. It was the contemporary Pope to Newman who accepted the 
theory of invincible ignorance. On justification, the theories of St Augustine were 
distinguished by later theologians. Whereas, in the case of usury, the same authority, the 
Holy See, later changed its teaching due to different meanings of the word usury. In 
Bellarmine's case, it is the same theologian who seemingly contradicts himself, but, if 
19 Ibid. 337.
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read carefully, is merely clarifying the scope of papal authority which still has to be 
obeyed in its proper role. 
Applying this theory to OUT example of abortion, a medical knowledge as to the 
precise moment of conception of a new life may further the moral principle as to the 
desttuction of a fertilized ovum. At the root ofNewman's theory there is the need for the 
individual to apply general principles to oneself as the acting person. From the universal 
teaching that all human life is sacred and merits respect, the knowledge of the first 
moment of existence of this individual human being here and now allows conscience to 
apply the moral teaching to a specific action to be done or avoid Therefore, conscience's 
role is not to empty the universal teaching, but rather develop and mandate it in a 
concrete situation. 
Another reading ofNewman would be that infallibility does not necessarily apply 
to this person's concrete situation. Specific personal situations are not implied in the 
definition. In other words, the Pope cannot know infallibly if this action I am going to do 
is evil, since he does not know if this specific action is within the universal scope of his 
doctrine. Conscience must apply the doctrine. 
This, of course, is a far cry from a reading ofNewman whereby the individual 
conscience makes universal statements of moral rights and wrongs. In this sense, 
conscience would supposedJy state that all abortions are not evil and hence some 
abortions may be permissible. In this case, conscience is going beyond Newman's theory 
and getting into universal propositions, which turn out, in this case, contradictory with 
Church teaching. 
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Another imperfect reading ofNewman would be to suppose that conscience 
makes an exception in the concrete, contradictory to Church universal teaching. The 
exceptions Newman spoke of are further and future developments, clarifications, and 
applications ofa previous theory. Hence, an application clearly contradictory to the 
"legitimate sense of the words,~ either in a minimalist or maximalist fashion, would be 
"imposing on the consciences of others." "Caution is to be observed.,,22 
Conversely, how can infallibility limit conscience? Newman himselfgives the 
case of a Catholic who refused to accept the dogma ofthe Immaculate Conception and 
left the Church. In this example the Catholic in conscience cannot accept a new dogma of 
the Church.23 Therefore, his judgment in conscience tells him not to continue in the 
Church. In Newman's case, his conscience rejected the Anglican Church..24 In both cases, 
the individual conscience rejected the teaching authority of the Church. Hence, 
infallibility per se in neither case limited the role ofconscience. Again., Newman., in his 
commentary on Vatican I, opens the door to a false interpretation of its acts and the need 
for "another Leo" to set it right.2S Here, Newman's thought led to go beyond the apparent 
fixed nature ofVatican I to an ulterior interpretation of the same which we know today as 
Vatican II. Historically, Newman saw how Vatican I was in fact stopped violently and 
needed to be complemented later. 
22 Ibid. 337-338. 
23 GA200. 
H Cf Chapter VIII. 
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As to the question of the person who leaves the Church because of the dogma of 
the Immaculate Conception, Newman answered that that person never accepted the 
indispensable and elementary faith of a Catholic. A real convert to Catholicism believes 
in "whatever the Church then or at any future time should teach." This person only 
believed those particular doctrines "which at that time [of his conversion) the Church in 
matter oHaet formally taught." Hence, we can suppose that the person in good faith left 
the Church, because, in conscience, he bad never accepted her living authority.26 
What is interesting here for our study is that Newman stated lack of belief in 
infallibility as the reason why this person left the Church. (fthe person had have believed 
in her infallibility, the dogma of the Immaculate Conception would have been no 
problem. Hence, belief in the living infallibility of the Church is a necessary limit for 
conscience, not only from a perspective of this or that dogma which the person may later 
accept or not. Rather, if a person accepts in conscience the on-going role of infallibility 
in the Church, then that person's conscience follows on to whatever the Church infallibly 
teaches. Ifa person's conscience does not accept this infallibility, that person's 
conscience may lead in another direction which is not truly Catholic. 
However, supposing that one's conscience does consider that the Church has 
infallibly taught some moral doctrine that he "in conscience," that is, before God, 
considers mistaken in his personal situation. To get out of the contradiction, either one 
has to accept the teaching or reject the teacher. In the first case, he realizes that his 
Z6 GA200.
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conscience has erred since he believes in the non-erring quality of the Church's 
Magisterium in this case. With Newman, he sees how easily conscience is "obscurecL~ 
how "impressible" it is by current opinion, how "WlSteady in its course. ,,27 
In the second case, the person may act like the person quoted above by Newman. 
Having rejecting the Church's infallible teaching in one subject, logically the claim of the 
Church to infallibility in other areas is rejected., and, so, the very dogma of the 
infallibility of the Church, and the Church herself, are likewise repudiated. 
An alternative reading ofNewman would be for the person to reject the infallible 
character of the doctrine out of an erring conscience. He dido't know it was infallible. 
Hence, he remains in the Church with a certain inconsistency. Seeing that he was not in 
conscience convinced of the infallible character of the doctrine, he rejects it as non­
infallible and, hence, not ultimately, binding in conscience. 
In both readings, however, the authority ofboth the infallibility of the Church and 
supremacy of conscience remain intact for a believing Catholic. Newman taught a 
harmony ofconscience and infallibility. In the area of thought, infallibility reigns 
supreme. In that of conduct, conscience. 
As to per se non-infallible propositions, again conscience is not directly engaged. 
According to Newman, it is not conscience's concern to examine Church teaching and its 
fallible or infallible character. Rather conscience is the moral sense ofduty to act. 
n Diif. ii. 253.
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A classic example in Newman's life was his writing ofAn Essay on the 
Deve/opmem ofChristian Doctrine. His search for the truth may have ended in just that: 
an intellectual grasp ofthe true Church. However, as explained in Chapter VI, Newman 
had learnt from Keble to move from conviction to action. Once he realized that the 
Catholic Church was the true Church, he decided it was his duty in conscience to avail of 
the first opportunity to request admission. lll 
The truth or non-truth ofan non-infallible Church teaching is a question for a 
"wise and cautious theology."z9 As to the Catholic who does accept the Church's 
infallibility, can one's conscience reject certain Church teaching? The supremacy of 
conscience taught by Newman deals with a person's acts, not his beliefs in universal, 
even if they be non-infallible, propositions. Therefore, conscience is not concerned with 
the area of the teacb.ing of the Church. Quoting Aquinas, Newman wrote: 
Conscience is not a judgment upon any speculative truth, any abstract 
doctrine, but bears immediately on conduct, on something to be done or 
not done.30 
21 Apo. ~Wheo [ was fully confident that the Church ofRome was the only true Church, [joined 
her.- 127. 
29 lbid. 332. 
)0 lbid. 256. 
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CHAPTER XV 
DUTIES AND RIGHTS OF CONSCIENCE 
The reproach levelled against us [is]
 
that the Catholic Church has now become ... a despotic aggressive Papacy,
 
in which freedom of thought and action is utterly extinguished.
 
Letter to the Dulce ofNorfolk 
As a conclusion to our previous chapters, the next question facing us is Newman's 
view on the trilogy of hwnan freedoms of speech,1 thought and action.! The latter are 
generally called the "rights of conscience." Newman clearly speaks of the rights of 
conscience in the context of his theory ofconscience as obedience to the voice ofGod 
"as apprehended in the minds of individual men.") Since one has a duty to obey God, we 
likewise have a right to do so. Again, Newman rejects conscience as "self-will," "without 
any thought of God at all.',4 So, the question in this chapter is how conscience has rights 
I Diff. ii. 197. 
1 Ibid. 342.
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linked to its duties, and how far these rights may affect others and society in general. 
How much can one say that Newman anticipated certain rights now commonly held in 
universal declarations ofhuman rights and Vatican U's teaching on religious liberty? 
Logically we cannot read into Newman a situation non-existent in his time. 
However, his dealing with the problem ofliberties posed by Gladstone enlighten us as to 
his views. Again, his very life is the ultimate isthmus test on his thought. Still and all, 
some guide-lines are found in the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk. 
[n the paragraph where Newman speaks of rights of conscience, the argument is 
to distinguish between rights ofconscience based on a concept of conscience as "self­
will" and the rights of conscience understood as obedience to God speaking in our 
conscience. That is our first distinction. Newman talks of conscience always as an 
obedience to God as "the rule ofethical truth, the standard of right and wrong.-5 
Conscience is never a thinking, speaking, and acting, according to one's ownjudgment 
and humor, ''without any thought ofGod at alL',6 Hence, conscience for Newman is a 
moral imperative, not a subjective whim, and much less the subjective whim ofdoing 
away with conscience properly understood. Nevertheless, the objective search for God 
and truth necessarily involves the individual's subjective understanding of the same. 
Therefore, Newman obviously understands the possible pluralist nature of religious 
assent and dissent. 
l Ibid. 246. 
6 Ibid. 250. 
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Seeing that conscience is not a license, but rather a duty, it has rights.' Hence, for 
Newman not only the person with an objectively true conscience has rights, but even one 
in error. At the conclusion ofChapter 5 of the Letter to the Duke afNorfolk he quotes 
Catholic theologians to the effect that 
ifa man is culpable in being in error, ... still he must act according to that 
error, while he is in it, because he in full sincerity thinks the error to be 
truth.s 
Therefore, to the question whether error has rights, Newman would answer that 
error per se does not have rights, but rather the person exercising his conscience does. 
The rights ofconscience are derived from the duty of following conscience. The 
inference is from a duty to a right. The man in error "must" act accordingly. Later we 
shall see the duties Newman puts to this right in the social arena. 
In fact, Newman goes on to even consider the Church having as a moral 
foundation the "most serious doctrine, the right and the duty of following that Divine 
Authority, the voice of conscience.,,9 This is what Newman understood by that "liberty 
ofconscience,n at which no Pope had ever scoffed The Church is founded on both the 
duty and the rights of conscience. So, conscience, rightly understood, and liberty of 
conscience, correctly read, have never been condemned by the Church. Quite the 
opposite. In this understanding, they are accepted by Newman. 
In an earlier passage, Newman spoke of the war against the rights ofconscience. 
7 Ibid. 
I Ibid. 259.
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All through my day there has been a resolute warfare, ... against the 
rights ofconscience, as I have described it.... Public writers, day after 
day, have indoctrinated the minds of innumerable readers with theories 
subversive of its claims. As in Roman times and in the middle age, its 
supremacy was assailed by the ann of physical force, so now the intellect 
is put in operation to sap the foundations of a power which the sword 
could not destroy. We are told that ... its dictate is an imagination; that 
the very notion of guiltiness, which that dictate enforces, is simply 
inational. 10 
The rights of conscience subject to the attack described by Newman are the rights 
to do what conscience dictates, which others are to .respect. Just as before in history, 
coercion by force was used against conscience, in his day, says Newman, intellectuals 
tried to dissolve its true content. Hence, Newman wished to defend conscience against 
two kinds ofattack: that of force upon one's conscience to do or not to do what one 
thinks is right or wrong; and, second., that of intellectual sophisms against the very notion 
of each person having their own conscience with its duties and rights. In contemporary 
terminology of cult tactics, Newman was possibly describing the use of techniques of 
effective conscience control: 
So that in the abstract indeed and in idea it [conscience) is free, but never 
free in fact, never able to take a flight of its own, ... any more than birds 
whose wings are clipped. II 
In the context of the Letter to the Dulce ofNorfolk Newman could then affirm that 
conscience has "the right ofopposing the supreme, though not infallible, Authority of the 
Pope...12 Newman had spoken a few lines earlier of the supreme authority ofconscience 
,. Ibid. 249. 
11 Ibid. 255. Cf. this writer. "Cult Tactics in the Confessions." BraniffBriefly,(Aprii 1995),4-6. 
12 Diff. ii. 257. 
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in its own domain. The right ofconscience to oppose the Pope avoids the collision 
between two bearers of "supreme authority." When the domain of conscience and the 
jurisdictional authority of the Pope intersect, conscience ultimately reigns, and., in that 
sense, has a right over the Pope. 
To explain this, Newman gives some examples of the supreme, though not 
infallible, authority of the Pope: 
What have excommunication and interdict to do with Infallibility? Was SL 
Peter infallible on that occasion at Antioch when S1. Paul withstood him? 
was S1. Victory infallible when he separated from bis communion the 
Asiatic churches? or Liberius when in like manner he excommunicated 
Athanasius? And., to come to later times, was Gregory XlII, when he had a 
medal struck in honour of the Bartholomew massacre? or Paul IV, in his 
conduct towards Elizabeth: or Sextus V, when he blessed the Armada? or 
Urban VIII, when he persecuted Galileo?1J 
Next., he gives cases when disobedience in conscience is called for. [n both 
examples, the domain of conscience and the jurisdictional authority of the Pope clash. 
Thus, if the Pope told the English Bishops to order their priests to stir 
themselves energetically in favour of teetotalism, and a particular priest 
was fully persuaded that abstinence from wine, etc., was practically a 
Gnostic error, and therefore felt he could not so exen himself without sin: 
or suppose there was a Papal order to hold lotteries in each mission for 
some religious object, and a priest could say in God's sight that he 
believed lotteries to be morally wrong, that priest in either of these cases 
would commit a sin hie et nunc if he obeyed the Pope, whether he was 
right or wrong in his opinion., and, ifwrong, although he had not taken 
proper pains to get at the truth of the matter. 14 
13 Ibid. 
14 Ibid. 260. 
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In these cases, conscience is "fully persuaded," "in God's sight," to disobey the 
Pope in an non-infallible jurisdictional area.'i 
Newman's next question in the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk regards the social 
character of these rights of conscience. Did Newman understand rights as having a purely 
individual character such as erasing the possible guilt involved in following an erroneous 
conscience? Was his concept ofliberty of conscience a mere absence of coercion or 
sophisms? Or are they rights to act according to conscience in the social realm? Did 
Newman defend or attack the triple liberty of thought, speech, and action? 
Newman addresses these issues in Section 6 of the Letter to the Dulce ofNorfolk 
in which he defended the Syllabus of 1864 against Gladstone's attack. Liberty of 
conscience implied for both Newman and Gladstone liberty of speech., thought, action, 
worship, and conscience. To simplify the issues, we may consider freedom of conscience 
in these three situations: 
I.Situation 1: 
There is no freedom of speech, press, assembly, worship, or ofconscience. In this 
hypothetical situation, there is only one religion, censorship of the press, no right to 
dissent, and authority controls all conduct to the exclusion of individual conscience. 
2. Situation H:
 
There are freedoms, but with certain limits.
 
3. Situation nI: 
IS Ibid. 
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Unlimited freedoms to say, think and do, what one thinks fit. 
Newman's thesis is that Gladstone accused the Pope of adhering to Situation 1. 
Newman maintained that "the Pope has done no such thing:'16 Rather, Situation II can 
be applied to contemporary British courts of law, and that is not condemned by the 
POpe.17 What the Pope does condemn is Situation 10, which is also condemned by the 
"present state of British law:,18 The question Newman does not answer was whether the 
Pope explicitly adhered to Situation n. 
To prove his point, - that the Pope is not adhering to Situation I - Newman first 
compared contemporary Papal teaching to fonner British Toryism. The idea of a 
'"Christian Polity," where "Christianity was the law of the land," and '"the State had a 
conscience~ was '"Popery today and Toryism yesterday:,19 The conviction of one true 
religion led to the established Church ofEngland having the support of the civil power in 
diverse ways ofdiscrimination against dissenters. 
Newman admits to being an admirer of this system of State Religion, but 
considers it to be impossible to maintain. [n his view, there are three steps to an 
'"inevitable" pluralism of ideas and religions, in accord with Situation 1I. 
First, there was the cultivation of the intellect that leads "into a thousand various 
shapes." And, in matters of religion, this is even truer, "by reason of the extreme subtlety 
16 Ibid. 269.
 
17 Ibid. 270.
 
18 Ibid. 271.
 
19 Ibid. 262, 264.
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and abstruseness of the mental action by which they are determined~ So. Newman 
observes that in the "past seventy years. first one class of the community, then another, 
had awakened up to thought and opinion...20 
Second, the differences of religion means that the State no longer has one 
conscience. the Anglican. but rather "haJf-a-dozen, or a score, or a hundred, in religious 
matters, each different from each." Hence. a deadlock comes about when some could not 
work with others with unanimity as required by a State Religion. As a necessary 
consequence, Newman concludes, the whole theory of Toryism collapses. Here. it is clear 
that Newman does not approve the enforcement ofa State Religion over the consciences 
of others, but rather that a plurality of consciences fostered by education means that a 
State Religion can not hold 
Thirdly, Newman, like others, sees that a return is impossible. Only a miracle 
hinders this evolution of ideological pluralism. Even if a return were possible, Newman 
notes. such a restoration may interfere with human responsibility.21 The implication here 
that a return to religious unanimity by the people makes a State Religion acceptable to 
all. However, this religious unanimity always involves the possibility of some in the 
National Religion wishing in conscience to change religion. As, in fact, happened in the 
life ofNewman. The Church of England was the State Religion which Newman in 
conscience left. Situation II is the moral answer for both Church and State. 
zo Ibid. 267.
 
21 Ibid. 268.
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From the above analysis, we may draw several conclusions on Newman's teaching 
on liberty ofconscience. Obviously, Newman prefers a situation where Christianity is the 
law ofthe land., of the monarchy, and of the university. However, he sees how increased 
culture brought pluralism ofopinion and religion. His ideal is to combine Christianity 
with culture, as he himselfdid all his life. We remember, for example, his intellectual 
defense of the Anglican Church, his intellectual search for the truth ofCatholicism, and. 
now, his intellectual defense of freedom of conscience in the Catholic Church. His 
reaction to the growth ofother religions is not to reject such liberties by the use of 
coercion, censorship, and cult-tactics. In fact, he called such religious pluralism ~men ... 
with consciences. ,,22 The underlying convicti.:>n, therefore, is that Christianity should be 
the law of the land, but in conscience. 
Next., we may easily parallel Newman's treatment ofToryism with a hypothetical 
treatment of Popery. (fthe Pope wants a State Religion, such a thesis is impossible, 
because ofthe free flow of ideas. Likewise, a State Religion is undemocratic since it 
demands a despotism exclusive of dissenters. Finally, it would be an imposition of 
Catholicism "interfering" with personal responsibility. 
Newman's final solution was hazy. His hope was, in centuries to come, 
there may be found out some way of uniting what is free in the new 
sttucture of society with what is authoritative in the old.n 
22 Ibid. 267.
 
D Ibid. 268.
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Finally, let us ask what duties does Newman. in fact, put on the exercise of 
liberties ofconscience in society? This addresses hypothetical Situation III. 
Later in the same Section 6 of the Letter to the Duke ofNorfolk, Newman 
explains that the Pope does not condemn all liberty of press, conscience and of worship. 
Again, comparing Papal decrees to British law, Newman shows that both place 
responsibilities on human freedoms. What is interesting for our study are the social 
obligations Newman puts on freedoms in his interpretation of British law and Papal 
teaching. 24 Hence, Situation m, as unlimited freedoms, is rejected. 
First, there is the duty of"political society" and "common security." Newman 
considers that the very notion of "human society" involves the limits of certain, even 
innocent, liberties for public order. He then goes on to list several limits on Catholics in 
British society for the good of "social compensation," such as the prohibition of public 
religious processions. Likewise, he notes the parallel curtailment of religious freedoms in 
the Papal States. To further his point, he observes the limits on freedom of speech, press 
and religion in Britain. Freedom of speech is not freedom to insult. Freedom of the press 
is not freedom to libel. Freedom of religion is not total equality for Catholics in England. 
The conclusion is that both British law and the Pope do not allow for unrestricted use of 
all human freedoms. The latter would be a return to "a liberty of self-will,,,15 Situation 
Ill. 
2< Ibid. 269-275.
 
%j Ibid. 274.
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Secondly, Newman concludes this section with his evaluation of the Papal 
rejection of Situation Ill, paralleled to that ofBritish law. Again, there are rights and 
duties ofconscience. In this case, it is not just the need for common peace, but the case 
for social justice against "atrocities." Freedom ofconscience is obviously not a freedom 
to do all one wills. Whereas abuses of freedom endangers others and leads to "atrocities," 
the correct use of freedom implies the duty to help others. With individual rights, come 
social duties. Respect for other's rights are a duty in conscience.26 Not only is there a 
need for a common security, but also a duty to promote social justice and public 
morality.27 
"Conscience has rights because it has duties. n2B 
26 Diff. ii. 274. 
%7 Vatican U uses the term ~public order" 10 cover the concept of~public peace" and ~public 
morality." Dignitalis Humanoe. 7. In The Conciliar and Post Conciliar Documenr~·. ed. Austin Aannery. O. 
P. (Northpon, NY: Costello Publishing Co.• 1988),801. 
21 Diff. ii. 250. 
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CHAPTER XVI 
WAS NEWMAN TOO LIBERAL? 
And, I rejoice to say, to one great mischief 
[the spirit of Liberalism in religion] 
I have from the first opposed myself 
Biglietto Speech 
A year before his death in 1890, John Henry Newman made a short, fonnal 
speech in Rome when he received the ticket swnmoning him to be invested as a cardinal 
of the Catholic Church.. hence called the Biglietto speech. "This great occasion" gave the 
future Cardinal Newman the opportunity to weigh his every word before a world 
audience. The main point ofhis speech.. however, was his joy on having from the 
beginning "opposed the spirit ofLiberalism in religion...1 
How do these concluding thoughts on Liberalism stand in relation to the 
remainder ofNewman's life as a champion of conscience? How do we define this 
I My Campaign in Ire/and, 393-400. 
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philosopher of religion whom people also considered, according to Pope Leo XIII. "too 
liberal,,?2 
A lot depends, ofcourse, on what we understand by "liberal," and what Newman 
understood by"liberal.,,3 Is there a continuity or a break between this BigUefln speech 
and Newman's understanding of liberty ofconscience in the Lefler to the Dulce of 
Norfolk? So, let us first examine what Newman did say in that last Biglietto speech and 
then try to read it in the context of his other writings in defense of the supremacy of 
conscience. If so, then we may possibly understand Newman's "Liberalism." 
The Liberalism condemned by Newman in the Biglietto speech was defined as 
"the docnine that there is no positive truth in religion.·,.s Therefore. Newman thought that 
there was a certain religious tolerance solely based on the ideology that religion is a 
merely subjective feeling, and, hence. a solely personal affair with no social 
consequences. 
This "liberal" view and its consequences led to Newman's lament that 
Christianity was no longer the law of the land Before, the civil power had been Christian 
with religion the bond ofsociety. No longer. (n like fashion, education, once under the 
authority and teaching of the Church, has now become totally secular. understanding 
secularism as the ideology of excluding religion. 
Calling this event an ....apostasia." Newman found three reasons behind it. 
1 W xxix. 426.
 
J See Chapter V above.
 
•	 All unreferenced quotes are from the Biglielto speech.
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First, Newman distinguished between the infidelity which may be the result of 
Liberalism and the infidelity which is its root. "Infidelity" was understood by Newman as 
disbeliefor atheism. In Newman's mind., the root of LiberaIism in England was not the 
disbelief of other countries, but rather the desire ofEnglish religious "sects" over three 
centuries to separate Church and State. Newman called this "unChristianising of the 
monarchy" not a blessing, as sects had it, but a "catastrophe." 
Second., Newman saw the advent of so many sects as pushing society to act in 
disregard of religious principles. [f society is to be democratic and representative. it is 
impossible to act in recognition ofany specific religious denomination. To achieve 
harmony, religion must be excluded., noted Newman. 
Every dozen men taken at random whom you meet in the streets have a 
share in political power, -when you inquire into their fonns of belief, 
perhaps they represent one or other ofas many as seven religions~ how can 
they possibly act together in municipal or in national matters, ifeach 
insists on the recognition of his own religious denomination? 
Finally, Newman recognized that Liberalism is attractive to people of diverse age 
and background., precisely because there is a lot of good in it. The array of human virtues, 
such as liberty, equality, and justice, proclaimed therein, is justly acclaimed by all. 
However, Newman considered this attraction of true virtues "a device of the Enemy ... 
so carefully framed." 
All of the above would seem a clear indication that Newman was in tavor of the 
confessional State in his last famous speech. Liberalism, for Newman, was the "ruin of 
many souls." However, our reading ofhis Letter /0 the Duke ofNorfolk in the previous 
chapter, his very life as found in the Apologia. and the philosophy of religion developed 
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in the Grammar ofAssent, point to a clear supremacy ofconscience over State Religion. 
Is there a contradiction? 
Another way ofunderstanding Liberalism would be respect for individual 
freedoms as its essence. Newman's speech and his earlier life and writings seem at odds. 
How can we possibly combine them? Is the Big/ielto speech a step backwards in his 
defense of conscience? Or, in the line of his historical analysis ofChristianity in An 
Essay on the Development ofChristian Doctrine, may we affirm an organic development 
in Newman's thought on liberty of conscience? 
However, first let us clearly see what Newman understood by Liberalism vis-a-vis 
the union ofChurch and State. Liberalism, in the Big/iello speech, was reducing religion 
to the individual's personal life as if it were just an opinion and fancy with neither 
objective content nor social consequences. In this basic principle, Newman saw the evil 
ofLiberalism. On the contrary, if religion does have an objective truth independent of 
one's personal opinion, even individual religious conviction should have a social impact. 
In accord with this logic, Christianity can be the law of the land. the fabric of society, the 
religion of the monarchy. So, if one is convinced as a Christian to love one's neighbor, 
then one lives in society in accord with this value, wrote Newman. 
This understanding ofChristianity being the law of the land does not necessarily 
mean an imposition ofChristianity on unbelievers. Rather, the Christian needs to live 
socially according to his faith: to feed the hungry, give drink to the thirsty, welcome the 
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stranger, clothe the naked, take care of the sick, and visit the prisoner.5 So, logically, 
even the laws enacted will reflect these Christian principles. For example, if a people are 
Christian. their laws and society would be in accord with Christian principles on help for 
the hungry, suffering, immigrants, poor, sick., and, ofcourse, infants and children. The 
latter is a far cry from coercion in religion on dissenters. 
Accordingly, secular education, criticized by Newman for excluding God, is 
likewise not considered an evil in itself because of the virtues it extols, but, rather, 
precisely because it anathematized religion. Newman's problem with secularism is that it 
is a ~Liberalism" which excludes God and religion from education. However, in its 
totality secularism does have human virtues, such as justice, veracity and benevolence. In 
the Big/ietto speech., Newman said: 
It is not till we find that this array of principles is intended to supersede, to 
block out, religion, that we pronounce it to be evil.6 
So, religion in education is neither a coercion of religious belief on students nor 
an exclusion of religion from the classroom. Rather, it would be the acceptance by the 
believer ofhis Church's authority and teaching in the religious sphere. What Newman 
rejected was an educational system that excluded religious expression and doctrine. 
So, Newman's lament in the Big/ietto speech was not in favor of a Christian 
coercion, but rather in favor ofa Christian social and academic consciousness. Then, are 
the principles of liberty ofconscience taught in the Letter /0 the Duke ofNorfolk 
, Mr. 25:32-46. 
• Campaign 399. 
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contradictory to the Big/ietto speech? Ifwe understand Christianity being the law of the 
land in both documents in the perspective of religion having a social element due to the 
fact that it is objective, then there is freedom of speech, thought, and religion. At the 
same time, society prohibits public immoralities like infanticide.7 The civil power, 
monarchy or other, can be Christian, which does not Imply that it forces non-Christians to 
be Christian in belief. Rather, being Christian implies Christians follow Christian moral 
principles in society. 
Ofcowse, the question on social liberties can be turned around. Does being 
Christian. either as an individual or in society, imply respect for others in their 
conscience, and, therefore, rights ofconscience and religion'f Was official Church 
persecution ofdissenters not a one-sided misreading ofChristianity, due to unchristian 
influences on Church members?9 
So, ultimately, our question remains: did Newman's philosophy ofconscience in 
the final Big/ietlo speech imply: 
1. A religiously neutral State. 
2. or a religiously confessional State? 
7 Diff. ii. 274. 
a See John Locke, ~A Letter Concerning Toleration" On Polilicsand Educa1ion. (Roslyn, NY: 
Classics Club. 1947). Locke began by aflinning "toleration to be the chiefcharacteristic mark of the true 
Church." 21. Cf Vatican II, ~From the very beginnings ofthe Cburch the disciples ofChriS! strove to 
convert men to confess Christ as Lord, not however by applying coercion 01' with use of techniques 
unworthy of the GospeL" DignilOtis Humonae, II, Flannery, &08. 
9 Locke. 48, 63. Cf this writer. "Religious Liberty: Newman defends Aquinas." Brm/iffBriefly. 
(Dec. 1994),10-11. 
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This religiously confessional State could either be: 
a) A State which is Christian in its laws, rulers and society, while respectful of 
other religions because of a duty of respect for conscience. 
b) A confessional State tolerant of other religions as a lesser evil. 
c) A confessional State, tolerant of no other religion, since error has no rights. 
The implication from Newman's philosophy of religion in the Letter to the Duke 
ofNorfolk is that a neutral State had to come about due to "cultivation of the intellect" 
and the needed political harmony based on consensus. 10 In this case, religious pluralism 
is a necessity growing from education, and certainly not per se an evil. This philosophical 
ethic flows from Newman's teaching on the duty of following even a culpably erroneous 
conscience as representing the voice ofGod. II This would seem to be a religiously 
neutral State. 
However, in the Biglietto speech, the emphasis is more on a State which should 
be Christian but is tolerant of sects for the sake of social peace, as seen above in this 
chapter. In the philosophical analysis of tolerance in this speech, following erroneous 
consciences "may be the ruin of many souls." The latter seems to favor a confessional 
State tolerant of other religions as a lesser evil. How can other religions be considered 
evil and following them the ruin ofa person's soul - Biglietto speech - iffollowing 
conscience is a right and a duty as in Newman's earlier writings? 
10 DifI. ii. 267. 
\I Ibid. 259. 
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To help US solve this riddle, let us look at other somces ofNewman's teaching on 
conscience. Chmch and State. Features of Newman's criticism of what he referred to as 
the "Christian Theocracy» are to be found in two letters written in 1860 to T. W. Allies, 
then engaged upon his book The Formation ofChrislendom (1865). The tendency of 
Newman's criticism is to give a religious backing to the idea of a religiously neutral State. 
Newman wrote: 
I do not see my way to hold that "Catholic Civilization," as you descnbe 
it, is in fact (l do not say in the abstract). but in fact, has been, or shall be. 
or can be. a good or per se desirable. 12 
Newman's reason is that through this union ofChurch with society. the "world" 
invades the Chmch. The criterion. as in the BigJietto speech, is the salvation of souls. 
Again. the theological problem of whether an individual's soul is saved or not depends 
on one's philosophy of conscience. If we understand Newman as saying that fidelity to 
even a culpably erroneous conscience is fidelity to God, then the salvation ofsouls is tied 
to a person's fidelity to conscience. Neither a merely legal recognition ofChristianity by 
the State or an adhesion to Christianity by society as a whole are at issue here. Hence, 
Newman, in a second letter to Allies. concluded: 
(Since) the object ofChristianity is to save souls: I ask, Have we reason to 
suppose that more souls were saved (relatively to the number of persons) 
under the Christian Theocracy than under the Roman Emperors. or the 
English Georges? 13 
\1 W xix. 421.
 
13 Ibid. 422.
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In a letter to Lord Acton, Newman gave another twist to the mutual influence of 
Church and State under the Roman Emperors. Newman considered Christianity as in fact 
beginning the emancipation of individual freedom of religion from State control: 
But did not Christianity itself commence the emancipation of the 
individual mind by infonning the law of conscience and of faith? Were 
not the Martyrdoms in the first centuries a portentous novelty, bringing in 
a new world? and did not Hosius, Hilary ... follow up that heroic 
revolution by their free words and acts in a matter of opinion, in defiance 
ofemperors?l~ 
Coming back to the nineteenth century, Newman, in connection with the religious 
persecution in Spain, wrote: 
I am not at all sure that it would not be better for the Catholic religion 
everywhere, if it had no very different status from that which it has in 
England There is so much corruption, so much deadness ... when a 
dogmatic faith is imposed on a nation by law, that I like freedom better. 15 
This comparison with England brings us back to the parallel in the Letter to the 
Duke ofNorfolk whereby he considered the Pope not writing anything contrary to British 
law on individual freedoms at the time. How can we read this together with the Biglietto 
speech? Laws, the monarchy, and society should be Christian, but being Christian does 
not imply imposing faith on others. On the contrary, being Christian would imply respect 
for conscience, linked to socia! justice, peace, and public morality mentioned in the 
I' Newman to Acton. 16 June 1877: W xxviii. 206. 
" 17 June 1863; W xx. 477. 
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Leller. 16 Moreover, giving a specific religion the backing offorce may involve "lire and 
sword" as "instruments to convince men's minds of error." 17 
An ultimate solution to Newman's paradox in his philosophy ofconscience in the 
Big/iello speech and his earlier writings may lie in the philosophical distinction between 
the real and the abstract, the concrete and the universaL'S Two remarks, made almost 15 
years before the Biglietto speech. both of around the same date, show Newman pulled in 
opposite directions as to the ideal and the real relation between Church., State, and 
conscience. 
In June 1863, he wrote: 
I should call myself an Anti-Liberal, because, in harmony with the Pope's 
syllabus, I should say that the best thing ofall is to have a Unity of 
religion in a country and that so real that its Ascendancy is but the 
expression of the universal mind. 19 
However, in the same year, he said: 
\. Diff. ii. 27()'275 
17 locke. 33. Vatican U speaks of"lechniques unworthy of the Gospel." Dignifatis Humanae. II, 
Flannery,808. 
I. GA215.
 
'9 W xx. 477.
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Though it be true abstractedly that the true religion alone is to be allowed., 
yet in the concrete it is allowable to wish that there should be a general 
toleration of all religions. 20 
Hence, Newman's toast. No doubt he was loyal to the Pope in accord with his 
faith, but the first requisite of all religious belief is conscience. 
:zo The Theological Papers ofJohn Henry Newman on Biblical Inspiration and Infallibility, ed. I. 
Derek Holmes, (Oxford: 1969), 101. 
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CHAPTER XVII 
CONCLUSION 
This liberation [of the whole human race]
 
cannot be reduced to its social and political aspects,
 
but rather reaches its fullness in the exercise of freedom of conscience,
 
the basis and foundation ofall other human rights.
 
John Paul II, Cuba. 1998
 
To understand Newman's toast to conscience, we have chosen a chronological 
development in order to have as an ultimate guiding interpretative principle his very life. 
Newman claims that 
a man's life lies in his letters. Biographers varnish; they assign motives; 
they conjecture feeling ... they palliate or defend. 1 
Nevertheless, this writer has claimed., based on the methods of the Essay. 
Apologia. and Grammar. that the best guide to Newman is Newman himself, as he lived 
his life. The strength of our essay on Newman lies in our abandoning an theories in favor 
ofliving facts The wide acclaim to the Apologia Pro Vila Sua, a historical 
I ill XlOri. 20.
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documentation in place of polemical rhetoric, proved the integrity ofNewman's 
conversions in conscience. Here we have tried to extend that approval to all his life as a 
toast to conscience, striking a careful balance between private judgment and religious 
authority. In Newman's words: 
Catholic Christendom is no simple exhibition of religious absolutism, but 
presents a continuous picture of Authority and Private Judgment 
alternately advancing and retreating as the ebb and low of the tide; - it is a 
vast assemblage of human beings with wilful intellects and wild passions, 
brought together into one by the beauty and the Majesty ofa Superhuman 
Power.2 
So, for example in regard to Catholicism, we noted his submission to Church 
authority once he was a believing Catholic, but it is clear that the same non-Catholic who 
began the DevelopmenJ ofDoctrine was as equally faithful to his conscience as the 
converted Catholic at its end. J Hence, this essay aims to be an Apologia Pro Dictu Suo 
(an Apology for his Toast): a toast to Newman's "personal guide" to Truth amid "ghosts" 
in darkness and ··shadows" in uncertainty.oJ The very facts ofhis life show his consistent 
faithfulness to conscience, the ""aboriginal vicar ofChrist..5 
Parallel to his life, our synthesis of Newman's thought on conscience followed the 
teaching of the Grammar. Conscience, being intellectual and emotional, judicial and 
critical, is both an inner light and a personal judgment. Since conscience links creature 
2 Apo. J94 
1 Ess. Advertisement to the First Edition. 
• GA 304. 
l Diff. ii 248.
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and creator, it possesses divine strength and human weaknesses. Conscience is together a 
moral sense and the voice ofa Master, living, personal, and Sovereign. Hence, we 
concluded that conscience, having the qualities ofan "immortal diamond.," ifwe wish to 
apply Newman's devotee, Gerard Manley Hopkin's metaphor, is both creative and 
receptive.6 Creative because it is personal; receptive because it is an assent. 
To see what Newman meant by liberty of conscience as reflected in his toast to 
conscience and then to the Pope, we took note of several nuances in the Leiter: Church 
and State have clear limits on a person's conscience, and infallibility has to do with 
general propositions while conscience has to do with practical dictates at the concrete 
level. Nevertheless the general trend of Newman's teaching is that the same God speaks 
to us through conscience and through religious authority. Conscience 
is a messenger from him, who, both in nature and in grace, speaks to us 
from behind a veil and teaches and rules us by his representatives. 7 
Hence it would seem impossible for there to be a theoretical conflict for a believer 
between his conscience and his Church. Since the dictates ofconscience and the truths of 
revelation both come from one and the same author, these internal and external monitors 
recognize and bear witness to each other. We are bound to obey both. However, that was 
Newman's whole point in the Leiter to the Duke ofNorfolk on an individual Catholic's 
6 The image ofselfas an ~immorta1 diamond" is from Hopkins' poem ~That Nature is a 
Heraclilean Fire andoflhe comfon ofthe Resurrection." in The Works ofGerardManely Hopkins (Ware. 
Hens: Wordswonh Editions, 1994),67. cr Bernadene Waterman Ward. ~ Newman's Grammar ofAssent 
and the Poetry ofGerard Manley Hopkins,~ Critical Essays on John Heruy Newman. ed. Ed Block. 
(VICtoria., BC: EngIisb Literary Studies, 1992), 39-54. 
7 Diff. ii 248. 
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freedom ofconscience in politics. Generally, obedience is due to authority, both Church 
and State, except in ''very rare" occasions when conscience "may prevail," under very 
precise conditions.8 
Then, the question of freedom ofconscience in theological reflection was raised by 
Newman in his treannent ofthe dogma of papal infallibility in the Letter co the Duke of 
Norfolk. Wherein the limits ofone and the other? Alongside that question, we noticed 
that the philosophy ofconscience as a natural faculty present in every individual does not 
coincide with beliefby all in the Catholic Church. Hence, not only is it feasible in 
conscience that someone seemingly becomes a Catholic and then leaves the Church,9 but 
Christianity itself is considered as a "complement" to natural religion. lO Hence, Newman 
stated the "most serious doctrine," 
the right and the duty of following that Divine Authority, the voice of 
conscience, on which in truth the Church herself is built. II 
So, we discussed Newman's argument in favor of conscientiously accepting Papal 
teaching or authority precisely because conscience has accepted the validity of those 
claims. [n Thomistic terminology, revelation presupposes and perfects natural religion. 12 
Religious authority, according to Newman. likewise presupposes and perfects natural 
• Ibid. 258.
 
9 GA200andlJev. 86.
 
10 Diff. ii 254.
 
II [bid. 252.
 
12 Summa Theo/agi«. l. q.l. a.8. ad 2, ~Cum enim graria non Iol/ar nalUram. sedperjiciat." 
(Since therefore pcc does not destroy nature, but perfects it.) 
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conscience. Religious obedience not based on conscience as an acceptance by the 
individual of certain truths is obviously empty. For example, in the case of the Catholic 
who leaves the Church because of the dogma of the Immaculate Conception, Newman 
notes that the person never accepted the "living authority" of the Church. If he did accept 
that authority he would conscientiously accept any future dogma. 13 But if external 
authority is taken away, the mind falls back of necessity upon that inward guide which it 
possessed even before Revelation was vouchsafed, that is, conscience searching for 
truth. ,~ 
So, if authority depends on its being accepted by conscience, and revelation is a 
complement to natural religion, we reasonably concluded with Newman that the 
knowledge acquired by conscience is personal and, in that sense, independent of what 
mayor may not be revealed by God. But, in the same token, conscience, by its very 
nature of seeking the will of God is obliged to form its judgments in accord with what it 
know to be from God. This is because each man's conscience is his lung needing oxygen: 
I am as little able to think by any mind but my own as to breathe with 
another's lungs. ls 
As an epilogue, the Biglietro speech took up the problem of conscience precisely in 
our theme of liberty of conscience. Newman's condemnation of Liberalism cast doubt on 
his defense of ··personal assent" and ··free inquiry" in the search for religious truth. His 
13 GA200 
'4 Dev.86. 
" GA304.
'---,
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treatment ofChurch and State therein cast ulterior light on our author's belief in both 
truth and conscience. 
Catholicism, for Newman, is for all "with an eye and a heart for the truth".16 In a 
Catholic perspective, the opposite oflibeny of conscience, the psychological pressure 
and physical coercion of religious intolerance, shows the need for force and fear to 
promote falsehood and tyranny.17 Hence, precisely because a toast to the Pope comes 
from free inquiry in theology and personal assent in conscience, we argued that Newman 
rightly gave first priority to conscience over authority, as the proximate norm for human 
conduct. Conscience is, therefore, norma normans normata (a binding law that is itself 
bound). However, this proximate norm is of itself in constant search of truth and 
holiness, which are found in God., his revelation and his representatives. 18 
So, the ultimate conclusion of this dissertation is that Newman's doctrine on, and 
life according to, conscience ultimately lead to an understanding oflibeny of conscience, 
as later taught by Vatican II in the Declaration on Religious Liberty: 
• "It is in accordance with their dignity that all, because they are persons ... 
are both impelled and bound to seek the truth...19 
16 GA295. 
17 See his reflections on the use ofrepression., rather than instruction., in Italy. W xix. 40 I. 
Ii Diff. ii. 248 
.. Vatican II, DignilQlis Humana. ft. 2. In The Conciliar and Post Conciliar DocumenlS. eel. 
Austin Flaunery. O. P. (Nonhport. NY: Costello Publishing Co., 1988).801. 
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• "But men cannot satisfy this obligation ... Wlless they enjoy both psychological 
freedom and immunity from external coercion..,20 
• "The search for truth must be carried by free inquiry with the help of teaching 
or instruction, communication and dialogue."zl 
• "It is by personal assent that men must adhere to the truth they have 
discovered ..22 
• "However, in forming their consciences the faithful must pay careful attention 
to the sacred and certain teaching of the Church.,,2J 
Our reading of Newman states that there is both a duty to search for truth and a duty 
to respect the search of others for truth. Hence, in accord with Vatican II, Newman 
postulated tree inquiry and persooal assent for oneself and for others. This double 
understanding of liberty ofconscience as implying freedom of thought, speech, and action 
will, I nope, be wb.at we have found in our study ofNewman as he "wrote, argued 89d 
acted."Z4 
This positive affirmation ofNewman on liberty ofconscience may be coupled with 
his negative warnings. In fact, Vatican II not only considers it ''wrong'' for authorities to use 
force or fear in religious matters, but also declares the right ofall to be immune from coercion 
20 Ibid.
 
21 DignitatisHumanae., n. 3. Flannery, 800.
 
n Ibid.
 
2J DigrritQ/is Humonat!, n. 14. Flannery.811.
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00 the part of"individuals, social groups and every human power."25 Newman's conviction 
of the need for "full liberty ofthought"Z6 detennined him to fight against the "espionage, 
denunciation and terrorism"27 ofa "Church within a Church"28 which "dares to speak in the 
name of the Pope." 29 
To the CODven Emily Bowles, who urged him to speak out 00 the doctrinal 
development of papal infallibility, Newman compared his writing to "dancing on the tight 
rope some hundred feet ti"om the grOtmd.,,30 For Newman saw some "trembling" at freedom 
ofthought. Leo XIII's CardinalJ1 feared the Church slipping into a sort of Novatianisrn, a 
shrinking into ourselves and narrowing Ihe lines ofcommunion, using lhe language of despair 
and disarray at the prospect before us. 32 
lfltimately, we consider Newman an aulhentic visionary of Vatican II and we "feel no 
temptation at all to break in pieces the great legacy ofthougbt thus committed to us for these 
latter days."H Conscience in freedom led him on the road to Rome. Joining his praise for the 
'" DignitaLis Humanae, 2. Flannery, 800. 
,. Diff. ii. 78-79. 
27 W lOCiii.193. 
28 Ibid. 216. 
29 Ibid. 193. 
]0 W xxii. 215.216. 
31 MMy Cardinal! it was not easy, it was not easy. They said be was too liberal but I bad 
determined to honour the Church in honouring Newman." W xxilt. 426. 
11 Ibid. 305. 
3] Apo. 193. 
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~noble and independent" Bishop Dupanloup, we approve his cowage of "daring to do what 
we think right.,,34 
John Henry affinned at the beginning of the Letter 10 Ihe Dulce ofNorfo/Ic that both 
the Scho/a Theo/ugorum and time detennine the force and interpretation of papal and 
synodal utterances. J5 Our hope is that the work of scholars will further clarify Newman's 
thought on liberty and truth, authority and conscience. 
].I W xxiii. 396.
 
), Diff. ii. 176.
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